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Preface 
This book originated in a series of research papers and discussions convened by 
the Institute of Policy Studies in 2007. The discussions involved a variety of 
academics and practitioners chaired by Colin James. Following the seminars, 
Colin wrote an extensive note of the topics discussed and the emerging 
conclusions. That note has been a valuable inspiration to this text. 
Having received Colin’s paper, Andrew Ladley, the then director of the 
Institute of Policy Studies, worked with his colleague Nicola White to write an 
assessment of changing constitutional understandings of parliament and its role. 
Andrew made a start on a text with the intention that he and Nicola would 
complete it as a joint draft. However, other priorities intervened and both 
intended authors moved on from the institute, leaving a draft of an introductory 
chapter and an outline for the proposed text. Key within that proposal was 
Andrew’s formulation of the iron rule of political conflict; that was at the heart 
of the book as proposed and remains central to the book as completed. 
In late 2009, Jonathan Boston, the current director of the Institute of Policy 
Studies, commissioned me to take the available material and complete a 
manuscript for publication. This book has grown beyond the plans of the 
previous proposed authors, but I still owe a huge debt to Colin, Andrew and 
Nicola for the earlier work. 
The main shift I have brought to the work is to focus not on parliament 
itself, but on the relationship between parliamentarians and public servants. 
(Judges are there too; it turns out there are more than two parties in the 
relationship between officials and politicians.) Similarly, though constitutional 
issues are covered, this text focuses more on the pressures on people as they 
work in different parts of government. That reflects my own background as a 
public servant with long (it felt like forever) experience of working with 
parliamentarians. 
Though the resulting text is a practitioner’s document, reflecting personal 
experience, it is not a memoir. I aim to share my knowledge, but I am not 
sharing confidences. There is only one place where I have used a personal 
recollection, and in that example I have gained the agreement of the member of 
parliament concerned before publishing the incident. 
The text outlines a simple theory of factors that drive the relationship 
between politicians and public servants, and it draws out the practical 
implications of that theory by means of case studies. In selecting these case 
studies I looked for recent examples, and to ensure objectivity I have generally 
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selected cases where I had no or little involvement. The exception is the case 
study about the advice to negotiating parties in 1996; that is the only occasion 
when officials have played such a role so I had to use it even though I was 
actively involved as a senior Treasury officer at the time. 
Far from relying on inside knowledge, this book is almost entirely drawn 
from publicly available material. In New Zealand the combination of the 
Official Information Act 1982 and very good departmental websites means 
much is available on any topic. In Part One, the emphasis is on developing the 
theory that drives the text, so it is not heavily sourced. But Parts Two and Three 
deal with the application of those theories to real incidents, and I have attempted 
to substantiate the facts of each example. Much is drawn from media coverage, 
a great deal from official websites, and a small amount from requests for 
information from departmental records. In that process I have been very 
impressed by the quality of record-keeping in government departments and the 
work that has gone in to making material available on the internet – hence the 
dedication of this book. 
Many have contributed to this book. Most important are Colin James, 
Nicola White and Andrew Ladley, whose earlier drafting has shaped my 
thinking. Some of Andrew’s drafting has survived into this book and he is 
acknowledged as the joint author of two chapters. I am very grateful to him and 
the other two for their efforts. 
The first contributor to the book was the Emerging Issues Programme; this 
is a fund provided by government departments to support research into issues of 
the day. Since this text goes as far back as 1215, it may seem odd to think of 
parliament as being emergent, but a theme of this text is that parliament 
constantly adapts and so this project qualifies for support within the programme. 
The Institute of Policy Studies is grateful for the continuing partnership and 
support that is offered through the Emerging Issues Programme. 
Government departments have given significant support to the development 
of the case studies. Permission to access information for case studies was given 
by the Secretary for Education (special education), State Services Commissioner 
(government formation), Secretary for Justice and Chief Parliamentary Counsel 
(Real Estate Agents Bill), Secretary to The Treasury (imprest), and 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (select committee inquiry). I am particularly 
thankful for the special efforts by staff in those departments as follows:  
Jan Breakwell and Brian Coffey (Ministry of Education), Hugh Oliver and 
Malcolm Macaskill (State Services Commission), Alan Bell (Ministry of 
Justice), Fiona Leonard (Parliamentary Counsel Office), Marcus Jackson and 
Peter Lorimer (The Treasury), David Shanks (formerly Inland Revenue 
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Department, now Ministry of Social Develoment) and Peter Newell (Inland 
Revenue Department). 
Several people gave up time over Christmas to read a near final draft; I am 
grateful for the comments and suggestions they offered. Some were happily in 
contradiction to the comments that others made; that seemed to leave me with 
freedom to make my own choices. In other cases, the comments were 
emphatically uniform and I bowed to superior wisdom. I offer thanks for this 
service to Jonathan Boston, Matthew Palmer, Vernon Small, Chris Eichbaum, 
Derek Gill, Nicola White, Andrew Ladley, Lesley Bagnall and Sam Prebble. 
Any remaining mistakes must have been inserted after those readers checked the 
text and they are absolved of any responsibility. 
I am much indebted to the staff and contractors of the Institute of Policy 
Studies. Jonathan Boston first suggested to me that I take on this task and has 
provided warm (and critical) support and advice throughout. Zoë Lawton, an 
intern at the Institute of Policy Studies, has acted as research assistant; she has 
been very prompt in finding legal cases, newspapers, Hansards and files and has 
checked every reference. Zoë has been a great help, saving me many weeks’ 
work. Belinda Hill and Victor Lipski provided prompt and precise service as 
editors, Diane Lowther did an excellent job creating the index, and Kevin 
Scarlett at Milne Print did the lay-out work for the cover. 
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1 
Introduction 
The business of government involves many people attending to a variety of 
duties.1 Control of those processes comes from Wellington, which acts like a 
committee in continuous session.2
                                                 
1 The first draft of this introduction was by Andrew Ladley; some of his prose survives in this 
longer chapter. 
2 I am grateful to Jas MacKenzie for this analogy. He used it when recruiting me to join the public 
service in the 1970s; unaccountably, it attracted me into government service. 
 Various subcommittees form and re-form; 
sometimes as working groups, sometimes as officials’ committees and 
sometimes as ministerial or parliamentary groupings. The topics shift through a 
constantly rotating agenda covering food standards, tax rates, military 
deployments, threatened species, tyre tread-depths, and anything else of general 
interest to society. Reports, memos and emails move between the different 
participants as they seek to inform and influence. 
The participants in that committee are colloquially known as ‘suits’, but 
various groups can be identified within that population. One of the most distinct 
groups of those involved in the broad process of government is parliament, 
which consists of around 120 members. A much bigger and less distinct group is 
officialdom, or what is loosely called the public service; there are tens of 
thousands of public servants in Wellington. From those numbers it would seem 
obvious which group might prevail in any test of strength between parliament 
and the public service. And indeed the result of any such contest is predictable: 
parliament wins every time. That is right and proper because the public service 
exists in a supporting role to parliament. 
Constitutional purists will be dismayed to see the relationship between 
parliament and the public service expressed in this way. The two may both be 
parts of the overall machinery of government, but they are within different 
branches of government. Parliament is the legislature and the public service is 
part of the executive; the public service does not serve parliament. The public 
service works for ministers and ministers account to parliament. The public 
service can be said to support parliament only in the sense that all three legs of a 
three-legged stool must be in place for any leg to stand. But taxonomic purity is 
not the point of this book. 
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Though the intention is to be correct, the aim is to explain lucidly, rather 
than expound pedantically. For example, the strict constitutional meaning of 
parliament is the House of Representatives (including the clerk of the House) 
plus the Queen (or governor-general). Here it means what most people mean: 
the 120 (or so, depending on the electoral arithmetic) members of parliament 
(MPs) who make and change governments, and make and change statutes. 
Similarly, several dozen people (including former state services commissioners) 
can precisely define the limits of the public service and can go on to expand on 
the other categories of state servants in New Zealand. In this book, however, the 
public service means what most of the public would understand: it refers to 
officials working in the various agencies of government. Where the distinctions 
between groups matter, they are explained in context. 
That pragmatic approach also characterises parliament in New Zealand. 
Parliament is of course an institution at the centre of political power and 
governance – it makes (and unmakes) governments, it authorises taxation and 
expenditure, it makes law, and it is shaped by myriad rules of varying degrees of 
formality. But it is also a living process, constantly in motion, evolving in small 
ways. It is a human institution – with very New Zealand characteristics. 
The public service is one of the groups that interact with parliament in the 
overall process of government. But the behaviours and attitudes seen in the 
public service are often so different from those shown by parliamentarians that 
they can seem to be different branches of humanity. Contacts between the 
essentially political culture of parliament and the managerial and bureaucratic 
culture of the public service are a central feature of the process of government in 
New Zealand. This book attempts to unravel the confusions that can arise 
between these two groups at the heart of government. 
Both groups tend to favour pragmatism over theoretical purity, but their 
work is dominated by a big picture of historically derived constitutional 
principle, of constant party-political contest and a clash of cultures. That big 
picture shapes how the political contest can impact on non-political public 
servants.3
                                                 
3 A political scientist would say that a public servant’s work is political; the correct term to 
convey non-involvement in party politics is non-partisan. But in New Zealand the public service 
generally uses the term non-political and it is used here. 
 Practitioners in parliament’s processes (elected representatives, 
parliamentary officials, public servants, the press and the surrounding layers of 
civil society) are daily players, focused on the moment. For a public servant 
preparing answers for a minister to an oral question, or appearing before a select  
 
Introduction 
 3 
committee, there is unlikely to be time for anything other than delivery as best 
as possible under pressure. But all this daily activity takes place within a 
constitutional framework anchored by principles. Foremost of these principles is 
that an executive (the cabinet, commonly called the government) is formed from 
elected MPs, making it responsible and accountable to the House and thence to 
the people of New Zealand. 
That bedrock also frames the ongoing political contest which parliament 
embodies. Being responsible and accountable to the House, and thence to the 
voters, has created an unwritten iron rule of political contest (the iron rule), 
which often surprises new MPs in its intensity, but is soon branded indelibly on 
their psyches. Its quadruple formulation is as follows.4
• The opposition is intent on replacing the government. 
 
• The government is intent on remaining in power. 
• MPs want to get re-elected. 
• Party leadership is dependent on retaining the confidence of colleagues 
(which is shaped by the first three principles). 
There is nothing wrong or deplorable about the fact of political contest. 
Though this democratic competition might seem to detract from some Olympian 
ideal of caring and dispassionate government, it is good that people should 
come to government with passion. It is through the competition for power that 
the competition of ideals and skill is played out. 
It is in the nature of the political contest that it involves MPs, aspiring MPs, 
their political staff and their political supporters. It is definitely not the business 
of non-political public servants. But the regular reality is that public servants are 
affected by the political contest, often to their surprise and confusion. They are 
non-political, but every day of the week there are some who have to cope with 
politics. That continuing culture clash plays out in ‘the everyday paradox’, 
which is formulated as follows. 
• All public servants are non-political members of the executive, so they are 
not involved in the political contest. 
• But all public servants are accountable to their minister who is an MP and 
is accountable to parliament for their work (some are indirectly accountable 
to a minister through their board). 
                                                 
4 This formulation of the iron rule was devised by Andrew Ladley, and any further use of it should 
be attributed to him. 
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• Therefore, it is inevitable and commonplace that officials are swept up into 
parliamentary contests. 
Politicians operate under the iron rule of political contest. That shapes their 
culture and their approach to their work. Public servants are administrators who 
come from a managerial culture. Generally, it matters little that mutual 
incomprehension is common. But incomprehension can turn to frustration and 
fear when the operation of the everyday paradox sweeps the public servant into 
the foreign culture of politics. 
Both politicians and officials can find themselves in foreign parts when 
their actions are reviewed in court. The judiciary is the third branch of 
government; it ensures that excesses of populism or bureaucracy are kept within 
the law. As it does that it introduces a third culture to the mix. Although the 
primary focus in the book is on MPs and officials, the role of judges must be 
considered because they have a strong influence on both groups. 
The goal of this book is to add somewhat different perspectives to the body 
of literature about the House and New Zealand political and constitutional 
issues. The magisterial publications by a former clerk of the House, David 
McGee,5
A smaller body of work exists about the operations of the public service. 
Often this work draws on management theory to explain processes or describes 
structures by reference to the central laws that set up the state services, 
including the State Sector Act 1988.
 dominate the landscape regarding the practical rules and principles by 
which the House itself works. Detailed studies have been made about how 
proportional representation has affected all elements of parliament, including 
coalitions and legislation. And of course, academics, current and former MPs, 
public servants closely connected to the Beehive or the House, and a cluster of 
politically wired journalists participate in, and think and write about, daily 
events, trends and developments. 
6
Legal texts on the constitution describe where parliament fits within the 
structure of government. This book does focus on aspects of the law, but it does 
not claim to be a legal authority. Professor Joseph is the current New Zealand 
authority, and his book is referred to as necessary.
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5 McGee (2005).  
6 See, for example, Scott (2001). 
7 Joseph (2007). For those with the time to absorb 1,300 pages, and $200 to spare, I strongly 
recommend Joseph’s book as a fascinating read. Alternatively, Palmer and Palmer (2004) is 
similarly authoritative and a little more accessible.  
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Unlike those other sources, this book looks at parliament with an emphasis 
on how its work influences the public service. The picture that emerges is of a 
many-faceted institution, at the centre of the power structure of the state but also 
constrained in many formal and informal ways. Its reach is octopus-like, but 
also tentative. It is respected but also ridiculed and at times despaired of. It is 
the focus of those who want to make a difference, but are frustratingly resistant 
to crusades. It is an imperfect and blunt translator of the people’s wishes and 
hopes, and a confusing cauldron of different perspectives, beliefs and argument, 
as well as the theatre in which the nation plays out the ongoing contest for the 
right to wield political power. 
To the extent that New Zealand draws on the United Kingdom heritage, 
parliament is an ancient institution. In form it would be clearly recognisable if 
fairy-tale MPs were to wake up after a century and walk into the chamber. 
Sometimes changes have been reasonably dramatic, as with the electoral system 
in 1993. But mostly change is gradual, incremental and not particularly 
noticeable for all but the most dedicated of watchers or players. Parliament is a 
living, adaptive institution, shaped by the pragmatic mores and needs of a 
practical people in a small polity, interconnected with the world. For all the 
texts setting out rules and analysis, there is, in short, no textbook parliament. 
The public service is similarly hard to comprehend, mainly because of its 
size and operational complexity. The variety of tasks undertaken by the public 
service runs from collecting taxes to disbursing benefits, from advising on new 
laws to monitoring fishing boats, and from maintaining archives to protecting 
national parks. Its activities are ordered in a hierarchical system, under the 
responsibility of ministers, and using authority granted by parliament. This book 
seeks to explain that authority, its origins and its implications for the operation 
of a modern government system. 
But, though this book includes some exploration of the culture of the public 
service (and of the legal profession), this is only partial; there is an emphasis on 
the contrast between the public service culture and the parliamentary culture. 
The underlying goal is to explain the confusions that arise when officials 
approach the political world of parliament. The equally interesting issues of the 
frustrations and confusions endured by ministers as they deal with officials,8 or 
the ways a public service culture may become self-serving9
                                                 
8 Palmer (2008, pp 243–244) says they speak different languages. 
9 This is covered extensively in The Treasury (1987).  
 are not part of this 
study. This focus on the interaction with politicians may create an impression 
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that the political work of parliamentarians is in some sense less worthy than the 
managerial approach of officials; no such impression is intended. 
Although there is room for improvement, there is much to respect about 
parliament and its members. All New Zealanders should be proud of this 
institution. Its members collectively set out to work for the benefit of the nation. 
They often fail, but that is not for lack of effort or application. Of course they 
fail; if public policy were easy, it would not be needed. Not only do 
parliamentarians grapple with the hardest issues of the day, but they do it in a 
wilfully difficult way: through politics in an open, democratic contest. 
Democracy is complex and demanding, but it eclipses any of the attractions of 
technocratic efficiency. The focus on the strains that may arise between officials 
and politicians is not meant to imply that something is amiss; on the contrary, 
the strains are evidence of two groups working under the contradictory 
disciplines of their respective roles. That is how it is supposed to be; the process 
of democratic government is not supposed to be easy. 
The book has three main parts. Part One covers the framework of 
constitutional context, political contest and culture clash. Part Two puts 
parliament into its modern context as a source of the law in New Zealand; that is 
critical for officials because obeying the law is the first responsibility of public 
servants. Part Three focuses on how parliament performs its functions, and the 
implications of that for officials. 
 Part One 
Principle, Contest and Clash: 
The basics 
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Introduction to Part One 
The regular processes of government involve politicians and administrators 
continually trying to handle the issues of the day. The politician may be 
preoccupied by the need to defend a policy on television later that day, and the 
official may be concerned about the morale of staff whose careers will be 
influenced by the same policy. But as they deal with these practical day-to-day 
events they are often unknowingly playing roles that are driven by three 
elements: constitutional principles, political contest and the clash of cultures 
between the political and the non-political. Each of these three elements needs 
to be teased out more fully. That is the purpose of Part One. 
A central part of that exposition is some history. That is because the 
principles that drive the constitution have not been extracted from some 
philosophical discourse; they were hammered out over centuries in arguments 
between monarchs, parliaments, ministers, courts and officials. Those 
arguments led to a series of resolutions as the arguing groups kissed and made 
up; or sometimes the resolution was that the loser was executed because people 
took arguments very seriously in those days. The resolutions of those various 
arguments became accepted practice. Those accepted practices have become the 
principles of the constitution. To understand how that happened requires a rapid 
review of events from the middle ages to the present. 
The process of political contest occurs in any democracy. This part 
examines the impact of that contest on parliament, its members, and its work. 
Finally, this part introduces the different cultures that have arisen in parliament 
and officialdom (partly as a result of respecting constitutional principles), and 
the confusion and clash that can arise as the two cultures meet. 
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2 
Constitutional Principles Come from History 
Jointly written with Andrew Ladley 
Constitutional basics 
The essence of the New Zealand constitutional system can be summarised as 
responsible and accountable government operating under the rule of law. All 
citizens, and especially public servants, need to understand what that means; 
once it is clear, the place of the public servant in the firmament, including her or 
his relationship to parliament and to the courts, will jump into focus. 
Confusingly for the outsider, there is no statute, charter or other document 
that allocates and confines governmental power using the words ‘responsible 
and accountable’ government. The closest one might get is the introductory 
description of the constitutional order set out by Sir Kenneth Keith in the 
Cabinet Manual,10
The expression ‘responsible and accountable’ means, in New Zealand, that 
government is based on the consent of the people expressed through elections 
that constitute the people’s representatives in parliament. A prime minister and 
cabinet, supported by the majority of those representatives on key matters, form 
the government of the day. That prime minister and cabinet are responsible and 
 which is drawn on here. Explaining the concepts relies on 
different sources and reveals different meanings. Only some of the meaning can 
be found in clear legal provisions. A great many key rules of the system are 
simply accepted experience on how things ought to operate, known as 
constitutional conventions. 
Parliament is at the centre of the constitutional framework, even though the 
executive branch (into which public servants fall) is a much bigger player. But 
size is not everything; the key is balance. The constitution works as a balanced 
system of overall governance, with institutions (and those making decisions 
within them) having zones of relative autonomy that are by definition limited. 
At various times some claim pre-eminence, but there is no unlimited power in 
New Zealand’s constitutional system. 
                                                 
10 Cabinet Office (2008). 
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accountable to parliament for the conduct of government, and through 
parliament they are responsible to the people. 
The idea that no power is without limit comes from the rule of law. That is, 
rather than any one institution or person having the power to make laws and 
then apply them without constraint, everyone must operate under the law. The 
limits to powers are to be found in law and in principles of fairness and respect 
for human dignity that are expected to be upheld by all holders of public office, 
by the people themselves and, in particular, by the courts. 
All government (that is, executive, parliamentary and judicial branches) is 
carried out in the name of Her Majesty the Queen, but this is subject to the 
notion that actual power, constitutive power, comes from the people of 
New Zealand and from the accumulated experience of centuries of common 
law. In that single sentence lies the history of the evolution of parliamentary 
government in Britain and its transplant and growth in New Zealand. Hence the 
Crown is, in New Zealand usage, shorthand for the government as a whole (as 
opposed to the government currently holding office, that is, the cabinet). 
Applying this to elaborate further on the layers of meaning, a fuller 
description of the constitutional order (set out in the Cabinet Manual) is as 
follows. 
• The Queen is the nominal (and residual) head of state, and executive power 
operates under the symbolism of the Crown. 
• The governor-general is the Queen’s representative living in New Zealand, 
but for all intents and purposes, including on foreign visits, functions as the 
New Zealand head of state. 
• The governor-general presides over the Executive Council, but does not 
actually rule; rather, he or she acts on advice on all matters. 
• This advice is the polite constitutional term that really means the instruction 
as to how the executive power of government is to be exercised, that is, 
instruction given by a prime minister and cabinet that is able to command 
the confidence of parliament. 
• Commanding the confidence of parliament is itself a term of art in the 
constitutional system – it means being able to get sufficient votes in the 
House of Representatives on confidence matters. Those are the budget that 
sets out how government is to be financed, and any other matter that is of 
such importance to the government that, if it did not secure sufficient votes, 
it should resign. 
Constitutional Principles Come from History 
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• The prime minister and cabinet are constantly responsible to the House by 
needing its consent to govern, and accountable to the House for how they 
govern. Through elections for parliament, the people ultimately decide on 
whether they approve of the government after a term of three years, or 
mandate other representatives to reconstitute a new government for the next 
three years. 
Below this constitutional construct, in a firmly subordinate role as part of 
the executive, are the various arms of the state services. The executive is one of 
the three branches of government. The legislature, the first branch, makes laws. 
The judiciary, the second branch, applies those laws to resolve disputes. The 
executive, the third branch, is all those other parts of the government system 
that actually do things, to people or for people, using the authority of the law. 
Ministers lead the executive and are accountable to parliament for the actions of 
the executive. Public servants, or officials, work within the executive under the 
responsibility of ministers. It is officials who generally exercise the real day-to-
day powers of government. Collecting taxes, running prisons and controlling the 
border are all done by public servants. Policing the streets and patrolling the 
oceans are done by uniformed branches of the state services. These powers are 
defined by the authority of parliament, and they are exercised under the scrutiny 
of the courts.11
                                                 
11 There are some Crown prerogatives, deriving from history, but these are not explored here. 
 
The principles of consent of the people and the rule of law dictate that the 
public servant must be subordinate to political leadership. This is expressed 
through the accountability of departmental chief executives to ministers (or, in 
the case of Crown entities generally through a board to the minister). The 
minister then accounts to parliament. 
Government is conducted in the name of the Queen, but by representatives 
chosen by the people. How formal power can notionally come from the head of 
state, but real power from the people and the law, is only understandable from 
the history that shows a gradual and irreversible democratisation of monarchical 
power, subject to the law. An outline of history explains the context that shapes 
parliament, the ongoing processes of adaptation, and how responsible and 
accountable government has become the essence. 
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Constitution Act 1986 
New Zealand’s parliament reflects its United Kingdom roots going back many 
centuries, and the institution has been growing in New Zealand’s culture for 
more than a century and a half. That institutional memory shapes how the New 
Zealand parliament works. A full historical account is obviously beyond the 
scope of this book. Here, the goal is to connect some of the key developments 
across the centuries, especially as they relate to the formation and export of the 
Westminster story.12
In constitutional terms, these simple provisions are sweeping. Bearing in 
mind that the New Zealand parliament was entirely created in 1852 by an Act of 
the United Kingdom parliament, the 1986 Act seizes all future authority to 
 The summary developed here is of course idiosyncratic, 
since its purpose is to show how the respectful balance between parliament, the 
political executive, the public service and the courts developed over centuries. 
It is useful to begin that historical summary with an immediate illustration 
of the absorption of that heritage into current governance as seen in 
New Zealand’s Constitution Act 1986. The key sections dealing with parliament 
carry the simplicity of continuity: 
14 Parliament 
(1) There shall be a Parliament of New Zealand, which shall consist 
of the Sovereign in right of New Zealand and the House of 
Representatives. 
(2) The Parliament of New Zealand is the same body as that which 
before the commencement of this Act was called the General 
Assembly (as established by section 32 of the New Zealand 
Constitution Act 1852 of the Parliament of the United Kingdom) 
and which consisted of the Governor-General and the House of 
Representatives. 
15 Power of Parliament to make laws 
(1) The Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full power to 
make laws. 
(2) No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the 
commencement of this Act shall extend to New Zealand as part of 
its law. 
                                                 
12 The British system of a cabinet drawn from and accountable to parliament is commonly called 
the Westminster system; the term comes from the Palace of Westminster, which is where the 
Houses of Parliament convene. 
Constitutional Principles Come from History 
 15 
control New Zealand’s constitution. The United Kingdom parliament, which 
established the New Zealand parliament, is disempowered by the New Zealand 
parliament from any further right to legislate for New Zealand. Lawyers, 
conditioned to demand a legal source for every power, might gasp. If parliament 
removes the source of its own authority, on what authority does the power of the 
New Zealand parliament stand? 
The answer is that the New Zealand parliament rests on the continuity of its 
history. It is the same body as its colonial (and then dominion) predecessor, 
except that it now recognises no external source for, or controlling, its power to 
make law. Parliament was, still is, and will continue to be. It is still a bit 
breathtaking; not because it sweeps away the past, but for the opposite reason. 
An Act passed in 1986 has ensured the New Zealand parliament is the successor 
to a tradition spanning several centuries. 
The 1986 Act marks the final confirmation of the legislative independence 
of the New Zealand parliament, or what is sometimes called full parliamentary 
sovereignty. And there is little in the 1986 Act to suggest that there are any 
domestic limits on the power of the New Zealand parliament to make law. Thus, 
there is no equivalent of the ringing terms of the United States Constitutional 
Amendments, which provide a string of limitations on the power of the United 
States congress to make law infringing on core rights of citizens, phrased 
simply, ‘Congress shall make no law [on]’. 
But none of this should suggest the absence of all limits so that a majority 
of members of parliament (MPs) in New Zealand could pass any law 
whatsoever and expect it to be implemented as such within New Zealand. This 
is discussed in Part Two, but here two perspectives are sufficient. First, it is 
more useful to see the New Zealand constitutional system as a set of balanced 
powers rather than to look for some sort of theoretical absolute power. Second, 
it is easier to understand the role of parliament in the New Zealand constitution 
as what happened, and what happens, rather than being too wedded to theory. 
In some countries, the passage of a Constitution Act might have been 
momentous. But this was an ordinary statute, with only one clause subject to 
any special procedure (setting the term of parliament at three years, and making 
this only amendable following a referendum of 50% of voters or a parliamentary 
vote carried by a 75% majority). In the New Zealand parliament, the 
Constitution Act appears to have been largely seen as reflecting existing 
constitutional form, along with pragmatic updates. The simplicity of 
section 15(2), providing that no Act of the United Kingdom could have effect in 
New Zealand law, marks the final cut with the power of the Westminster 
parliament to legislate for New Zealand, a power that had formally been 
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available from 1840 until this clause came into effect in 1986. This is classic 
New Zealand gradualism – the changes had taken place years before in practice, 
and the 1986 Act quietly recognised this in law. 
The real power of the Constitution Act 1986 is not so much in its 
constitutive effect as in its continuity. The broad principles of the distribution of 
power in New Zealand reflect those that evolved in Britain over nearly 1,000 
years and it is useful to outline the key developments that have affected the 
New Zealand constitutional framework. 
As outlined above, the heart of the British and New Zealand constitutions is 
that the monarch (or governor-general), in whose name the formal legal power 
of the state is exercised, does not control its use in practice but acts on advice of 
a cabinet with a democratic mandate, expressed through parliament. This came 
about through ancient battles for power. 
Impact of history 
Given the connected evolution of government in what is now the United 
Kingdom, there is no clear beginning to New Zealand’s constitutional history. 
Nevertheless, the tale can start in England in the 13th century.13
An example of how current institutions have their origins in 13th century 
structures can be seen in the development of independent courts of justice. The 
 
Most of the present institutions and functions of government did not exist, 
but there were nascent signs. Clearly the Crown existed and was embodied in a 
person with substantial power. The king was supported by a council, the Curia 
Regis. This council was appointed by the king, mostly from among the barons 
and senior clerics, and performed many functions. Sometimes it met to consider 
issues of tax and spending. In this function they were supported by the clerks of 
the exchequer (who used a checker board to keep track of finances). In this 
process the council tended to combine a judicial role by considering claims to 
resources and an administrative function by determining spending priorities. 
Eventually these roles separated into the Court of Exchequer and the Treasury. 
There was also an inner group, the Privy Council; this group was the origin of 
cabinet. The work of the council was assisted and recorded by clerks. These 
were generally priests or other members of religious orders, because the Church 
was the main centre of literacy. 
                                                 
13 This does not purport to be an original work of history, and no attempt has been made to find 
original sources. Any reader wishing to know more of these matters can refer to a wide variety 
of general histories. 
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origins of courts of common plea, which essentially applied the customs of the 
people, are lost in the mists of time. But the consolidation of the monarchy after 
the Norman invasion of 1066 saw increasing petitions for justice being made to 
the king. Accordingly, one of the functions of the Curia Regis was to hear cases. 
Council members sat with the king to hear legal claims. Eventually some 
members were appointed to carry out this function even in the king’s absence, 
and so the King’s Bench court was established. Gradually the advisory role 
became more and more independent from the monarch. Occasionally monarchs 
tried to re-assert their historical dominance in controlling judges. But by the end 
of the 17th century it was settled that the law should be administered impartially 
and not as an instrument of royal policy. 
Interestingly, the ancient source of the authority of judges as advisers to the 
monarch remained evident, even in New Zealand, until very recently. The Privy 
Council is still formally a committee that gives advice to the Queen, even in its 
judicial function. Thus, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decisions on 
New Zealand cases, while it was still our final court, concluded with the words, 
‘For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the 
appeal should be’. 
But, though the origins of some modern institutions were emerging, the 
13th century did not have government as we know it today. At that time, the 
English monarchy by no means controlled all of England, let alone the 
surrounding areas. Technology was simple, transport and communications 
rudimentary. Not only did the king have difficulty imposing royal writ across 
mainland Britain, but there were myriad sources of competing or at least shared 
power, including the Church (bishops, religious orders, the pope); local and 
European contest (especially in France); reciprocal obligations between the king 
and the leading barons, landlord and tenant; the growing economic power and 
populations of the cities (especially London and other ports); and even the 
various fledgling institutions of state (including the different branches of 
courts). 
In this process, any assertion of all-powerful dominance was at best 
rhetorical. Some barons were more powerful than others, and the king was at 
times the most powerful in that respect, and usually commanded a bigger army. 
That power occasionally produced dictatorial behaviour from monarchs. But the 
monarchy itself was never all-powerful in Britain, and the later French 
formulation of the monarch being the state never took hold in Britain. 
In 1215, civil war loomed but was averted by the signing of the Magna 
Carta. This document was, in simple terms, a ceasefire agreement. In return for 
King John agreeing to respect the ongoing rights and privileges of the nobility 
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(including not to seize their lands and not to try to use the law to imprison them 
without a trial by a jury of peers), the barons agreed to end their military action 
against the king. Successive monarchs did their best to regroup with stronger 
armies to impose complete dominance several times that century – but on each 
occasion the monarchs were compelled by superior force to accept the Magna 
Carta as the basis on which the barons would re-pledge loyalty to the Crown. 
By this slow process war about dominance led by consent to the concept of 
limited government. The Magna Carta was re-issued several times, until its 
adoption in 1297 by a great gathering of worthy lords and leading citizens, 
called parliament. Hence, the statute of Magna Carta 1297 was the confirmation 
of limitations of royal power that (so far as the barons asserted) had existed 
from time immemorial. The Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 provides that 
parts of that charter are still a fundamental part of New Zealand law over 600 
years later. 
Unsurprisingly, this great victory did not end the determination of 
successive monarchs and their advisers and armies to build a coherent 
government with fewer rivals. Good reasons lay behind this determination, 
including the extraordinarily violent competitiveness that characterised Europe. 
Being in control of taxes to raise a competitive army and navy was a matter of 
survival, requiring a stronger monarchy and centralised government. 
A short summary of the English constitution between the 13th and the 20th 
centuries might be that it represented the period when the monarch’s 
governments built the institutions and jurisdictions of a centralised state, 
particularly to be able to beat off armies from Europe on land and sea. However, 
while those powers of centralised government were being built, they were 
contested by other institutions. From these contests, which in the 17th century 
saw one king executed and another deposed, the notions developed that royal 
powers were limited by the consent of parliament and by the common law. To 
obtain the consent of parliament, monarchs needed key advisers who held the 
confidence of parliament. Thus grew cabinet government, responsible and 
accountable. To develop and administer policies, those cabinets needed 
professional support; that led to the permanent civil service. 
The contest for control, played out over several centuries, was the forge in 
which the constitution was moulded. Three key elements of the constitutional 
structure are relevant to this book: parliament, cabinet and the civil service. 
Conveniently, they largely developed sequentially, in that order. 
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Growth of parliament 
The Magna Carta laid out the idea of a constrained monarchy in 1215, and it 
was confirmed by the first parliament in 1297. But it was not until the Bill of 
Rights in 1688 that the supremacy of parliament over the king was firmly 
established. There was no straight line from one to the next. On the contrary, a 
succession of monarchs worked with varying success to re-assert control. 
Tudor times saw a high point of royal power. Henry VIII and Elizabeth I 
both had some very capable men on their councils who worked assiduously to 
strengthen the Crown. Royalty benefited substantially by the dissolution of the 
monasteries, and the monarch became head of the Church of England. This 
brought huge wealth, and reduced competition for authority. The Tudors often 
ruled by proclamation, but even they found it expedient to call parliament in 
order to raise funds for government, especially as England faced various 
external threats. 
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of European wars in the 
consolidation of centralised government under the monarch, and in the contrary 
need to share authority. There was widespread recognition that only a strong 
army and navy, centrally controlled, could protect England in an age of 
extremely competitive and violent European expansionism, including conflict 
over trade, religion and territory. 
A central command – an army and a government – needed to be funded and 
the search for revenue might be regarded as the defining feature of the evolution 
of centralised government. A few details explain how this took place. 
By about the 13th century, the capacity of the monarch to raise sufficient 
funds from feudal extraction through landlords was exhausted. More, much 
more, was needed. Trade through the major ports and cities, especially London, 
had produced an entirely new source of wealth, and hence of potential taxation. 
But how to extract tax from cities that were vast conglomerations of people with 
no allegiance to the rural land-owning processes that had previously produced 
rents and revenue? 
The simplest answer was to appeal to leading citizens for their agreement to 
be taxed, in return for the protection of peace; security was, and is, a key 
ingredient in economic growth, particularly security of trade routes. Equally, it 
became clear that the now-centralised government needed new tools of 
regulation and control to prevent domestic chaos and keep up with changing 
times. New laws and new taxes were needed, and it was best for both to take 
place if they were done by as much agreement as representative consultation 
(backed by force and law) could achieve. Long before Rousseau’s formulation 
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of a notional social contract (1762, in which subjects exchange allegiance, and 
tax, in return for protection) the core idea had been the basis for monarchical 
rule in Britain 
The great parliaments of the 14th century had grown in importance. By 
1600, faced with ongoing need for revenue, it had become reasonably settled 
that new laws could not be passed nor taxes raised by the monarch, without the 
consent of parliament. Throughout the 17th century, that principle was 
vigorously contested by the Stuart kings, who rather favoured the apparent 
absolutism of their French counterparts across the channel. 
Desperate for funds to raise armies against the major threats of Austria, 
Spain and France, successive British Stuart kings tried to raise taxes without 
parliament’s approval, even going so far as to appoint judges to imprison those 
who did not pay the new taxes. In 1649 civil war broke out. King Charles I was 
captured and beheaded, and for nearly a decade the parliamentary military and 
political leader Oliver Cromwell (and briefly his son, Richard) tried to rule 
Britain without a monarch. But the mental and practical mechanisms for that 
early republic were not up to the job, and chaos resulted. A restored monarchy 
set about doing the same thing as its predecessors (asserting dominance). Again 
civil war threatened. In 1688, James II fled down the Thames and by sea to 
Ireland, dropping the Royal Seals into the river (apparently thinking that without 
the symbolic authority of the Royal Seals, all government was impossible). 
James II was brought down by the Glorious Revolution. The name history 
gives to that rebellion demonstrates the rule that history is written by the 
winners, but it was a momentous event. The leading figures of the day invited a 
royal couple from Holland, William and Mary, to continue the Stuart dynasty as 
joint monarchs, but only on strict conditions. They were required to accept 
limited government in accordance with law, respect for the powers and 
privileges of parliament, and a whole host of rights that would be protected 
(such as appointing and dismissing judges, and trying to raise taxes or spend 
money without the consent of parliament). This document was passed into law 
by the British parliament and signed by William and Mary, King and Queen, as 
the Bill of Rights 1688. It is still, in its entirety, a cornerstone of New Zealand 
law. 
At the time of the Bill of Rights, the United Kingdom parliament had two 
houses, Lords and Commons, as it does today. But the composition of both was 
very different. During the last 300 years, the membership of the British 
parliament changed. Gradually, the concept of elections took hold, with ever-
increasing expansions in the rights of people to vote for members of the House 
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of Commons. And more recently the voting membership of the Lords was 
reduced. 
Though those changes had profound effects on the issues of interest to 
parliament, and so on the lives of people in Britain, they are not basic to the 
powers of parliament. Accordingly, 1688 is a suitable time to cut off this review 
of the history of the British parliament. 
In the nearly 400 years between Magna Carta in 1297 and the Bill of Rights 
in 1688 the British constitutional psyche had been built from concepts of limited 
monarchical government according to law, respect for the liberties of the subject 
and, most simply, no taxation without parliamentary approval. The pre-
eminence of parliament was the most visible expression of that new 
constitutional understanding, and parliament was established as the central pillar 
of government. From 1688 onwards, no monarch would again challenge the 
proposition that her or his government could not make laws, levy taxes or spend 
money, without the consent of parliament. During the next 300 years to the 
present day, this constitutional foundation provided the basis for the political 
contest for power. 
Evolution of cabinet 
The powers of parliament emerged from the clash of armies and death on the 
battlefield, but cabinet was developed as part of the political struggle. 
Undoubtedly these political struggles did shorten some lives through over-work 
(and others through over-consumption), but the weapons were words not 
swords. 
The terms on which William and Mary were invited to be joint King and 
Queen of England essentially confirmed that the monarchy would not try to pass 
law or taxes without parliament, nor interfere with its proceedings. But the Bill 
of Rights did not directly seek to limit their ability to run the government. At 
that point, the actual business of government was still very much under the 
control of the monarch and her or his advisers and ministers. Strictly speaking 
the work of these ministers could continue without consent of parliament. But 
the need to get money and pass laws meant it was already commonplace that 
senior government officers were MPs. 
This had been so for some time. Sir Thomas More, for example, served as 
Speaker of the House of Commons during his time as a minister for Henry VIII. 
Clearly, the idea of the Speaker as parliament’s man standing up to the king was 
still evolving. Likewise, 150 years later, Samuel Pepys became an MP during 
the Stuart restoration years, the better to forward the interests of the Navy Office 
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in political debate. The idea that ministers should defend the performance of 
their offices in parliament was already the norm. But the notion that they served 
together as a united administration was still in the future. 
At the end of the 17th century, the king or queen still met with his or her 
inner councillors to discuss and decide affairs of state. There was no need for 
anyone to be identified as the leader of the government: the monarch was the 
leader and chaired the meetings. Similarly, though there were various major 
offices of state through which ministers could wield considerable power, none 
was generally accepted in parliament as representing the government as a 
whole. It was quite possible for the king to change ministers. This could happen 
for poor performance, and an inability to command respect in parliament would 
be a factor in such consideration, but the idea that the king could call on only 
those ministers who enjoyed the confidence of parliament was not yet 
established. It was generally accepted that appointment to government office 
was a matter of royal patronage. 
One catalyst for change was the accession of George I, a German. From 
1717, he ceased to attend cabinet meetings, perhaps because he could not speak 
English. Although he still met individually with his ministers (communicating 
in French), his departure both reduced the influence of cabinet and left a void to 
be filled by a new leader. He needed such a leader very soon, when it became 
apparent that he had participated in questionable transactions that led to the 
South Sea Bubble.14
                                                 
14  The South Sea Bubble was a speculative boom and crash that shook British markets in the early 
18th century. Sadly, the incompetence of New Zealand finance houses in the early 21st century 
has many precedents. 
 Sir Robert Walpole emerged as a minister who could 
defend the king in parliament and chair cabinet. 
Walpole is generally regarded as the first prime minister (though he never 
accepted the title), holding the leading role in parliament and cabinet from 1721 
to 1742. He ensured that his colleagues subscribed to his views and he was the 
sole controller of royal patronage. He promoted the supporters of his Whig party 
so assiduously that a Whig dominance was established for many years. He was 
so much in command that he placed little reliance on cabinet, and instead used 
his own abilities, connections and the power of patronage to craft his support in 
parliament. He was accepted as the leader of the executive branch of 
government, with the responsibility to advise the monarch in the day-to-day 
relationship with parliament, and in the ongoing business of governing; that is, 
commanding the public service. 
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He was particularly successful in the role, because he understood the 
importance of keeping parliament on side. At that time, keeping the support of 
parliament was common sense and good politics for a minister. By the 19th 
century, however, common sense had hardened into principle: the ministers 
making up the government – the group that advised the monarch on the day-to-
day business of government and use of state power – needed explicitly to have 
the confidence of parliament as well as that of the monarch. This was a gradual 
process. By the 19th century, it was firmly established that the monarch could 
act only on the advice of ministers in most matters, by the 20th, in all matters. 
Likewise, by the end of the 19th century there was no longer any doubt that the 
monarch could appoint only a prime minister who had the confidence of 
parliament, and that all other ministers must be proposed by the prime minister. 
This arose from the process of political contest. Parliamentarians outside 
the government became increasingly focused and effective in identifying 
weakness among ministers, leading to the forced resignation of those who could 
not maintain their parliamentary support. The loss of individual ministers can be 
survived by a prime minister, but the effectiveness and prospects for the 
government as a whole can be damaged. It became clear that the business of 
government progressed more smoothly if ministers acted coherently, as a 
unified group, rather than as individual operators in the political fray. And so 
ministers began to stand together as a disciplined group, led by a prime minister. 
A disciplined system of collective cabinet government slowly evolved, with 
ministers drawn from, and accountable to, an elected House of Representatives, 
and taking responsibility for all actions of the Crown (the government). The 
process of democratising the Crown had been under way for centuries, but its 
definitive formulation was consolidated only when the cabinet effectively 
wielded the commanding and governing power of the sovereign, based on the 
consent of the House of Representatives, elected by universal suffrage. 
For public servants especially, it should be stressed that the evolution of 
cabinet government took place almost entirely by that constitutional curiosity of 
Westminster-based parliamentary systems: conventions. In particular, the 
cabinet, that most important star in the firmament for a public servant, has no 
status in law. It is not established by statute, regulation or standing orders. It has 
simply evolved as a practical response to the need to maintain responsible and 
accountable government, and it exists by convention. Put simply, conventions 
are agreed rules of conduct of government, developed from experience and 
accepted by all the key actors and commentators. These conventions are not 
rules of law, enforceable by the courts; they are rules of constitutional practice. 
If someone breaks them, the system shudders and a crisis might develop. If 
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enough people break them, they cease to be conventions and the constitution 
evolves. 
To take a New Zealand example, it is a convention that the governor-
general (or Queen) will always sign into law any regulation that has been 
brought by cabinet to the Executive Council. However, if ever a governor-
general suddenly broke the convention and refused to sign, the regulation would 
not be made and a major constitutional crisis would develop. Possible 
consequences would be that the governor-general would resign or be removed 
and replaced. A statute might be passed to clarify the situation and to prevent it 
happening again. 
In the meanwhile, however, so long as everyone follows the convention (or 
until everyone agrees on a new convention), the system continues smoothly. 
There are a host of such conventions in the New Zealand constitution. The most 
important of these are now written in the Cabinet Manual, and they include such 
matters as the conventions of caretaker government, the circumstances in which 
a prime minister would be expected to resign, and the rules of collective cabinet 
responsibility (dramatically changed as a result of multi-party governments).15
Permanent civil service 
 
This emergence of government by cabinet is the result of a Darwinian 
process. It is not obvious that anyone would have designed it that way on 
purpose. Many technocrats would like things more neatly cut and dried. But the 
fact is, it works. It achieves flexibility and responsiveness, while maintaining 
responsible and accountable government. 
Virtually any government since the emergence of civilisation has included 
functionaries who keep the affairs of state organised. The best systems have 
created means by which capable workers can rise to the top, whatever their 
origins. The worst systems are characterised by entrenched privilege and 
corruption. 
The strength of England’s ancient administrative tradition is demonstrated 
by the Domesday Book. Nearly 1,000 years ago the king’s clerks assembled an 
extraordinary record of all the assets in the kingdom. For centuries that record 
and the clerical ability that produced it was a major factor in England’s strength, 
as it underpinned the tax system. This is the kind of esoteric excellence that 
would gladden the heart of any true administrator. Even the Chinese, whose 
                                                 
15 Joseph (2007, pp 215–251) includes a whole chapter on conventions. 
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merit-based mandarinate is even older, never had such a complete record of the 
tax base. 
Those medieval clerks were mostly drawn from the Church, because that 
was the only centre of scholarship. Many leading clerics were younger sons of 
barons or other prominent people, but others were bright young men who 
entered the Church from humble beginnings. This demonstrates that clerical 
work for those in authority has long offered some social mobility, but it was to 
be another 800 years before the permanent non-political, merit-based 
bureaucracy evolved. 
The idea of working for the government meant little in medieval times. One 
worked for one’s feudal lord or for the king. A household role might well 
include wider responsibilities on behalf of the kingdom. But it became 
increasingly common for men (it was always men) to be appointed to public 
office, sometimes working their way up from inferior positions. The evolution 
of these roles can be seen in a brief outline of the careers of a few prominent 
office-holders. 
By Tudor times, men such as Sir Thomas More and his successor Sir 
Thomas Cromwell both started their careers by studying the law (rather than 
taking holy orders) and later entered service for Henry VIII. Their most 
significant contributions were in diplomacy and in working against or for 
religious reformation. The distinction between political and non-political roles 
would have been a completely foreign idea to them. By modern reckoning they 
occupied the most senior secular role in the government, and so were 
politicians. But they worked their way up through lower roles, without ever 
jumping to a political status. Each position was achieved on the basis of 
preferment from on high as the gift of a patron. This was not necessarily 
corrupt, as good administrators were regularly recognised for their ability. But 
loyalty to the patron was critical. 
There is another key difference in the careers of these two luminaries who 
made huge marks on the history of England compared to job expectations today: 
in both cases their careers ended with execution. This certainly adds salience to 
the thought that all political careers end in failure. 
The career of Samuel Pepys illustrates the further development of 
government service. He was the son of a tailor who won a scholarship to 
Cambridge. His initial appointment as a clerk in the Navy Office came through 
the influence of his cousin, who had good contacts at the court of Charles II. His 
diaries record that, after initially enjoying the benefits of an easy and 
bacchanalian life, he realised that he could achieve recognition only through 
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hard work. His expertise in administration and newly acquired knowledge of the 
navy was recognised and he received several promotions, eventually serving as 
secretary of the affairs of the Admiralty of England, roughly equivalent to a 
combination of the more modern positions of first lord and secretary of the 
Admiralty. Like More and Cromwell before him, when Pepys was in a senior 
role he entered parliament. Though never executed, he suffered the effects of 
strong opposition as he faced a charge of treason, based on the scurrilous 
evidence of a well-known blackmailer. He was saved when the king dissolved 
parliament. 
Through diligence and capable administration Pepys introduced robust 
processes to the Navy Office, and hugely strengthened the navy. At the peak of 
his career he became one of the most powerful people in the kingdom. Like his 
predecessors, he worked in a context of patronage, and he had to be astute in 
managing political affairs. But the scale of the operations of the Navy Office 
represented a significant expansion in the size of government compared with 
that in Tudor times. 
Throughout the 18th century the pattern continued. The major offices of 
state continued to expand, which required increased professionalism from 
everyone concerned. Processes of recruitment and training, however, did not 
adapt, and positions were achieved by purchase or patronage. Promotion was 
automatic, and the apogee of the civil service career was the pension or, for 
grandees, a seat in the House of Lords. 
By the beginning of the 19th century there was a separation between the 
role of the minister and the position of permanent head of various offices. The 
permanent heads were not MPs, but that did not mean the process for the 
employment of civil servants was apolitical. On the contrary, most appointments 
were made on recommendations of people the senior civil servant needed to 
curry favour with, most particularly the minister and the minister’s political 
friends. There were capable people who did good work, but this was largely 
despite the system they worked in. This was the state of the civil service when 
New Zealand was colonised, but one more example will complete this survey of 
British civil service development. 
The career of Sir Charles Trevelyan shows the next stage of evolution. In 
the 1820s, Trevelyan, the son of an archdeacon, entered the bureaucracy, but not 
government service. By that time Britain’s interests had widened, and the 
largest and best-organised administrative operations were found, not in the 
government, but in the East India Company. The East India Company had a 
thorough training system, inspired by the Chinese system of merit-based 
promotion for mandarins on the basis of exams. Trevelyan served very 
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successfully in India before returning to London and joining government service 
as assistant secretary to the Treasury, a position he held nearly 20 years. During 
that time he achieved infamy in Ireland for his failure in his responsibility to 
alleviate the Irish Famine, but this was not held against him in London, and he 
became governor of Madras in 1859. After publicly opposing proposed financial 
policies he was recalled in disgrace. But by this time job loss did not lead to 
execution or even the threat of further penalty. Instead, after a couple of years of 
gardening leave he returned in triumph, appointed to the (non-elected) position 
of minister of finance for India. 
Compared to during Tudor and Stuart times, Trevelyan’s career illustrates a 
new global scale of British activity, and a gentler process of penalising those 
who have lost high favour. But his most important role in the development of 
government was as writer of the Northcote–Trevelyan Report, which introduced 
major civil service reform. During the Crimean War the weakness of logistic 
support for the troops became a major scandal. Trevelyan and a politician, Sir 
Stafford Northcote, were appointed to investigate the performance of the civil 
service. They described a system of placeholders and time-servers with 
automatic promotion and low morale. Although they believed the challenges of 
government should attract the keenest and most able, they found that: 
Admission into the civil service is indeed eagerly sought after, but it is 
for the unambitious, and the indolent or incapable, that it is chiefly 
desired.16
This completes the story of the evolution of the Westminster/Whitehall 
system of government.
 
Following the Northcote–Trevelyan Report, major reform saw the removal 
of patronage and the introduction of the merit-based system of public service 
that has largely endured to the present day. From that time there has been a clear 
separation between the political role of the minister and the non-political role of 
the administrator. Career preferment has been firmly based on performance, 
rather than connections. 
17
                                                 
16 Northcote and Trevelyan (1854).  
17 The term Whitehall relates to the merit-based civil service in Britain; it comes from the street 
where many ministries are still located. 
 It is time to turn to developments in New Zealand. 
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Immigrant system of government 
For the purposes of this summary, around the middle of the 19th century British 
constitutional history delivered to New Zealand a set of institutions honed by 
civil war and countless contests. None of this suggests that the institutional 
development was somehow perfected – clearly not. The great electoral reforms 
of 1830 enfranchised only about 10% of adult men, while women had to wait a 
further century to vote. However, a balanced set of institutions was developing. 
Any claims of ultimate authority had been fudged, with: 
• the monarch accepting it was not possible to govern without parliament to 
make law, levy taxes, and provide a Cabinet) 
• parliament accepting that the monarchy was essential to stable government 
in form and practice 
• both parliament and the monarchy accepting that the law applied to all, 
administered by independent judges 
• judges accepting that, whilst the common law applied on all matters, the 
statutes from parliament constituted the superior law of the realm. 
The results of all that history were in essence exported by settlers and by 
constitutions re-establishing the institutions to New Zealand. The new 
institutions had, of course, to adapt to their own sets of contests, which over a 
century and a half have given the New Zealand parliament (and general 
constitution) its local flavour.18
In 1840, New Zealand was a new colony. The political situation in Britain 
at the time meant the extension of the authority of the United Kingdom 
parliament was dependent upon obtaining consent from the native peoples of 
these islands. That was the purpose of the Treaty of Waitangi, which recorded 
an exchange of (some degree of) governance in exchange for protection of 
rights and the rule of law.
 
19
The new colony was governed initially by the Colonial Office of the British 
government, briefly from New South Wales and then, as soon as could be 
arranged, under its own revenue and parliament. Elections were held, based 
 Having decided that they had obtained the consent 
they needed, the British rapidly established Crown authority, followed by the 
embryos of parliament, courts, cabinet government and a public service. 
                                                 
18 Constitutional Arrangements Committee (2005). Readers seeking a more complete but 
accessible account of the evolution of New Zealand’s constitution are referred to Appendix B in 
the committee’s report. 
19 Clearly, there is more to the Treaty of Waitangi than this. Palmer (2008) is the most complete 
recent source outlining the legal and constitutional implications of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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initially on a qualified property franchise (taxpayers). With representatives in a 
New Zealand parliament it was inevitable that history would immediately replay 
a familiar theme. The settler parliament demanded that the governor act on 
advice of a cabinet responsible to parliament, rather than carry out the 
instructions of the Colonial Office with the support of advisers who had been 
appointed without reference to parliament. The application of that hard-fought 
principle still took some time to arrange. Indeed, delays in seeking confirmation 
that the governor would act on advice of representatives of the General 
Assembly prevented the first responsible government from taking office for two 
years. 
Thereafter, the core principle of responsible government was approved, 
subject to some limitations in which the governor, acting on instructions from 
the Colonial Office in London, was expected to intervene in matters of 
governance. Consistent with the basis on which Crown authority had been 
extended, the key initial limitations related to the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
protection of Māori, particularly the reservation that only the Crown (the 
governor and his staff) could purchase Māori land. Similarly, there were initial 
limits on the full legislative authority of the New Zealand General Assembly. 
However, the overwhelming goal of the British government was to 
establish a self-sufficient colony that could survive on its own revenues – which 
inevitably meant that the settler parliament needed access to the only real source 
of initial revenue: land sales. Soon even this key reservation of power was 
handed over to the settler government. 
Put simply, New Zealand constitutional history thereafter is essentially a 
progressive establishment of the full doctrine of responsible and accountable 
government. Initially, it was responsible and accountable to a limited group of 
property-owning men. It took several more decades before full emancipation 
made the government responsible and accountable to all people. 
Whilst much governance was conducted locally, some matters were 
initially reserved for London. From 1892, Britain instructed the governor here to 
accept the advice of ministers without any qualification, and another 34 years 
passed before formal power to reserve a bill for royal assent in London (which 
had never been done) was rescinded. Formal legislative independence was not 
assumed until the passing of twin Acts of the New Zealand and Westminster 
parliaments in 1947. Any lingering possibility that the British parliament could 
technically still legislate for New Zealand was finally ended with the 
Constitution Act 1986. At what point in that process the New Zealand 
parliament became fully independent is a matter of definitional debate. 
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Evolution of the New Zealand state services lagged, then leap-frogged, the 
process in Britain. Patronage endured throughout the 19th century. Though there 
was a formal requirement for examination for entry to the service, the prime 
minister, Richard Seddon, notoriously and regularly circumvented this by 
temporary appointments, and the service was rife with petty patronage. By the 
end of 20 years of Liberal party rule the situation was scandalous. 
Bill Massey’s Reform party took office in 1912 and immediately set about 
the reforms that its name implied. The government went further than in Britain, 
and enshrined the professional, non-political public service in the Public Service 
Act 1912. Authority for appointments and employment was removed from 
ministers, and the protection of the non-political public service was given to a 
new statutory office – the Public Service Commission (later renamed the State 
Services Commission). Though there have been major changes in management 
systems in the intervening century, the basic ethos of a professional merit-based 
public service dates back to that legislation. 
And so, to the present 
The theme for this chapter has been that parliament must be located in an 
historical context. The three branches of government, legislative, executive and 
judiciary, balance one another like a three-legged stool. All three emerged over 
history as checks on the power of the monarch, and then on each other. Between 
them, they give working force to the fundamental concepts of democracy and 
the rule of law that underpin modern constitutional government. To understand 
the pressures on and responses of parliament, therefore, requires an 
understanding of the interplay with the pressures on the other two legs of the 
stool. 
The precise terms of that balance are not constant. They have evolved over 
time with changing circumstances and continue to do so. There is an ongoing 
constitutional conversation among the three branches of government in 
New Zealand, especially as new challenges arise.20
                                                 
20 The term ‘conversation’ has been introduced recently to describe the interaction between the 
three branches of government. See, for example, White and Ladley (2005, p 9) and Palmer 
(2008, p 239); the term is also in use in Canada. 
 Much of the dynamic of 
balance is shaped by popular consent connecting parliament and the people. But 
because the terms of that interaction are not static, expectations of the citizen–
state relationship change. Furthermore, the interplay with the rest of the world is 
the other increasingly dynamic element in the picture: New Zealand may be an 
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island geographically, but not geopolitically. It is interconnected to the world in 
the movements of people and trade and in governmental and legal relationships. 
That international interaction affects parliament, too. The full picture is one of 
dynamism across a complex set of relationships. 
By the time the New Zealand parliament acquired full law-making 
capacity, the world was changing around it. One dramatic change was the 
growth of international institutions and international law. Interestingly, just as 
New Zealand was internationally accepted as a fully independent state, some of 
its first independent acts were to limit its independence. New Zealand joined the 
United Nations and signed international treaties and conventions, with the 
express purpose of accepting limitations on governmental and parliamentary 
powers. 
A second change was taking place at about the same time, with both 
domestic and international aspects. The role of the courts was progressively 
changing, seen internationally in the development of human rights standards 
enforced by courts, and locally in the development of administrative law to 
require all actions of government to be fair, reasonable and in accordance with 
law. Although primarily an assertion of a constraint on the executive’s use of 
power, administrative law has also always carried with it a potential check on 
parliament as well. The simplest version of this check is that across the 20th 
century, courts have increasingly read additional requirements and procedures 
into the legislated words of parliament, especially where fundamental norms 
were at issue. The statute book is peppered with seemingly absolute discretions 
granted to executive decision-makers, which the courts increasingly stated did 
not mean what they appeared to say, often citing the language of deference that 
‘parliament could not have intended’. 
The interaction between parliament and the courts, and the way that 
interaction changes, is the subject of Part Two. Here it is enough to say that the 
branches of government stand in balance. Like most things that balance, they 
sway from time to time, and must adjust to restore the balance. 
Any view based on history has a risk of creating an illusion of 
completeness, but the work of building parliament and the other branches of 
government is not complete. The process of change is ongoing. Matthew Palmer 
has listed 80 elements of our constitution. Of those 59 can be associated with a 
specific date, and 42 of those 59 have been changed or established since 1970; 
that is, over 70% have been changed in the last 40 years.21
                                                 
21 Palmer (2006, p 147).  
 But that does not 
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mean it is irrelevant to consider history. The various elements of the modern 
constitution are important details constructed to give effect to the principles of 
responsible and accountable government, the separation of powers and the rule 
of law, and a merit-based public service. Those are principles established by 
history. 
 33 
3 
The Iron Rule of Political Contest 
Jointly written with Andrew Ladley 
Darwinian struggle 
The bedrock principle of New Zealand’s political order is that a government is 
responsible and accountable to parliament (and thence to the people). This 
chapter outlines how that bedrock principle shapes the ongoing political context 
in which parliament operates. Being responsible and accountable to the House, 
and thence to the voters, has created in New Zealand (and, with variations 
reflecting each context, in comparable parliamentary systems) an iron rule of 
political contest, in a four-fold and inter-related set of goals.22
• The opposition is intent on replacing the government. 
 
• The government is intent on remaining in power. 
• Members of parliament (MPs) want to get re-elected. 
• Party leadership is dependent on retaining the confidence of colleagues 
(which is shaped by the first three principles). 
As with any formulation of a rule of behaviour, this is stylised. No human 
is as one-dimensional as this rule implies, and (contrary to popular opinion) 
politicians are human. Similarly, this formulation is not meant to imply that 
politicians are self-seeking (any more so than any other person pursuing a 
career). The point is that the constitutional principle of responsible and 
accountable government demands political contest; it is that requirement for 
political contest that creates the iron rule. Also, the rule suggests there are only 
two sides in parliament, the government and the opposition; and that there are 
only two states in parliament, in government or not in government. Proportional 
representation has made things more complex; parties position themselves along 
a spectrum, near to or far from the government. And some ministers hold office 
while insisting that they are not part of the government. But these complications 
do not change the underlying truth: parliament is about the struggle for power, 
                                                 
22 Attributed to Andrew Ladley; see footnote 4.  
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and government is where the power is. Accordingly, the iron rule means that 
MPs are locked in continuing contest. 
Its iron-likeness is that it is always, always in operation. This does not 
repudiate the idea that pursuit of policy is relevant – all parties and all MPs have 
some ideological basis and perspectives on how to make the world better. But in 
considering everyday parliamentary tactics these are well down the pecking 
order if set against the imperative of getting into power. 
Within the precincts of the House, there are occasions when the iron rule 
might appear to be suspended, like the famous Christmas ceasefire for a game of 
football between the Allied and German trenches in World War I. Hence, there 
might be joint tributes to the recently departed, or a common show of unity on 
some military occasion, or an extremely rare policy agreement on all sides of 
the House. But even these are not really suspensions as opposed to tactics for 
short periods where all sides agree on stage management. For example, the 
leader of the opposition is invited to speak at parliamentary occasions for 
visiting dignitaries. The unwritten political protocol is that these are 
parliamentary occasions, rather than party-political, so the leader of the 
opposition’s speech will be carefully framed to be gracious and statesperson-
like; not trumping the prime minister, not showing any great difference in 
foreign policy, but also making it clear that she or he is a credible prime 
minister in waiting. Breaching the protocol risks showing up the leader as not 
credible as a challenger – and hence may result in loss of support amongst 
colleagues. So, the show of unity at a state banquet is not false – but the unity is 
itself an agreed formulation for the continuation of the iron rule by other means. 
Occasions of real cooperation are rare; so rare they seem contrary to nature. 
In 1993, the National government persuaded Labour and the Alliance to enter 
into an accord, with the aim of putting superannuation matters beyond politics.23
I do feel like the Bosnian Muslims. I do feel my village has been 
raided, my goat impregnated, my farmhouse burnt down. And then 
after capturing, humiliating … somebody wanted to call the United 
Nations for peace talks.
 
The leader of the opposition, Mike Moore, described his feelings graphically: 
24
                                                 
23  This book refers to New Zealand political parties by their most commonly used name: ACT 
New Zealand (ACT), the Alliance Party of New Zealand (Alliance), the Green Party of Aotearoa 
New Zealand (Green Party), the Māori Party, New Zealand First, the New Zealand National 
Party (National), the New Zealand Labour (Labour), and United Future New Zealand (United 
party). 
24 Armstrong (1993). 
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Without getting diverted by concern for the goat, one can sense Mr Moore’s 
dismay at being manoeuvred into the suspension of hostilities, which is an 
unnatural political act. Even that accord (which proved to be short-lived) was 
not a positive gesture, but an agreed retreat from the damage that the debate was 
inflicting on the credibility of political parties. 
The Darwinian nature of the iron rule will already be apparent from the 
above, and it can be simply articulated. Being responsible and accountable to 
the House, and thence to the people, frames a mutually accepted struggle for 
political survival: who will represent the people in government and how will 
government function? This affects everyone working in parliament, and 
everyone who takes part in any way in a parliamentary process. It is, therefore, 
important to understand how the rule operates. The process is active and 
constantly operating on all sides. There is no firm front line between the 
opposition and government; in focusing on one perspective one is inevitably 
also discussing how the other responds. 
Accepting that this is an interactive process, not one-directional, the 
following sections focus first on the opposition in terms of the major parties 
contending for office, then on the government. Finally, they consider the 
position in the iron rule of the smaller parties and players on both sides of  
the divide. While it is inevitable that readers will associate this discussion with 
the current or very recent holders of the respective offices (especially as 
examples are used), essentially the same applies to whoever is in that office. 
There may be variations in tactics and personalities, but all are subject to the 
iron rule. 
The opposition 
All parties in parliament have at their heart an idea, an ideology, about how the 
world, or at least New Zealand, could be run better. But voicing an idea is only 
the start; it is only in government that the ideas can be implemented. The 
opposition has few levers, so getting into government is the point of its politics. 
The largest party in opposition generally has a realistic hope and expectation of 
forming the next government and its drive towards the goal is implacable. 
As a result, the fundamental, overriding and unrelenting perspective that 
drives the parliamentary opposition is to replace the government. At its 
simplest, this requires showing why the government is bad and the opposition 
better. In particular terms, therefore, the opposition must accuse, imply, attack, 
discredit, mock, humiliate, show contradiction, expose, and by any 
(parliamentary) means, wear down the government. Drawing (political) blood is 
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the goal, and the closer to the leadership of the government this process can 
reach, the redder. But, crucially, everyone in the state sector, from the prime 
minister down, is in the cross-hairs: ministers, chairs of select committees, chief 
executives, the entire public service, state-owned enterprises. The immediate 
battlefield is the House, using every tool and space available: question time, 
written questions, general debate, budgets, Estimates, legislation, select 
committees, members’ bills, the parliamentary press gallery, discussions in 
corridors, and coffee in Copperfield’s (the parliamentary coffee shop). 
The ultimate goal is, of course, to convince the electorate that it is time for 
a change of government. That requires that the country knows what is 
happening, which brings the media to the forefront. The opposition goes to 
extraordinary lengths to get on the front pages, Morning Report, general radio 
and television, and to stay on message. And the message is attack, attack, attack. 
In parliament, the immediate focus is on the parliamentary press gallery, who 
are critical to all sides in the iron rule. 
Battle requires supplies. The opposition is funded by public and private 
funds, sustaining a research unit and staff members for MPs and for each party. 
Actual election campaigns just before an election, as technically defined, have 
limits on expenditure, but the ongoing whole-of-term war has only the limits 
that the public or private purse will contribute. In terms of weaponry, if the 
opposition is constantly shooting arrows, what are they made of? The general 
answer is that anything that hurts government is a weapon, so the choice is 
wide. The more specific answer is that information is at the heart of what hurts. 
This places the search for information, and its careful advice and placement by 
media-minders, at the forefront of the opposition’s agenda. Research units in 
parliament, and MPs themselves, constantly scan the media to find material that 
might hurt. Putting the opposition, particularly its big hitters, into the limelight 
as cogent critics of the government is the goal. 
Given the widespread reporting on all aspects of New Zealand life, but 
particularly on what goes wrong (political storms are front page news, not the 
things that are going well), the ordinary business of government provides 
endless opportunities (111 calls, hospitals, bullying in schools, youth crime, 
crime in general, prisons, drought, flood, the economy, immigration). So do new 
proposals for policy or legislation, or public statements or travels of government 
ministers. But these are front stage and perhaps obvious. Less obviously, the 
opposition is constantly probing in the backstage of government. Here the 
principal tools are written parliamentary questions, the Official Information Act 
1982, and the various formal avenues of inquiry (such as the ombudsmen, 
auditor-general, and state services commissioner). 
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It is difficult to exaggerate the importance and the impact of the Official 
Information Act 1982 in the iron rule. As Nicola White has shown,25
Thus, as Julius Caesar discovered (and since then the element of surprise 
should have been lost), the poetry of pressure from the opposition’s perspective 
is that the final unkind cut may be made by someone close to the principal target 
– her or his colleagues. Prime minister David Lange, beleaguered and isolated in 
a divided caucus, is said to have quipped across the House to the effect that he 
knew where his opponents were, and that was mostly in front of him (the 
opposition); but he also knew where his enemies were, and that was mostly 
behind him (on his own side). As the bleeding continues, as opinion polls drop 
and herald that the opposition is likely to be the next government, and 
particularly if a competitor emerges from the government’s ranks, ready to sally 
forth and do better, so the discomfort of the government members increases. 
Numbers men (or women since numbering is an equal-opportunity task) start 
quietly checking the support. Rumours are planted or otherwise circulate from a 
mass of possible sources, including the press. Then, once the numbers are clear, 
some et tu Brute colleague has to confront the prime minister, point out that the 
 the Act has 
become a central tool in this process, with endless streams of requests for vast 
amounts of paper, which are then scanned for any value, and dumped. It is no 
exaggeration to say that an entire service industry within government has grown 
to manage this process. The search, constantly, is for information that will 
surprise, hurt, wound and (hopefully) kill. 
Damaging or destroying is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
achieving the objective of the first part of the iron rule. The opposition has to 
establish some credibility as an alternative government in the place of the 
current (unworthy) incumbents. This provides some limits to a single-minded 
strategy of attack without an alternative and credible policies. And certainly, the 
opposition is vulnerable to counter-attack in much the same terms as above, the 
more so if it has recently been in power and can be blamed for problems that 
emerge. But, ultimately, the opposition’s weaponry is exhaustion: death by a 
massive hit on a prime minister who made a major mistake would be best, and 
the scalp of ministers is useful, but death by a thousand cuts is the default, like 
the multiple bites of wild dogs chasing down an antelope in the grasslands of 
Africa: over time, even the strongest beast will be exhausted. In parliamentary 
terms, success is when the MPs of the other side see the risks of current 
leadership being greater than their potential rewards (see the third and fourth 
parts of the iron rule) and choose a new leader. 
                                                 
25 White (2007).  
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numbers are against him or her – and so the next prime minister emerges, 
desperate to reverse fortunes. 
Leadership counts, perhaps increasingly so in the parliamentary arena, as 
television presents such short bites of information and impressions. A case in 
point is the damage done by repeated exposure of a short television clip of Don 
Brash teetering on a shaky gangplank at a time when his leadership was in 
question.26
Obviously, it has not always been the case that sitting prime ministers are 
replaced when the prospects of defeat loom for a government at the next 
election. Often a prime minister will stay in office hoping to turn the tide or 
perhaps to absorb the damage. Changes of prime minister inevitably will depend 
 
Throughout New Zealand’s political history, the importance of leadership 
has been critical to the iron rule. If the government is under sufficient pressure 
that its leadership is shaky, the opposition has gold. If shakiness emerges in the 
run-up to an election, so much the better. In recent decades, this was particularly 
evident in the events that led to changes of government in 1990 and 1999. 
On Labour’s side, David Lange resigned in 1989 just before he was pushed 
as the numbers men were numbering. Geoffrey Palmer replaced him as prime 
minister, but the polls did not turn favourably. The numbers men got back to 
work, and Palmer in turn resigned under pressure, with Mike Moore taking over 
for a few weeks before the election in 1990. It is not clear whether this was a 
forlorn attempt to reverse the tide (if so, it failed), a tactic to lessen the damage 
with fewer seats lost, or a calculated move of the old caucus to select the 
opposition leader for the next term, without the benefit of the fresh views of 
new MPs. The Labour government fell, exhausted, and Mike Moore was 
replaced in a landslide victory by National’s Jim Bolger. Mike Moore led the 
opposition into the next election in 1993 and, despite significant gains, lost 
again. Following the formation of the new National government, Mike Moore 
was quickly replaced as leader of the opposition by Helen Clark. 
And on National’s side, the prime minister, Jim Bolger, looked 
impregnable until the polls indicated that National would certainly lose the 1999 
election. Numbers men numbered, Brutus appeared, and Jenny Shipley became 
prime minister in 1998, being seen as a winnable foil against the rising female 
star in the Labour opposition. National lost at the election in 1999 – and Jenny 
Shipley was replaced as leader of the opposition by Bill English a couple of 
years later. 
                                                 
26 Chapple (2006). 
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on the circumstances and personalities, including the hubris of challengers; 
there may be nobody willing to take on the job. In Australia in 2007, whilst the 
opinion polls forecasted the inevitable defeat of prime minister John Howard’s 
government, no challenger was able or willing to seek to command the bridge of 
an apparently sinking ship. 
In 2008 in New Zealand, a similar scenario occurred: declining poll ratings 
for an incumbent government, but no suggestion of a leadership change. 
Following the election the departing Labour leadership demonstrated an 
understanding that untidy leadership change is damaging, and an extraordinarily 
smooth transition was achieved with Phil Goff emerging uncontested as the new 
party leader. 
For the opposition, there is a constant double-bluff calculation to be made, 
over whether it is better to deliver a fatal blow and drive a panicked government 
into a disastrous leadership change, or to continue to wound the prime minister 
sufficiently to destroy the government at the elections – but not so much as to 
force a leadership change in favour of a possibly better leader who might rally 
the troops. 
The permutations are endless. Unsurprisingly, the iron rule is completely 
engrossing for those caught up in its power. 
The government 
As already will be clear, the government does much the same thing as the 
opposition, with much the same focus on leadership, but from the perspective of 
being in, and wanting to stay in, power. Attack is centrally against the leader of 
the opposition. In some respects, this can be easier than attacking a prime 
minister. While the prime minister has a risk of making a serious mistake in 
office, the position also provides plenty of chances to exercise leadership which 
projects a positive image. For the prime minister, just drinking a beer while 
cooking a barbecue with a visiting prince gets a picture in the paper.27
The position of leader of the opposition is extraordinarily difficult. The 
leader is trying to project the image of a future prime minister, better than the 
incumbent, capable of leading the nation. But there is little opportunity to prove 
the necessary skills; all the leader of the opposition can do is criticise and opine. 
The government never gives the leader of the opposition an easy ride; any 
weakness or inexperience is exploited. 
 But the 
leader of the opposition gets few chances to look good. 
                                                 
27 Fox and Broun (2009).  
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But the advantages a government has of not completely destroying a 
vulnerable leader on the other side are also enormous; something both Margaret 
Thatcher and John Howard understood and prospered from. In the United 
Kingdom, Michael Foot could get enough votes to lead the Labour party in the 
1980s, but was never a credible prime minister, and the prime minister of the 
day knew it. Tony Blair, as leader of the opposition, was of course a completely 
different opponent. And much the same proved true of John Howard’s 
opponents over the last decade in Australia until Kevin Rudd emerged. 
There is great comfort for a prime minister in having opposite in the House 
a leader of the opposition who is vulnerable. In New Zealand, this proved true 
for Helen Clark, albeit narrowly, in the opposition leadership of Don Brash. The 
government threw endless ammunition at Don Brash in parliament, where he 
clearly could not compete with the prime minister. Instead, he spent more of his 
time in the country at large, especially in Auckland, where votes and dollars 
were thought to be in abundance. However, a succession of media images and 
other slips, along with ideological bogeys, increased the scope for the 
government to scare off the suggestion that it should be replaced by an 
alternative under Don Brash’s leadership. 
For government, then, the iron rule dictates that the constant strategy 
against the opposition is a plaited combination of policy, credibility and fear – 
principally by portraying the opposition as unable to govern, or as about to 
embark on some radical new (or old) agenda, or as untrustworthy. Hence, 
government ministers and their researchers will look for and find vulnerabilities 
in the opposition – divided leadership, mistakes on policy, contradictions, 
previous actions, ideological comments, defects of character (affairs, sexuality, 
drinking, suggestions of violence, antics on dining tables), anything that wounds 
anyone connected to the leadership and its party. All this is played out in the 
House, with constant cut and thrust: a comment that the government knows that 
the leader of the opposition is a ‘dead man walking’, a counter-hint from an 
opposition MP to a minister that he might be having an affair with his secretary. 
The iron rule has some limits in its language and tactics. In the House the 
rules of parliament (unparliamentary language, calling a member a liar), are 
constantly invoked, and everyone knows when they have gone too far. 
Otherwise, there are some mutually agreed (but never explicit) avoidances, such 
as families and personal attacks. These are not ultimately done for sympathy 
reasons, however much that might be relevant, but because they are in the 
interests of both sides. There is a limit to the amount of collateral damage that 
the public will accept; dragging in the antics of family members may get a 
headline, but may also provoke private head-shaking. Always, the calculation 
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about whether to use any information will be its perceived political benefit, set 
against the risk that all bets will be off on all sides. 
Somehow, this mutually assured destruction works tolerably well, at least 
in the House. In the wider press, MPs know that dirt-throwing, including into 
family matters that are decades old, is an occupational hazard, reflecting the 
pervasiveness of the iron rule amongst supporters outside of the House. For the 
ideologically determined or the party rottweilers, ‘my enemy is a target’, and ‘if 
I can hurt her or him by hurting the family too, I will try’. Such people are a 
particular hazard because with their lack of professionalism they often fail to 
understand the risks of backlash. 
Of course, government has the public resources and the power of office, so 
the contest might appear unequal. Government governs, implementing policy, 
taking decisions, meeting world leaders, getting on with the business, showing 
who is in charge, occupying the leadership ground, setting the agenda, standing 
on the castle walls waiving the flag, claiming the high ground of effectiveness 
and power. This gives tremendous media exposure, especially if the people 
concerned are good at sound bites and things are going well. 
But at the same time as front-footing, government is constantly back-
footing in response mode. And tides can turn from the one to the other very fast. 
An effective opposition will be constantly shooting arrows and some will find 
marks. Government is hard. Policies do not always work. Evidence might be 
contradictory or not available. Human beings make mistakes. The tyranny of 
responsibility that comes from having to govern in an imperfect world means 
that every opportunity for being a leader also contains vulnerability to things 
going wrong. So a government in office is at once dominating and paranoid, 
raising shields, trying to reduce the blood-flow: explain, fix, deny, obfuscate, 
allocate responsibility elsewhere, defend. 
Some governments simply do not understand the value for the opposition of 
a ministerial attempt to tough it out when something has gone wrong. The target 
stays in the cross hairs; every day something can be added to the story in the 
media. A few more cuts each day. At times, the attack on policy from  
the opposition finds a senior public servant in the cross hairs. For example,  
the revelation in 2007 that an employment decision in the Ministry for the 
Environment was made to suit the minister’s politics was a gift to  
the opposition.28
                                                 
28 Dewes (2007). 
 It provided an ongoing stream of stories that wounded the 
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government and the public service. At such times, the rhetoric might not seem 
fair to the public servant, but the iron rule trumps public servants’ sensitivities. 
Governments that understand death by a thousand cuts, and bleeding from 
slashes, understand when sticking plasters are needed, and when cauterisation. 
Getting ministers to resign (or much nicer, stand aside) while allegations are 
swirling, or immediately when it is clear that an incident has taken place that 
seriously damages credibility, is a critical triage process for a prime minister. 
For every avenue of attack from the opposition, government has to prepare 
a defence, from cauterisation to surgery, to changing policy. Such defences 
include the Official Information Act 1982, where endless, expensive and mostly 
unreported battles take place between requesters from the Opposition Research 
Unit, MPs, ministers, officials, advisers and the ombudsmen. 
So the iron rule shapes everything about government in and around 
parliament. The grouping in power has the high ground of government to 
dominate the battlefield, along with the unavoidable exposure of standing on a 
castle wall when arrows are raining down. The grouping out of power shoots the 
arrows every day, as many as possible, probing for weakness, trying to inflict 
cuts, if not wounds. There is no rest. 
Of course, some MPs (and the associated staff or journalists) tire of the 
unremitting process, or do not see themselves as currently in the same 
battleground as everyone else – but for MPs that tends to apply to bench players 
who by temperament or party status are marginally relevant either to defence or 
attack. For the rest, and especially for the key players, there is no suspension, 
ever. Every action, every day, is framed by the iron rule. The temperamentally 
unsuited, the weary, the not-useful, and the defeated (and, sometimes, the keen, 
but impatient) drop out, or are pushed out if possible. But there is an endless 
supply of others, mostly unsuspecting and unprepared, lining up to join the fray. 
Is there any scope, in this process, for smaller parties that might wish to play the 
iron rule in their own way, to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares, to be 
in government for some purposes and in opposition for others? 
The smaller parties and players in parliament 
The iron rule, in its New Zealand context, accompanied the dominance in 
parliament of the major two parties for much of the 20th century. It was widely 
expected that the introduction of proportional representation from the general 
election in 1996 would reduce two-party dominance; and it has. Still, there was 
a National-led government for parts of the 1993–1996 parliament (leading up to 
proportional representation) and for the 1996–1999 parliament, varying forms of 
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a Labour-led government in the three parliaments from 1999 to 2008, and 
another National-led government since 2008. In all those governments led by a 
major party the iron rule shaped how governments were made and operated, and 
how the minor parties and individual MPs responded. 
By 1996 parliament already had some small parties. The left-of-Labour 
Alliance represented a former faction of Labour, led by Jim Anderton following 
a split in 1988. The Alliance has since disintegrated, but Jim Anderton remains 
as a one-person remnant of old feuds, imperceptibly different from Labour. 
New Zealand First (as its name implies, aiming for a nationalist vote) was led 
by Winston Peters, who had left National after a cabinet split in 1991. In 1995, 
some breakaway MPs positioned to form a political party (the United party) that 
would operate at the centre, hence swinging either way depending on the 
numbers; it too has one remaining MP, Peter Dunne. Other parties have since 
positioned themselves for policy or population niches, including the Green Party 
(environmental vote), the Māori Party (Māori vote), and ACT (aiming for votes 
from those who wish to reduce the size of government). There have been several 
Christian parties, all gaining parliamentary representation by dissident 
breakaways from other parties, and all being rejected at the next general 
election. 
For all these parliamentary parties, the first objective within the iron rule is 
of course to get elected (or re-elected) – many hear the call though few will be 
chosen. But the purpose of getting elected is to participate in all parts of the iron 
rule, not just one. How that takes place exactly depends, as ever, on the numbers 
in the House and on the particular motivations of key leaders. 
For example, the New Labour breakaway party from Labour in 1988 (and 
the Alliance that followed) contained activists who appeared to see their 
primary goal as replacing Labour as the real voice of workers and the principles 
for which they stood. Only once that was achieved, would they confront the 
National party on the other side.29
From those perspectives, the coalition government of 1999–2002 (between 
Labour and the Alliance, with support on confidence matters from the Green 
Party) was the equivalent of Labour and National forming a coalition 
 Many of those same people also took the 
view that the combination of smaller parties that had made up the Alliance 
needed to be replaced by a unitary party organisation to achieve its two-step 
objectives. On that basis, they deeply resented the Green Party breaking away 
from the Alliance in 1999 to contest the election as a stand-alone party. 
                                                 
29 The comments in these paragraphs on the inner operations of the Alliance are based on Andrew 
Ladley’s recollection of his time working as Jim Anderton’s chief of staff from 1999 to 2002. 
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government – unthinkable. For those holding this view the coalition with 
Labour (and the mostly unwelcome support from the Green Party) was a pause 
in the real objective, rather than a genuine agreement to work together in 
government. 
But such are the complexities of splinter groups. Overall, however, small 
parties are subject to the same iron rule as the major parties: they wish to be in 
office if they are not, and to prevent the other side from coming in if they are. 
Always, prospects ahead determine whether fellow MPs or party members will 
support the continuation of parliamentary leadership, though in most small 
parties there is little choice because the incumbent leaders are the reason (often 
the only reason) why they are currently represented in parliament. And all MPs 
want to get back into parliament (as do those claimants outside of the current 
crop). 
This last factor (the fourth in the iron rule), plays out with particular 
intensity in the smaller parties – and as election time approaches, can dominate 
all other parts of the iron rule. 
At various times over the last decade, most of the smaller parties have had 
electorate-based party leaders (Jim Anderton, Peter Dunne, Green Party co-
leader Jeanette Fitzsimons, Rodney Hide and Richard Prebble from ACT, 
Winston Peters, and Tariana Turia and Pita Sharples from the Māori party). But 
for non-electorate MPs who came in on the party list depending on the 
proportion of the party vote gained in the general election, and for aspirant MPs, 
the position on the party list is critical. The same applies to list MPs in the major 
parties, but in a smaller party the intensity of competition is much greater. 
For example, in 1999 the Alliance gained about 8% of the party vote and 10 
MPs. Heading into a general election year in 2002, the party was below 5% but 
the party leader (Jim Anderton) had a safe electorate seat.30
                                                 
30  Under the proportional representation voting system parties that receive less than 5% of the total 
vote get no MPs, unless they win an electorate. 
 At that level of 
polling, the Alliance 10 would have been cut to about 6, and at the same time 
there were aspirants who wanted to be in parliament, including the party 
president. This meant there was intense infighting over the composition of the 
list order, especially since some of the senior Alliance MPs would have to be 
bypassed if activist MPs were to have a majority amongst the five or six who 
were likely to get back into the House. This kind of infighting appears to take 
precedence over other parts of the iron rule as candidate selection and 
finalisation of list places gets under way – for those not involved, it can seem 
astonishingly intense. But back in the House, the bigger picture of the iron rule 
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continues to frame activity, as the major parties square off for the critical phase 
in their raison d’etre, the general election. 
Outside of the party list scramble, however, smaller parties position to be 
on one side or the other in coalition and support arrangements that are of 
increasing flexibility. In that process, subject to the craft of building confidence 
by agreements with smaller parties, the iron rule applies. The process is more 
complex, because some parties will want to be joined with government for some 
purposes, but not for others. The pressures of coalition government caused a 
split in New Zealand First in 1998 and in the Alliance during the 1999–2002 
parliament. The received history lesson is that coalition can be dangerous for 
small parties. But the choices they make reflect their calculation on the third of 
the four sub-rules (getting re-elected) rather than their not recognising, and 
participating in, the iron rule. 
In summary, the constitutional context of responsible and accountable 
government plays out in a political contest as described above. This context 
shapes everything that happens in parliament, including its constant evolution. It 
has created a highly competitive culture, and those who rise to senior positions 
are fired in the heat of inter-party and intra-party conflict. Many people work in 
various forms of competition; business people, sports people and barristers 
spring to mind. But very few are expected to rise in public to account for 
themselves, day after day, as 50 or more rivals try to humiliate them. And there 
are very few who are expected to summarise complex policy positions in 
television sound-bites, sometimes without notice. Constitutional principles and 
the iron rule of party conflict both serve to mould the character of 
parliamentarians. That fact is essential to understanding parliament. 
Having explored constitutional principle and the iron rule of political 
conflict, the third element of the story is the clash of cultures between the 
political and the non-political. This operates through the everyday paradox, 
which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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The Everyday Paradox 
Two groups divided in a common purpose 
Politicians and public servants are engaged in a joint enterprise. Both are 
concerned in various ways with promoting the public good by using the powers 
of government. But their ideas of how best to achieve that public good can be 
very different. Even ministers and public servants who work together can 
surprise each other with their different assessment of priorities. The void is even 
greater between public servants (who largely work out of the public gaze) and 
the opposition (for whom public criticism of government action is the norm). 
For a hundred years in New Zealand, public servants, by law, have been 
required to be strictly non-political. That is, they must support the government 
of the day in a non-partisan way. But in a democracy, government is political. 
The politics of government is most apparent in the chamber of parliament. The 
arrangement of the furniture, with the government facing the opposition across 
the room, makes the political conflict visible to all. Within the chamber the 
subordinate and non-participant role of the official is explicit. 
During the committee stages of legislation officials are allowed in the 
chamber to support the minister. They may provide answers to questions to the 
minister who is responsible for taking the bill through parliament. But though 
they are in the chamber, they must not step on the floor of parliament; instead 
there is a reserved step, beside the Speaker’s chair, on which the officials’ chairs 
are placed. From there they may pass notes to the minister. For anyone other 
than a retired basketball player it is a long reach to the minister, but the official 
must not shuffle forward from the step, because they would then be challenged 
with the cry of ‘stranger in the House’. No one ever had a promising career cut 
short for letting their foot slip forward onto the floor; it is not a sacking offence, 
but a public challenge for trespassing into parliament is one of life’s minor 
embarrassments, best avoided. 
Though the separation between the political and the non-political is crystal 
clear in parliament, elsewhere it is murkier. Outside parliament the politics 
continues, but without the pageantry non-politicians can overlook the obvious. 
In the minister’s office, it is possible for an official to think they are in an 
extension of officialdom. Desks, tables, meeting spaces and administrative staff 
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can look like those in the office of any senior functionary. And the visitor might 
lapse into habits best left behind at the department, such as assuming the day 
will be carried by process, precedent or logic; or worse, seeing the minister as a 
colleague. 
The minister does have an interest in process, precedent and logic; they all 
can be useful in defending and explaining policy. But to carry the day the 
minister is vitally interested in much more, including presentation, timing and 
building a majority. The official who knows nothing of such matters fails the 
minister. But the official who trespasses too far into those matters enters the 
world of politics. 
The official who sees the minister as a colleague has overlooked the fact 
the minister’s daily reality is shaped by parliament. As ministers receive advice 
they constantly filter it through a party political lens as they determine how they 
might use it. The good official understands that and, without entering the 
political conflict, tailors advice to meet the minister’s needs. The less competent 
official ignores the political context and tries to involve the minister in the 
department’s priorities and operations 
The official works for the government of the day and within the law. That 
is what they are trained for and what they are schooled to believe is proper. 
They know that if they follow that simple approach they are doing the right 
thing and, as such, they must, surely, be safe. That is why it can be a shattering 
surprise when an error can become a matter of political controversy. As the 
opposition and the media seek to pick over the details of some administrative 
mishap, probing to establish blame, the official writhes in the spotlight. 
Many of the officials who find themselves under public scrutiny feel 
unfairly singled out, and believe that something extraordinary is happening. It is 
not extraordinary; it is the entirely predictable effect of the everyday paradox 
that, like the iron rule, operates continually at the boundary between the non-
political officials and the parliament-based politicians. 
The everyday paradox has three elements. 
• All public servants are non-political members of the executive, so they are 
not involved in the political contest. 
• But all public servants are accountable to their minister who is a member of 
parliament (MP) and is accountable to parliament for their work (some are 
indirectly accountable to a minister through their board). 
• Therefore, it is inevitable and commonplace that officials are swept up into 
parliamentary contest. 
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Public officials often have a fascination with politics, but most are relieved 
that they are not required to play a part in political conflict. They see it as a 
failure of the system whenever one of their colleagues is brought into the fray. 
This is not a new idea. For decades up to the 1980s there was much head-
shaking among long-serving officials whenever a public servant was named in 
parliament. At that time there was a generally recognised convention that public 
servants were anonymous. To be referred to by name in parliament was seen as 
a slight, because even a favourable reference could carry a taint of political 
favour. And an unfavourable reference was a slur that could not be rebutted, 
potentially staining the official’s career. Today, with greater clarity about the 
responsibility of officials, naming is not generally seen as an issue. But it is still 
common that officials are aggrieved that they are criticised; not just for the 
content of the criticism, but the fact of the criticism. 
Public criticism is painful, and it is difficult for an official to respond 
appropriately. But such criticism is not a sign that the system has broken, nor is 
political criticism a mortal blow at the non-political role of officials. On the 
contrary such events are an inevitable consequence of the iron rule of political 
conflict and a reflection of the everyday paradox at work. 
Sometimes senior officials see the unwanted attention they receive from 
politicians in moral terms. That is, the criticism from politicians in some way 
sullies the more pure world of managers. That view is not endorsed here. If 
there is any moral superiority it lies with MPs who have the authority derived 
from election. But this is not a philosophy text; the focus here is on how the 
system works. 
Of course non-political administrative work is best conducted with 
discretion, dealing with citizens’ issues privately and effectively. Problems are 
best identified early, and dealt with within the department. But a taxpayer-
funded activity can never claim that its operations are not the legitimate interest 
of the public, the media or politicians. Dealing with information requests, media 
inquiries and parliamentary questions is time-consuming and energy-sapping. 
The ideal world of some technocrats would not involve such nit-picking 
processes; presumably their world would be populated by benevolent officials 
constantly honing their processes to deliver the best results without the 
distraction of politics. But a simple glance around the world at countries that do 
not enjoy the benefits of democratic debate demonstrates that totalitarianism is 
not a reliable recipe for good government. 
Democracy is inefficient and its processes can be exhausting and 
frustrating, but it brings the moral authority that public servants rely on in 
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delivering the mechanics of government. If, in exchange, it also imposes 
scrutiny and complicates the careers of senior public servants through the 
operation of the everyday paradox, that is a small price to pay. 
Though the everyday paradox is not novel, its operation continually 
distresses public servants. Why is it so painful? The pain reflects the different 
cultures between politicians and public servants. 
Two cultures at work 
It is no surprise that politicians and public servants see the world through 
different lenses.31
Public servants can, and do, lose their jobs. Mostly, this is the result of 
organisational upheaval (restructuring), but it can be for poor performance. Any 
job loss occurs as an outcome of applying standard New Zealand employment 
 They may both be engaged on the same broad endeavour, but 
they have very different roles. Politicians and public servants generally follow 
very different career paths. They get their jobs (and lose them) by very different 
means. Though there are many exceptions, it is useful to look at this by 
reference to stylised accounts of typical careers. 
Public servants generally build their careers within organisations. They 
apply for publicly notified vacancies and are appointed after a private process of 
testing their merits against the needs of the job and the talents of other 
applicants. They are valued for their ability to work within the organisation. 
Analytical or organisation skills are prized, along with the ability to motivate 
staff and to get the best out of people, whatever weakness they may have. 
Though most agencies respect some questioning of policy and practice, they 
also value a willingness to support the common purpose of the organisation. 
At more senior levels, increasing value is placed on an understanding of 
where the agency fits within the wider scheme, including knowledge of the 
political process. Generally, though senior officials may need some specialised 
knowledge of government process, the skills they need are similar to those 
identified in most organisational management texts, except that there is less 
interest in charismatic leadership than some private organisations may favour. 
This is because ministers who seek public attention may not appreciate the 
competition of attention-seeking behaviour from the public servant. 
                                                 
31 Palmer (2008, pp 243–244) briefly covers a similar idea of culture conflict between ministers 
and officials. He suggests they speak different languages; officials speak policy and ministers 
speak politics. 
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law, where matters such as notice and rights of reply and employee privacy are 
important. 
Politicians, on the other hand, build their careers through parties and 
parliament. Even getting selected as a party candidate generally involves a 
public process of soliciting support. The election process itself is very public. 
The candidates make themselves available through public debates, photo-
opportunities and door-knocking, so the electorate might compare them against 
their opponents. The list system of proportional representation has changed the 
selection process for some of the candidates, but the essence of public 
competition for support remains. For every successful MP, there are a greater 
number of unsuccessful candidates whose disappointment must be endured in 
public. 
Once in parliament, individual progress, especially appointment as a 
minister, depends on getting the support of colleagues who (as the iron rule 
dictates) assess each other to see who among them is best able to improve the 
prospects of the party in the ongoing political conflict. Rules for selection to 
cabinet vary; National gives control to the prime minister, Labour uses a caucus 
vote, but the criteria are similar. Skills in debate and scoring points against other 
parties are important. Capturing publicity is a useful skill. The emotional 
strength to withstand criticism and respond strongly is vital. Those who can 
back themselves and marshal arguments will stand out. But those who are too 
ruthless in their own interest may never be trusted enough to be included in the 
deals that are needed to form a government. 
Politicians can lose their jobs, either as a minister or as an MP. Every three 
years this is a very real prospect, with no protection from employment law. The 
biggest job losses occur as a result of electoral re-alignments at the time of a 
change of government, when virtually every minister and many MPs can be 
swept from office.32
                                                 
32 The vagaries of proportional representation have allowed Peter Dunne (United) to avoid either 
fate in recent cycles, but in general the rule still applies.  
 Alternatively, a minister who loses the confidence of the 
prime minister is immediately out of office; an MP who offends the party can 
lose selection; and an MP who upsets the electorate may be voted out. 
Losing an election may be gentler than losing your head, but it is still a 
more mortifying process than most employees endure. With that ultimate 
sanction hanging over them, politicians compete daily in public, striving to 
reveal each other’s weakness. 
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These two career paths produce people with very different outlooks. 
Though both work for the public good, public servants progress through their 
careers by essentially private means; preferment and setbacks are determined by 
discreet processes. Politicians achieve their successes through public processes 
and their failures are there for all to see, picked over forever. There is not 
enough space here for a full anthropological dissection of the cultures that 
emerge, but a review of three areas illustrates the differences. Those areas are 
views about authority, information and loyalty. 
Authority 
To most public servants, authority is generally found in instructions and rules 
that are part of the management process of day-to-day activities. These will 
commonly be located in departmental circulars or manuals, and are transmitted 
through a hierarchical process from the head of the department. Public servants 
who follow the rules will usually be fine. 
To those in head office and other senior roles, however, authority has an 
external origin. Most importantly, authority is found in whichever law 
authorises or requires the current activity. Any competent official will have a 
passing knowledge of the law they operate under. Authority also comes from 
the minister’s instructions and cabinet minutes. In addition, those in policy roles 
will regularly consider what change in policy (and maybe law) would be 
desirable. In that context, authority comes from data and analysis. 
To the politician, day-to-day activities are not something to be managed. 
On the contrary, they are generally of little interest except when something goes 
wrong, when they become an opportunity for opposition attack. In that context 
departmental rule books are not authority, but evidence: evidence of 
departmental (and hence ministerial) responsibility either for applying the rules 
incorrectly or for drafting them incorrectly. 
In the wider context of reviewing policy and performance, politicians will 
share the public servant’s respect for the authority of law, data and analysis. 
These are important in constructing a case for policy. But in the final analysis, 
the politician’s authority does not come from those factors, it comes from votes. 
For authority, read majority. 
I recall an occasion as a young Treasury manager when I set out with 
enthusiasm to brief Phil Goff, who had been recently appointed as minister of 
education. At that time education vouchers were an area of The Treasury’s 
received wisdom, to be promoted at every opportunity. I had data and research 
to hand and set out to make my case. After a short time Phil Goff stopped me 
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politely, saying he had been mentally counting the votes in caucus for this idea. 
He thought maybe five caucus members would be interested to hear the case – 
but only five. Rather than continuing the discussion, the minister suggested the 
discussion move onto something else that he might have some hope of finding 
useful.33
Information 
 
All the authority of public service analysis cannot prevail against the 
authority of the majority. 
Information is an asset, at times even a treasure, to the public servant. 
Information must be collected properly, with due regard to the Statistics 
Act 1975, the Privacy Act 1993 and any other provisions that may apply. 
Information must be kept correctly, with appropriate regard to the Public 
Records Act 2005. And when asked for, information must be made available, 
with respect for the provisions of the Official Information Act or the Privacy 
Act, whichever is applicable. 
But it is not just the rules that make information special. Information about 
individuals is the basis for the administration of their entitlements and 
obligations. Information lies at the heart of tax assessments, accident 
compensation case management, the administration of custodial sentences, and 
prosecution for fisheries offences. Its careful handling and use at the proper time 
and in the proper way is fundamental to all public administration. 
Information is also critical to public policy. Data from statistics is basic to 
any analysis of policy proposals. Information may also come from interviews, 
administrative records, satisfaction surveys, public sources or even secret 
intelligence. Few people will place weight on a public servant’s hunch that 
something will work, but an analysis based on well-assembled data from 
respectable sources may be persuasive. Information needs to be collected, 
massaged and made available at the proper time and in the proper way. 
Information is also a treasure to parliamentarians. For them information is 
valuable as a tool to justify public policy, just as it is for the public servant. But 
to the politician information is not just an asset, it is a weapon. The public 
servant’s rules and propriety have little weight for the MP. Whenever the 
opportunity arises, when one side of the debate has information that the other 
does not, information is no longer material to be made available in the proper 
way; on the contrary it is a secret to be revealed at the most opportune time. 
                                                 
33 I am grateful to Phil Goff for permission to report this exchange. 
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An example that vividly demonstrates the difference in approach was the 
use of Don Brash’s ‘gone by lunchtime’ comment.34
Loyalty 
 This was a comment made 
by Dr Brash when, as leader of the opposition, he had the chance for a private 
diplomatic discussion with visiting United States congressmen. He was 
speaking of the nuclear ship ban, and apparently he said that if he had a free 
hand the ban would go by lunchtime. As is usual at such private meetings, 
foreign affairs officials were present and they forwarded the details of the 
exchange to their colleagues in Washington, which is normal practice. None of 
the diplomats focused on the fact that cables to overseas embassies are routinely 
copied to the minister’s office, so Phil Goff, the minister of foreign affairs, 
received a copy of the exchange. To him this diplomatic event was a domestic 
political goldmine, and its release was the obvious thing to do. 
Phil Goff did not break any law in releasing the information as he did. It 
was his information, and he was entitled to do what he did. The diplomats, 
however, found it very disconcerting to be dragged into the political conflict. 
Public servants are loyal to the government of the day. This does not mean they 
help ministers with their political tactics as they work to avoid the inevitable 
loss that eventually ends all governments in a democracy. What it means is that 
they accept the authority of the government, and work as best they can to carry 
out the government’s programme in office, within the law. That programme 
may well involve dismantling the work of the previous government; public 
servants may have spent many months of effort on that earlier programme. It is 
common that the same team that put the previous set of measures in place will 
be called on to pull those measures apart, because that team is the group that 
knows the area best. This can be deeply frustrating to the public servant who 
may believe the previous policy was better. 
In the process, good public servants will not complain about the 
government or the minister. They will not leak information to the media and 
will not withhold advice that could strengthen the government’s policy. In 
particular, they will not pass secrets to the opposition, even when the polls all 
predict an imminent change of government. But when the government does 
change, they will immediately transfer the same loyalty to the new team. 
Politicians also give loyalty to the government, but with important 
differences. They are fiercely loyal to the government they are in. And if they 
                                                 
34 Small (2004). 
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are not in government, they are loyal to the government they hope to be part of 
in the future. This strong and defensive team loyalty can make it hard for some 
ministers to believe in the public servant’s loyalty to the current government. 
At best, such ministers can behave like a wary spouse considering her 
partner’s record of serial monogamy. At worst, an untrusting minister will aim 
to have very little to do with the department, will avoid discussing plans, and 
will see any departmental problems as signs of a conspiracy against the 
government. This paranoia can be mirrored by the naivety of some public 
servants who cannot understand that a new government is looking at them with 
fresh eyes and has fresh plans, and will not be impressed by reports of continued 
brilliant management of the previous agenda. 
As always, the biggest strains can occur at times of stress when the public 
servant is under attack from the opposition. The public servant would generally 
like the minister to step forward and offer a defence. Ministers, however, find it 
hard to take the blame for public service mistakes. 
Management theory suggests we should learn from our mistakes. Political 
competition says mistakes are there to be exploited by the opposition. Officials 
try to explain such events in non-political terms, as problems that will be 
repaired by improved processes. The opposition wants to show them as failures 
of leadership that can be repaired only by a change of government. In the 
opposition’s eyes, the public servant’s attempts to explain things in managerial 
terms is a wilful or misguided attempt to reduce the political heat on the 
minister, and so the official can become a target. 
In that context, officials then hope that their loyalty to the government of 
the day will be rewarded by ministerial support. If ministerial support is less 
than vigorous, it may be seen as another instance of the widely deplored decline 
in acceptance of ministerial responsibility. But it is not that simple. 
From the official’s point of view, ministerial support can be a mixed 
blessing. Too much ministerial endorsement looks like political favour. From 
the government’s point of view, using political capital to prop up a public 
servant may not be capital well spent. After all, the public servant does not have 
any political capital to offer in return – and besides, the mistake may well have 
been a public service matter. 
Such events can be managed only on a case-by-case basis. If officials and 
parliamentarians understand the underlying principles, the pressure of the iron 
rule, and the ambiguities of the everyday paradox, such stresses can be 
managed. Most of the time relations do not deteriorate and the two sides rub 
along, each respecting the other’s idea of loyalty. 
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A self-limiting process 
This discussion has tended to focus on the problems and confusions between 
parliamentarians and officials. There are real misunderstandings on both sides, 
and these cause confusion. In addition, the process of the iron rule and the 
everyday paradox bring pressure onto officials. Sometimes that pressure can 
seem unsustainable, but the pressure is self-limiting. 
It is true that members of parliament regularly criticise officials for real or 
perceived mistakes or misdemeanours. Late in 2009, for example, it was the 
turn of Barry Matthews, the chief executive of the Department of Corrections, to 
be the target.35
The iron rule drives politicians to mount attacks, because they might do 
harm to the government. But the iron rule also moderates attacks, especially 
against people outside parliament, because a party that is seen as consistently 
unfair will have difficulty in the polls. Public servants, especially senior public 
servants, may not be popular with the public (they are not supposed to be 
popular), but that does not mean there is a widespread goal to ruin every public 
 The criticism came from opposition MP Clayton Cosgrove. It 
seems that at a select committee hearing the MP questioned the official about a 
supposedly threatening letter he had sent to the union. The official denied 
having made threats. When the MP later acquired a copy of a letter that 
suggested that if there were no change in union stance then contracting-out of 
prisons would be recommended by the official, he saw a deliberate misleading 
of parliament, and threatened to bring a charge of breach of privilege. Matthews 
still denied that the letter was intended as a threat; rather he saw it as an open 
account of what would be required if the union view did not change. 
There would seem to be room for honest disagreement about the letter. In 
the context of a select committee, facing what often feels like loaded and 
leading questions, many witnesses can be confused by a question, and a 
confused answer can be construed by a hostile questioner as being deliberately 
misleading. The path looks alarming; a short step from confused questioning to 
charges of breach of privilege. 
In fact, though such things could happen, and might well be consistent with 
Standing Orders, parliament’s rules of procedure, it is most unusual for 
parliament to proceed formally against a public servant. The protection comes 
from the same source as the risk – politics. 
                                                 
35 Kay (2009).  
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service career.36
The underlying point is that the pressures of the everyday paradox can be 
endured so long as the public servant shows respect for parliament. It is 
important to avoid being irritated or viewing exchanges in moralistic terms. 
Politicians can be less polite or respectful of senior managers than is typical 
inside government agencies. But that is their job. The constitution drives the 
need for political contest, and that contest demands the iron rule. Sometimes, 
when facing a particularly silly question, it can be difficult for the official to 
remember all that. But the best approach is to avoid provocation. In Homer 
Simpson’s terms the public servant should ‘turn every cheek on his body’.
 And it is precisely because attacking public servants is as hard 
as shooting fish in a barrel that it attracts little respect. 
So long as public servants are not contemptuous, scornful or rude in their 
dealings with MPs, then MPs realise there is little to be gained by hounding 
individuals beyond endurance. Yes, public servants will generally have to 
endure more hard and suspicious questioning than others will, but that is 
reasonable. After all, it is public servants who handle the government’s 
resources and powers on its behalf, and public service salaries offer some 
compensation for the trials of office. 
37
                                                 
36 This is an assertion based on feedback received while in office, and partially supported by UMR 
research. That research lists respect for public servants at the mid-point of polled professions, 
eighth out of 15. That is, above both of the two professions most likely to be involved in an 
attack on public servants: lawyers are 11th and politicians are 12th. See UMR (2009). 
37 This is not another example of Homer Simpson being sexist. He was discussing his very worthy 
neighbour, Ned Flanders, not the public service. 
 So 
long as that is done, even the angriest of MPs will be restrained by colleagues 
and the fish will continue to swim safe in their barrel. 
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Conclusion to Part One 
The chapters in this part have outlined the basic principles that drive the 
constitutional relationships between parliament and officials. History has firmly 
put parliament in the superior position, and officials are in a service role to 
ministers, who themselves account to parliament. Officials are definitely non-
political, but the operation of the iron rule and the everyday paradox, means 
they will be drawn into political exchanges, usually to their cost. 
But the degree of subordination is not absolute. The process works by 
mutual respect and restraint. Primarily, the respect is from officials to 
parliament, as it should be. But the restraint that parliament generally shows in 
using its formal powers against officials is a minor illustration of the balances 
that have evolved throughout the constitution. 
The history, principles and practices outlined in this chapter have focused 
on parliament and the public service. Taken in isolation they could create an 
impression that respect and obedience to the will of parliament are all that is 
needed to put the public servant on the right track. While such respect is 
appropriate, it is not all that is needed, because the constitution has more 
dimensions. 
The same historic processes that led to the evolution of parliament also 
created other balancing elements of the constitution, in particular the courts. 
Parliament enacts statutes, but courts determine the law on a case-by-case basis. 
This means public opinion is not the only balance in our constitution; there is 
also judicial oversight. 
The next part considers how these balances work out in practice, as it 
examines the extent of the powers of parliament. 
 
 Part Two 
Parliament is Sovereign:  
Or so they say 
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Introduction to Part Two 
The discussion so far has focused on aspects of authority and accountability as 
they apply to officials and parliament. In doing that, it has glossed over the 
primary obligation of public servants. Public servants must be loyal to the 
government of the day and act to discharge the (lawful) instructions of their 
minister. That is apparent from Part One. But the most important part of that 
obligation is the word in parentheses: that is, the first obligation of any public 
servant is to obey the law. 
It is a good idea that everyone should obey the law, but the imperative is 
much stronger on those who work for the government, because of the confusion 
and danger they could cause if they ignored the law. The government’s power is 
greater than any other’s in the country. Its powers affect everyone. If those who 
control the powers of government freely do as they think best (even if it is well 
intentioned), the result is an unpredictable and uncontrollable authority loose in 
the land. That is a form of tyranny. 
It is not enough that public servants are controlled by a democratically 
accountable government; they must obey the law. To do that it is not necessary 
to be a lawyer, but it is helpful to have a basic understanding of what constitutes 
the law and how it is made. So far in this book parliament is the only source of 
law that has been analysed; the question for this part is the extent and the limits 
of the powers of parliament to make the law. The idea of parliamentary 
sovereignty suggests that those powers are absolute, but the balance of powers 
under the separation of powers suggests that no authority is absolute. 
Parliament and the executive do not exist in isolation. If officials are to 
obey the law they need some understanding of the role of the courts. This 
chapter explains the balance that exists between the courts and parliament. It 
may look like a diversion from the core theme of the relationship between 
officials and parliament, but it is not. It is only by understanding parliament’s 
relations with the courts that the law can be understood. Without an 
understanding of the law, officials cannot do their jobs, and they certainly will 
not understand their relationship to parliament. 
In the hope of explaining these issues, the following chapters look at four 
questions. 
• Does parliament control law-making? 
• Are parliament’s laws beyond review? 
• Can parliament do whatever it chooses? 
• Can parliament regulate its own affairs? 
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The first, third and fourth of these questions have practical application and 
are illustrated by case studies drawn from recent New Zealand experience. The 
second is essentially theoretical, so it is explored by reference to constitutional 
debates that have occurred in recent decades. 
The consumer warning in the introduction still applies – this is not a legal 
text. Though it deals with matters that have been argued in court, it does not 
attempt to provide an authoritative view on the law. All the matters that are 
covered in a paragraph or two here have been the subject of lengthy judgments 
from superior courts, as well as weighty academic consideration. This book 
does not set out to match that discussion; rather the aim is to outline the issues 
so that those who seek to navigate through the mechanics of the constitution 
will have some warning of rough water ahead. Any who needs to sail through 
that rough water should get a lawyer. 
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5 
Who Makes the Law? 
Checks and balances 
Under the Westminster doctrine, parliament enjoys unlimited and 
illimitable powers of legislation. Parliament’s word can be neither 
judicially invalidated nor controlled by earlier enactment. Parliament’s 
collective will, duly expressed, is law.38
Sovereignty is a word that hardly ever arises in day-to-day life; it is 
reminiscent of former times. It creates in the mind images of royalty or old coin 
collections. But the New Zealand Oxford Dictionary defines sovereignty to 
mean ‘supremacy in respect of power, supreme authority’.
 
This all looks admirably simple. Having determined clearly who is on top, the 
public servant might decide to ignore all others and simply comply with 
parliament’s wishes. This would suggest that, in order to obey the law, all the 
public servant need do is to read the relevant statute. And, when aiming to 
improve policy, all that is needed is to advise the minister to change statute law 
to achieve whatever efficiencies may be expedient. 
This idea of parliament being supreme is widely held, and is reflected in 
loose catch-phrases such as that parliament is the ‘highest court in the land’ (in 
fact, parliament is not a court, and may only try breaches of its own privileges). 
It is hardly surprising that the supremacy of parliament is an idea that tends to 
find favour in parliament. Members of parliament (MPs) (and others) like to talk 
about it as parliamentary sovereignty. 
39
New Zealand is a sovereign state in which sovereignty is exercised by 
Parliament as the supreme maker of law, the highest expression of the 
 This generates an 
image more like an ayatollah, and so seems something worth fighting for, or at 
least arguing over; and some people argue strongly about it. For example, on the 
occasion of the 150th anniversary of the first sitting of the New Zealand 
parliament the deputy prime minister, Michael Cullen, set out a vigorous 
defence of parliamentary sovereignty. 
                                                 
38 Joseph (2007, p 487, emphasis in original). 
39 Deverson and Kennedy (2005). 
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will of the governed, and the body to which the government of the day 
is accountable.40
Parliamentary sovereignty is an inadequate theory of our constitution. 
An untrammelled freedom of Parliament does not exist.
 
There seemed to be no ambiguity in Dr Cullen’s mind and, therefore, for 
public servants, conditioned as they are to respect and obey ministers, it looks 
cut and dried. But there are some in the system who hold positions of authority 
that do not always see things the same way. For example, shortly before 
Dr Cullen’s comments, Dame Sian Elias, the chief justice, gave a speech in 
which she said: 
41
                                                 
40 Cullen (2004, p 13,191).  
41 Elias (2003, p 163). 
 
When judges and ministers present such diametrically opposing views, it is 
tempting to duck for cover, but some explanation is needed. 
It turns out the issue stems from the constitutional idea of the separation of 
powers; who gets what power, and how much power, and who controls whose 
use of power. The history outlined in the previous chapter focused on the 
transfer of royal power from the king to an elected parliament and cabinet. But 
it is not just a matter of transferring power; the other issue is controlling the use 
of power. A shift from a hereditary monarchy to an elected government with 
absolute power would not be likely to create a lasting benefit. After all, a 
government that knows it cannot last in office indefinitely might (in the absence 
of any controls) be tempted to plunder the treasury before it leaves. It has long 
been recognised that democratic government needs to be combined with the 
means of ensuring that the government acts within the law. Principally, it is the 
courts that play that role. 
The courts and parliament have jostled for centuries about who has final 
authority and where each jurisdiction must give way to the other. This chapter 
does not attempt to outline that history, but provides a snapshot of where the 
arm-wrestling seems to have reached at the moment. It is inevitable in exploring 
these issues that the branches of government look to be involved in an unseemly 
struggle for power; in fact that is not so. The juggling between the legislature 
and the judiciary is simply an ongoing example of the constitutional 
conversation. As one arm of government acts in a way that seems to push the 
boundaries, the other will respond; between them they maintain the balance. 
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Parliament at the centre 
A simple picture of law-making is that parliament passes statutes and those 
statutes are the law. Statutory law is important and authoritative, but it is not the 
full picture. Other forms of law include delegated law. Delegation occurs to 
handle the many points of detail that require attention; having 120 MPs debating 
and determining which drugs doctors may prescribe or what levels of fishing are 
permitted in each fishery zone seems a good prescription for chaos. Likewise, 
determining approved uses of land in different towns and suburbs across the 
country does not seem to be a good use of parliamentary time. Accordingly, 
such matters are delegated. 
There are several forms of delegated law, with the most significant being 
regulations. These are laws that are made by the governor-general in council. 
After the regular Monday cabinet meeting there is commonly a meeting of the 
Executive Council. Several ministers, including those formally proposing 
regulations, reconvene in a separate room at parliament (that is, not the cabinet 
room) to meet with the governor-general. The governor-general arrives with 
very little ceremony; most workers in parliament being unaware of the visit, 
other than the small inconvenience of a lift being reserved for his or her use. At 
the meeting, ministers propose the regulations, and the governor-general 
approves them. The regulations become part of the law and are gazetted. On 
average, there are over three times as many regulations made each year as there 
are parliamentary statutes.42
In addition, a large number of legislative provisions permit the making of 
laws by other official bodies. These provisions include ministers, some senior 
public servants and some other government agencies such as universities and 
schools. Some law-making powers go beyond the state to incorporated bodies, 
industry sector organisations and professional bodies; in every case the power to 
make law is included in a statute that designates who may make law and may 
specify how such power may be used. The laws made in this way have many 
different names, including standards, codes, directions, instructions, orders, 
warrants and notices. These various forms of rules are generally not drafted by 
 
Similarly, all local authority by-laws are a form of delegated law. Under the 
Local Government Act 2002 (and its various predecessors), local bodies are 
empowered to make laws that apply within their area. Such by-laws must be 
made following consultative procedures specified in the Act and must be 
publicly available. 
                                                 
42 Joseph (2007, p 1,007). 
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professional law drafters and are not published in any one place. Without some 
god-like omniscience, it is impossible for anyone to know all such laws. 
Though there is extensive delegation, parliament has not abdicated 
responsibility for the law-making process. During the last 20 years the 
Regulation Review Committee (a committee of parliament) has had the power 
to review any regulation or rule made using powers created by parliament. The 
committee can recommend that regulations (or any of the various rules that, for 
this purpose, are ‘deemed regulations’) may be disallowed if they breach the 
standards outlined in the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989. In fact no 
disallowance has occurred, but the committee is active in reviewing regulations, 
either on its own initiative or following a complaint from any person who has a 
concern. As a result, various regulations have been revised. This is an unusually 
explicit example of a constitutional conversation. 
Role of the courts 
The courts have a very significant and different role in reviewing regulations 
and rules. This role arises from the court’s responsibility to determine what the 
law is in relation to each case that is brought before it. Parliamentarians (or 
delegated rule-makers) write the laws that are generally applicable, but judges 
determine what the law is, on a case-by-case basis. That is, when people 
disagree on who has what rights or obligations, the courts determine the relevant 
facts, review various applicable laws and decide the legal position. This can 
arise in a variety of ways. Three examples are briefly canvassed in the following 
paragraphs: determining whether a rule was made using a proper delegated 
power; interpreting statutes; and reviewing administrative actions. 
First, the need to determine whether a rule was properly made arises from 
the fact that making law can be complicated. Well-meaning rule-makers might 
make many mistakes, including misunderstanding their own powers. For very 
many years it has been the practice of the courts to consider the validity of such 
rules. For example, whenever a citizen is prosecuted for breach of a regulation, 
the courts will consider the validity of the regulation. As early as 1701, 
Chief Justice Holt said: 
every by-law is a law, and as obligatory to all persons bound by it … 
as any Act of Parliament, only with this difference, that a bylaw is 
liable to have its validity brought into question43
                                                 
43 City of London v Wood (1701) 12 Mod 669, 678.  
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A regulation that is not clearly ‘within the objects and intentions’44
Words, on their own, lack precision as conveyers of meaning, and 
techniques of statutory interpretation are the principles for ascertaining 
the most appropriate meaning of those available for any text.
 of 
parliament’s statute will be ruled to be ultra vires, or beyond the authority of the 
rule-maker; as a result the regulation, by-law or rule will be declared invalid. 
Second, the need for statutory interpretation will be obvious to anyone who 
has ever had to read much statute law; try as they might, parliament’s intentions 
are often a little unclear. But more importantly, the meaning of a law can be 
understood only in the particular context of the facts in each case. The judge 
determines the facts based on evidence, and then determines how the statute 
must be interpreted in that context. 
The process of statutory interpretation has developed to a fine art. Most of 
us would think that the words of the Act would tell the story, but that is not all 
there is to it. In a recent Supreme Court judgment, Justice McGrath said: 
45
common law presumptions, in particular the presumption against 
interfering with the personal liberty of the individual, have also had a 
strong place as indicators of intended meaning of legislation.
 
This seems a bit breathtaking; is language not among humanity’s greatest 
achievements? How come words do not mean what they say? But this is not 
merely intellectual point-scoring. The judge went on to say that: 
46
That is, in considering cases judges look to previous court decisions for 
precedents; those precedents define the common law. Judges assume that basic 
common law rights endure, unless parliament expressly and explicitly rules 
them out. In that process, judges interpret statute with reference to the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and they aim to protect principles such as 
due process, fairness and liberty. This process occurs whether or not there is any 
ambiguity on the face of the Act.
 
47
In looking to the common law, judges are looking at an ancient Anglo-
Saxon thread of law. More recently, they are also likely to look more broadly at 
international law. Various factors drive this internationalisation, including the 
development of communication and information technology. It is now easier 
 Even if the words seem clear, judges still 
apply the common law rules as they make their interpretation. 
                                                 
44 Carroll v Attorney-General [1933] NZLR 1,461, 1,478. 
45 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, para 250. 
46 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, para 250.  
47 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, para 13. 
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than ever for lawyers and judges to know about significant legal developments 
in similar jurisdictions; precedents in other jurisdictions are not binding, but 
they may be influential. 
As well as this amorphous effect of transnational judicial discourse, there is 
a more concrete process of accession to treaties. Since the establishment of the 
United Nations the number of international treaties has increased. These treaties 
have been gradually incorporated into statute law in New Zealand, and so 
become part of the resource that is drawn on for statutory interpretation. These 
treaties have contributed substantially to our law, so that an authoritative 
estimate suggests that 200 of our (about) 600 public statutes raise issues of 
compliance with international obligations.48 As they influence interpretation, 
these international obligations operate to shape our law.49
More recently, judicial thinking about the Treaty of Waitangi has had a 
major influence on the law. The single most significant case occurred in 1987. 
The case arose because section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, for 
the first time, gave statutory recognition to the principles of the Treaty. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal fleshed out those principles, and they have 
been a major influence on policy-makers ever since.
 
50
The content of the common law, including the development of 
administrative law, depends on judges looking at past judgments in other 
 
Third, as well as the processes of reviewing regulation and interpreting 
legislation, the courts may also review any act (or inaction) of any person 
holding office, using the principles of administrative law. This means that 
officials must not rely solely on the provisions of a statute to guide their actions. 
Administrative law is largely concerned with the process of decision-making, 
but in recent decades, through judicial review, judges have occasionally looked 
at the substantive merits of official actions. Courts are likely to review an action 
on grounds such as procedural impropriety, illegality or unreasonableness. As a 
result, a growing body of administrative law applies to the actions of people in 
official roles. This law is as important and influential as any statute, but it was 
not made by parliament or by any delegated power. It was made by judges, 
using the power of precedent – it is common law. 
                                                 
48 Keith (2004, p 597). 
49 The impact of international law on domestic law is a large topic that is beyond the scope of this 
work, other than to emphasise the point that it is another example of the matters that must be 
kept in mind when considering the legality of official action. 
50 NZ Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. As with international law, the Treaty 
of Waitangi is a substantial topic that is generally beyond the scope of this work. 
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(similar) cases as a guide in identifying the law. Gradually as cases are 
determined by superior courts the law becomes clear and legal principles 
emerge. This means there are other players on the law-making field, the judges. 
Judges do not just apply the law; in the process of identifying applicable legal 
principles in a series of cases, they make law. Parliament is a manufacturer, 
making laws on a wholesale basis, and judges are the retailers, providing laws 
case by case. 
As they make laws judges bring a dispassionate approach, considering each 
case on its merits and applying the law without regard to political parties or 
ministerial authority. This implies that the judge is a quite different person to the 
parliamentarian or the public servant; it is worthwhile to make a brief excursion 
to attempt to understand the culture that judges contribute to law-making. 
Courtroom dramas may be popular, but real judges are only occasionally 
glimpsed on television pronouncing sentence; they do not appear on news 
shows to explain or defend their decisions. This means this important group is 
likely to be little known to most New Zealanders. 
Another conflict of cultures 
In looking at the relationship between officials and politicians it was useful to 
consider how they each make their careers. It is equally useful to look at 
lawyers, including the peak of the profession, the judges, to see how they may 
be shaped by their careers.51
A stylised account of a legal career, on the other hand, sees the lawyer 
making her way within the profession (as opposed to an organisation). The first 
requirement is to gain admission to the Bar, which requires evidence of 
qualification and character. Initially, a lawyer will commonly work for a firm 
(or a company or a government department), gaining experience in some area of 
the law. The key attributes are precision and thoroughness, supported by a good 
 
Recall that the political career is made in public, with regular public 
competitions determining long-term success. The ability to command a majority 
is the single most important determinant of success in politics, and the ability to 
cope with the emotional stress of constant public challenge is a vital survival 
skill. The official’s career is made in organisations, through discreet competitive 
selection processes; there is much more emphasis on analysis and working 
together, and less emotional stress from public exposure. 
                                                 
51 See Palmer (2008, pp 121–123) for another discussion of how a legal background influences 
judicial decision-making. 
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knowledge of the law; the emphasis is on rational and deliberative legal 
analysis. But from the outset, this rationality will be applied to matters of 
considerable emotional significance to the client; why else would they bother to 
pay for a lawyer? 
Some lawyers will get courtroom experience, which gives an opportunity to 
handle more emotion. The court always aims to sift through evidence in order to 
apply the law dispassionately, but on the way there can be very emotional 
moments. Defendants may face imprisonment and plaintiffs may face ruin; 
clients are commonly tense. And in court the lawyer must remain alert and 
confident in debating the law with a competing practitioner, in front of a judge 
who assesses every argument. It is like a long oral exam, but one in which 
someone else is trying to pass the exam at your expense, and you must do 
likewise. The process of cross-examining witnesses may involve significant 
confrontations. Even in parliament it is out of order to accuse a member of 
lying, but lawyers effectively make that accusation in court every day. The 
procedures may look sterile and polite, but that comes as a result of a lot of 
effort; the whole point is to take an argument that otherwise could not be settled, 
hear each side, and resolve it by careful application of the law. 
The most successful and hard-working lawyers may be made partners, 
which offers prospects for substantial incomes and more hard work. Some 
more-senior lawyers may decide to move out of a partnership to work as 
barristers, focusing on difficult cases referred from other lawyers. The more 
successful among them will be appointed as Queen’s Counsel, and so they are 
recognised as leaders in the profession. So long as the briefs keep flowing, this 
is simply another step on the path of more income and even more hard work. 
The process for moving from being a practitioner to becoming a judge used 
to be a mystery; one was simply invited (or waited forever by the phone for a 
call that did not come). Now the process is outlined in a note on the Ministry of 
Justice’s website.52 Periodic advertisements seek nominations or expressions of 
interest. The solicitor-general seeks the views of the chief justice to assemble a 
long list of candidates suitable for appointment.53
                                                 
52 Ministry of Justice (2003). The operation of the process was elaborated in a speech given by the 
then solicitor-general, Terence Arnold (2003). The approach is broadly similar for any court 
appointment, but here the focus is on the High Court bench.  
53 The solicitor-general is the government’s chief legal adviser, is head of the Crown Law Office 
and reports to the attorney-general, who is a government minister. 
 When there is a vacancy the 
chief justice and the solicitor-general consult with other judges and the 
profession to prepare a short list. Several names are then put to the attorney-
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general. By strong convention the attorney-general ignores any party political 
considerations in selecting a preferred candidate. The successful candidate’s 
name is mentioned in cabinet (that is, it is not a matter for cabinet input or 
decision), and then put to the governor-general for appointment. There is 
certainly no public competition, as there is for a political role. And even if there 
is an interview (which can happen occasionally), the assessment of merit is 
made by the process of consultation, not test; it depends on continuing 
performance as viewed by others in the profession. 
Once appointed to the bench, a judge serves till retirement. So long as they 
do not suffer incapacity or criminal conviction, they cannot be removed on any 
of the employment grounds that might apply to others. Their pay is determined 
independently (that is, not by ministers) and may not be reduced. These 
measures ensure judges are beyond influence or pressure from the government. 
Where a public servant may look to the rules to find authority and a 
politician looks for a majority, judges find authority in the law. A public servant 
sees information as a treasure, and a politician finds a weapon, but to a judge 
information, if it is acceptable and credible, is evidence. And while the public 
servant is loyal to the government of the day, and the politicians are loyal to 
their own government, judges are loyal to the law. 
The processes of appointment and tenure mean judges are not bound by the 
iron rule of political conflict; they do not enter the conflict. Similarly, though 
judges may be ‛subordinate’ to parliament, in the sense that statute law 
overrides common law, they do not serve ministers, so the everyday paradox 
does not apply. When the need arises, they are able to see policies and priorities 
from a more detached legal viewpoint. 
The career that has brought judges to the bench has taught them to 
approach issues rationally, consider them thoroughly and determine them 
clearly. Judges are dedicated to reasoned argument, supported by evidence. 
They are not oblivious to public opinion, but put more weight on good law, and 
certainly seek to resist political fads and fashions. Likewise, though judges 
acknowledge the responsible role that ministers play, they are not in awe of 
them (as officials may be) and are quite willing to judge a minister’s actions, if 
the need arises and depending on the topic. Traditionally, judges are more likely 
to defer to ministers in matters of national security, recognising that that is a 
basic responsibility of the executive, but will be more likely to intervene on 
matters affecting human rights, which are definitely in the court’s sphere. 
Judges, and those who appear before them, are well aware of judges’ 
responsibility to dispense justice, and the significance this has for a well-ordered 
With Respect: Parliamentarians, officials, and judges too  
 74 
society. This is why the respect regularly accorded to judges in a courtroom is 
beyond what is found elsewhere. Judges still bow to each other in court; you do 
not find much bowing anywhere else in New Zealand (except in parliament). 
They know that they are at the peak of their profession, and that they have 
achieved their positions by ability and peer recognition. 
An example of the deference shown to judges may be seen in the very first 
substantive hearing of the new Supreme Court. The first lawyer to appear before 
the court, a very experienced advocate, did not just welcome the court, or 
congratulate members on their appointment; he praised the judges for their 
ability. He said (by means of endorsing a quotation from another source): 
I predict the new Supreme Court will be seen as an outstanding Court. 
The judges … are very experienced in appellate work and in working 
together. They are well set to determine finally all the issues that a 
final court for New Zealand should determine54
Impact of judge-made law 
 
It would never be proper for a public servant to make such flattering 
comments to a minister, though probably some sycophants do, in private. But 
these comments were in public, and apparently they could be used to set the 
tone at the Supreme Court. The respect of the profession is a major strength for 
courts, providing comparable mana to the democratic mandate enjoyed by MPs. 
These, then, are the people who make judge-made law; the next section 
explains some of the ways in which judges have shaped the law in recent years. 
There is no simple way of encapsulating the law; it comes from too many 
sources. There are several hundred current statutes and many more regulations 
of various sorts. But even if these could be understood, there is an immense and 
constantly growing list of judgments that serve to act as precedent, so are also 
part of the law. Professor Joseph cites a total of 2,400 cases as he explains the 
law relating to the constitution and administration.55
                                                 
54 Hodder (2004). 
55 Joseph (2007; the table of cases covers pp 1,229–1,270). 
 Of those cases, about 1,200 
are New Zealand cases. You might think that would be enough; with that 
number of cases everything must be resolved already. Far from it; in fact the 
business is accelerating. Of the New Zealand cases Professor Joseph has listed, 
over 650 were determined between 1990 (after the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 came into effect) and 2007 (when the most recent edition of  
Professor Joseph’s book was published) – that is about one cited case every 
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10 days.56
Intercepting information 
 And, since then, a steady stream of cases will serve to keep him 
occupied preparing the next edition of his book. 
Clearly, it is not possible to expound on all this law here. Instead, a small 
number of cases illustrate how judges are constantly tuning the law, either by 
inserting protections and remedies that parliament unaccountably overlooked or 
by reviewing administrative action. Following that, in the next section a longer 
case study shows the issues that can arise for public servants as they operate 
within the law. 
In the 1990s, two people were seen hurriedly leaving a home following a break-
in in Christchurch. A witness recorded the number plate on their car, and it 
transpired that they were from the Security Intelligence Service (SIS). In the 
subsequent court case, the government acknowledged responsibility for the 
break-in, but claimed it was authorised by a warrant issued under the 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Act 1969.57
                                                 
56 Professor Joseph must have read all those cases, and presumably a whole lot more that he did not 
think were important enough to cite. Court judgments make dense reading; he deserves 
sympathy. 
57 Choudry v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 582. 
 That Act states, in section 4: 
the Minister may issue an interception warrant authorising the 
interception or seizure of any communication not otherwise lawfully 
obtainable 
Section 4 goes on to outline the acceptable grounds for the issuing of such a 
warrant, but that is not the matter of concern here. The point at issue was 
whether the Act permitted the SIS to break in to properties to collect 
information that was not otherwise lawfully obtainable. 
The SIS and the inspector-general of security (a retired High Court judge) 
had considered the break-in to be lawful, and in the High Court in Christchurch 
the judge agreed with them. Roughly their logic was that parliament authorised 
this interception and seizure of information and it must have intended to 
empower covert entry to achieve that purpose, as a necessary implication. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed. Using the principle that basic human rights cannot 
be abolished by implication, the court could not find any explicit authority for 
the SIS to break into homes, even with a warrant. Subsequently, parliament 
passed amending legislation to authorise entry onto property and to strengthen 
the safeguards around the use of the power. 
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This is a useful illustration of a constitutional conversation. The SIS was 
initially established because the executive was concerned about security risks. 
Following the discovery of an undercover SIS agent at The University of 
Auckland there was a public furore and a commission of inquiry. This led to 
parliament enacting the powers and protections of the New Zealand Security 
and Intelligence Act 1969. When the powers came to be tested in court, they 
were shown to be inadequate, so in 1999 parliament legislated again. 
Unlawful search 
In the early 1990s, in the Hutt Valley, a police team arrived with a warrant to 
search a house. The son of the owner and a neighbour both explained to the 
police that the person the police were interested in had no connection with the 
address. The search began, but the senior police officer was persuaded to talk 
with the daughter of the owner, a lawyer, who confirmed the police had the 
wrong address. Despite that the search continued for a short time longer. 
The homeowner sought redress from the police, but, though the search was 
unlawful and a breach of a right specifically protected by the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, that Act does not contain any provision for penalties. 
Because of that gap in the law the High Court struck out the action, but that did 
not stop the Court of Appeal, which considered that, ‘in affirming the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, the Act requires development of the 
law when necessary’.58
Citizens of New Zealand ought not to have to resort to international 
tribunals to obtain adequate remedy for infringement of Covenant 
rights this country has affirmed by statute.
 
The court considered that, since the Act imposes an obligation on the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary to protect rights, then the absence of 
specific remedies cannot mean courts cannot impose them. Noting that under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights all signatories have 
undertaken to provide remedies for breach of rights, the court felt obliged to 
provide a remedy. Alternatively, the only course would be to mount a very 
expensive action through international tribunals, which the court considered 
excessive. 
59
                                                 
58 Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 676 (CA per Cooke P). 
59 Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 700 (CA per Hardie Boys J). 
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Accordingly, the court created the power to award damages. By following 
that approach the court quite consciously added to the provisions of an Act of 
parliament. 
This too led to further constitutional conversation; the Law Commission 
reported on the issues in the case,60
Flag-burning 
 but the government did not move to change 
the law that the court had made. The case stands as part of the law of the land. 
In 2003, there was a demonstration outside parliament against the visit of the 
Australian prime minister. During the protest, flags, including a New Zealand 
flag, were soaked in kerosene and lit, producing a brief and spectacular fire. 
Next day on talkback radio the protestor said he burnt the flag because he 
believed it stood for imperialism. It seems he was one of the many thousands of 
people in the country who are unaware of the Flags, Emblems, and Names 
Protection Act 1981, which says, in section 11(1)(b), that it is an offence if 
anyone: 
in or within view of any public place, uses, displays, destroys, or 
damages the New Zealand flag in any manner with the intention of 
dishonouring it. 
This looked straightforward to the District Court judge, and the protestor was 
convicted. On appeal things were rather different.61
The question then was whether the ‘dishonouring’ provision of the Flags, 
Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981 could be interpreted in a way that 
was consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The judge 
 
The judge considered how the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 
1981 could be interpreted in the light of the free speech provisions in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. After carefully considering whether flag-
burning could be seen as ‘dishonouring’, the judge decided that dishonour could 
be involved. She went on to see whether the prohibition in the Flags Act was 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act, and concluded that clearly there was an 
inconsistency because freedom of expression was being limited. She turned to 
section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, which requires that other Acts should be 
interpreted in ways that uphold the rights in the Act ‘wherever an enactment can 
be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms’ in the Bill of 
Rights Act. 
                                                 
60 New Zealand Law Commission (1997).  
61 Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704. 
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showed impressive flexibility and imagination as she concluded that such 
alternative meanings were possible, so quashed the conviction. That is, a 
process where a flag is burnt as a symbol of imperialism may not represent an 
intention to dishonour the flag and so the protestor avoided conviction. 
This decision would surprise the MPs who supported the bill that became 
the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981. That was around the time 
of the Springbok tour and MPs and police certainly would have expected that a 
flag-burner in front of parliament would be arrested; it would be a change from 
hitting people with batons. But in the present context it seems a very proper 
decision, even if it demonstrates a flexible use of words. The judgment is 
crafted as statutory interpretation, but it largely eviscerates the penalty 
provisions of the Flags Act. 
State house rentals 
In 2004, a state house tenant applied for a review of his rent, based on the fact 
his income was variable. Income variability is not a factor included in the 
income-related rental formula in the Housing Restructuring (Income-Related 
Rents) Amendment Act 2000, so the application was declined. The tenant 
appealed to the State Housing Appeal Authority and was declined again. He 
tried again at the District Court, which said that Housing New Zealand should 
have considered the matter using its discretion under section 43(4) of the 
Housing Restructuring and Tenancy Matters Act 1992, which states: 
If satisfied that special circumstances justify it doing so, the company 
may, under its absolute discretion, set for and accept from a tenant of 
any [Housing New Zealand] housing a rent lower than the rent 
otherwise required 
Housing New Zealand went to the High Court for a judicial review of the 
District Court decision – by this time it was three years after the initial 
application. The case no longer concerned the individual tenant, but Housing 
New Zealand wanted clarity on its obligations. It claimed that there was no 
jurisdiction for appeal against its use or non-use of its discretion, and that there 
was no obligation for it to find out whether there were special circumstances 
when determining an income-related rent. Housing New Zealand’s policy had 
been to adopt a very limited view of ‘special circumstances’ and the application 
did not fit its criteria. 
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The High Court judgment neatly encapsulates some basic points of 
administrative law.62 First, despite the explicit words of the Act, there is no such 
thing as absolute discretion. In particular, the discretion had to be used to 
promote the purposes of the Act, including responding to social needs. In the 
words of the judge, ‘In law, no discretionary power is entirely unfettered’.63
Second, an organisation with legislative discretion must not adopt policies 
that frustrate the use of that discretion. Administrative criteria cannot be used to 
prevent consideration of special circumstances. Quoting the judge again, ‘A 
rigid policy is the antithesis of the exercise of discretion’.
 
64
And third, where a decision-maker has discretion to consider special 
circumstances, applicants should be informed of that discretion. If applicants are 
unaware of the discretion then they are prevented from making their case: 
‘administrative fairness include[s] an opportunity to place relevant information 
before a decision-maker’.
 
65
Implications of court rulings 
 None of these points is explicit in the legislation 
covering Housing New Zealand; in fact, these points are not generally found in 
any legislation. They are, however, settled points in administrative law and 
officials ignore them at their peril. 
Most officials do not make covert entry into houses, or even search with a 
warrant, and hardly any get involved with flag-burning. Those cases may seem 
remote from the day-to-day work of public servants, but they are relevant 
because they illustrate the importance of principles of legal interpretation and of 
fundamental rights. On the other hand, administrative work like reviewing 
rentals is standard fare for any bureaucrat; the administrative law that the judge 
relied on is applicable to any official action. 
But rather than see these provisions as a burden, they can be viewed as a 
mandate. Of course the official must follow whichever statute is applicable, but 
not blindly or rigidly. The principles of administrative law require fairness and 
good process. If parliament has neglected to mention those requirements, that 
does not mean public servants have a licence (or an obligation) to be unfair or 
sloppy. Unless explicitly abridged by legislation, the principles of 
administrative law endure. 
                                                 
62 Housing New Zealand Corporation v Auckland District Court [2008] NZAR 389. 
63 Housing New Zealand Corporation v Auckland District Court [2008] NZAR 389.  
64 Housing New Zealand Corporation v Auckland District Court [2008] NZAR 389.  
65 Housing New Zealand Corporation v Auckland District Court [2008] NZAR 389.  
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Occasionally cases arise that involve concerns about basic rights as well as 
proper adherence to administrative process. Such cases can demand 
considerable skill as officials consider the best course and aim to avoid error. If 
there is a legal challenge, it can require months or years of work before a case is 
resolved. The following case study demonstrates some of the issues that can 
arise in implementing complex policy change. 
Case study – special education 
In late October 1998, Wyatt Creech, the minister of education, decided to 
disestablish the positions of 1,166 full-time-equivalent positions in special 
education facilities across New Zealand. He did not do this lightly; he took 
advice on his powers to make the decision, and he based his decision on the fact 
that a new policy, Special Education 2000, ‘would address the special education 
needs of more young New Zealanders in a much fairer way than was then 
provided for’.66
During 1999, legal proceedings were filed to challenge the whole policy. 
The plaintiffs were a group of parents with some very sad stories; one, for 
example, had a seven-year-old boy who was unable to walk or talk and was not 
toilet trained, but was frequently able to pull himself upright to lunge at a hot 
 
Wyatt Creech had good grounds for his belief. His 1998 decision was a key 
step in a policy that had been under development since 1995. Cabinet had 
considered the matter many times; there had been consultation with disability 
groups and parents had been given information packs. His colleagues had 
agreed to substantial funding increases to improve the quality of special 
education and, though he was disestablishing positions, he knew the funding 
was sufficient for a large expansion in the number of people working with 
special-needs children. Cabinet had also agreed and funded an independent 
evaluation to assess the success of the new policy. 
Despite that work, the new policy was not universally welcomed. Its central 
tenet was that more special-needs children could and should be given the 
support they needed so they could be taught in ordinary schools and classrooms. 
Though many parents welcomed the change, some, often those whose children 
faced the most severe disabilities, were fearful. They doubted whether ordinary 
schools would be capable of providing the warmth and support that their 
children needed. 
                                                 
66 Creech (2003) in Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 747, 773.  
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element. His parents reported, ‘We have experienced problems getting [W] a 
fair education since before he commenced school’.67
Officials had long been alert to the risk of litigation. As early as July 1996 
officials had told ministers that many schools would be unaware of their legal 
obligations or would lack confidence in dealing with special needs children; 
accordingly, cabinet had approved extra funding to train boards and school 
staff.
 
The Daniels Case was supported by the Quality Public Education Coalition 
and the primary teachers union (the New Zealand Educational Institute). The 
plaintiffs claimed that the new policy failed to meet their children’s needs, so 
was a breach of the Education Act 1989 (together with provisions applying to 
special education in the earlier Education Act 1964). 
68
But, though they acknowledged a risk of litigation, officials assured 
ministers in the same paper that there was no need to change legislation. It 
seems this assurance was motivated, in part, by a realistic appreciation of the 
difficulty of promoting any legislative change. For example, during August 
1998, ministry officials told union representatives that repeal of some relevant 
sections in education legislation was contemplated, but, ‘Now with the political 
turmoil it seems likely only no[n]-controversial legislation will go ahead’.
 The special implementation evaluation was approved at the same time, 
so that the effectiveness of the policy could be monitored. 
69 
Later that year the minister was provided with Christmas reading in which the 
possibility of legislative change was canvassed. His annotation against that 
point was, ‘Special [Education] 2000 will need greater acceptability first’.70
                                                 
67 Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 747. 
68 Cabinet Office (1996c).  
69 Daniels v Attorney-General 3 April 2002, Baragwanath J, HC Auckland M1615-SW99, p 9 
(record of a meeting between representatives of the Ministry of Education and New Zealand 
Education Institute, 17 August 1998). 
70 Ministry of Education (2008b). 
 So, 
though officials would have preferred some legislative change it was not made. 
Despite officials’ earlier anticipation of possible judicial review, the extent 
of the attack was much wider than officials had contemplated. This was not 
simply a question of process, but an allegation that basic rights had been 
breached. In particular, section 8 of the Education Act 1989 states that: 
people who have special education needs (whether because of 
disability of otherwise) have the same rights to enrol and receive 
education at state schools as those who do not. 
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Though the argument was much more complex, involving the Education Act 
1964 and other provisions, much debate revolved around whether Special 
Education 2000 breached that statutory right. 
The High Court hearing occurred before Justice Baragwanath, a former 
president of the Law Commission. Counsel for the plaintiffs was a well-
respected Queen’s Counsel, and the Crown Law Office team included a lawyer 
known for producing an authoritative text on the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. There were days of highly erudite hearings; counsel and the judge 
canvassed cases from around the world, dropping into Latin and other languages 
as the mood took them. 
Some months later the judgment emerged. The Crown had lost. Despite all 
the work the judge concluded the government had failed in its duties to the 
children. The judgment acknowledged that it was not the court’s role to make 
policy decisions; rather it should limit itself to determining ‘whether the law has 
been infringed’.71
Faced with the choice between giving substance to the ‘entitlement’ 
and ‘rights to education’, or emptying them of legally enforceable 
content, I am satisfied that the former must be adopted.
 But in doing that, the judge needed to determine what were 
the rights protected by section 8 of the Education Act 1989. Crown lawyers had 
suggested the matter was too broad to be determined by a court (that is, 
justiciable), but the judge disagreed. 
72
• [the right to education] must not be clearly unsuitable (and in that 
specific sense of it suitable) for the pupil 
 
The judge went on to say: 
In my view it [parliament] cannot have intended such entitlement to 
entail anything less than  
• [the right to education] must be regular and systematic.  
The judge went on later to say: 
The court will enforce the minimum content of the right, which 
requires an individual focus on the learning needs of each child, and 
provision of extra assistance in proportion to the extent of the 
particular child’s disabilities.73
                                                 
71 Daniels v Attorney-General 3 April 2002, Baragwanath J, HC Auckland M1615-SW99, p 4.  
72 Daniels v Attorney-General 3 April 2002, Baragwanath J, HC Auckland M1615-SW99, p 45.  
73 Daniels v Attorney-General 3 April 2002, Baragwanath J, HC Auckland M1615-SW99, p 46.  
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A crunch point was that this responsibility was not attached to the school; it was 
a duty to be performed by the secretary of education (and the Ministry of 
Education). 
When officials came to report on the judgment to ministers they assessed 
the likely cost at around $106 million per year. But more importantly they 
warned that this was a very significant judgment; if it stood, it marked a 
substantial shift in the role of the courts into policy as they determined what 
would be the detail of a suitable, regular, systematic education. Litigation would 
increase across all of education as groups demanded equity of provision.74
The cabinet that had to consider whether to support an appeal was not the 
same government that had introduced Special Education 2000. The new Labour-
led government was friendlier to the teachers’ union that had supported the 
litigation, so it would have been understandable if they had not wanted to 
appeal. Instead the attorney-general soon decided that the decision must be 
tested.
 
75
Any requirement that the education be ‘regular and systematic’ is met 
in its essence, it seems to us, by the statutory requirements, including 
those for minimum days and hours, teacher registration and 
curriculum. These and the other features of the Act mentioned above, 
together with the very opaqueness of the proposed standard, also 
appear to us to negate a judicially enforceable ‘not clearly suitable’ 
general standard
 
In the Court of Appeal, things returned to an even keel. Rather than 
attempting to give substance to the right to education, the court turned to the 
statute, and decided that parliament had done it already. In considering the High 
Court judgment, Justice Keith said for the court: 
76
But that did not mean it was all over; there was still the more usual 
administrative law question of whether the minister had properly made his 
decision on disestablishing the special education positions. The minister’s 
decision related to special classes, units and services that had been established 
 
                                                 
74 Cabinet Office (2002b).  
75 Cabinet Office (2002a). It is an interesting side-line to note that in the Cabinet Policy Committee 
when the implications of the case were considered this item was only one among many. There 
were 13 items, and the committee usually has one-and-a-half to two hours. On that occasion, the 
committee also had to consider the 2002 budget (itself a massive item) and other substantial 
matters. Few officials or members of the public realise how many matters are considered by 
ministers in New Zealand.  
76 Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 747, 766. 
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around the country to meet the needs of children. The minister’s power to close 
those units was in section 98(2) of the Education Act 1964: 
The Minister may likewise disestablish any special school, class, clinic 
or service … if he considers that sufficient provision is made by 
another similarly established special school, class, clinic or service, or 
by any other school or class in or reasonably near to the same locality. 
As the minister had explained in his affidavit, he considered that the new 
policy would provide for children throughout New Zealand; the court did not 
debate his judgment, but said that was not the right question. It was not enough 
to consider whether special education would be provided across the country; the 
Act required consideration of each locality where a class or service was being 
disestablished. 
A review of the report to the minister proposing the disestablishment shows 
the court was right.77
No order was made for any remedy – it was beyond the court’s aspirations 
to unscramble the omelette. Instead, the parties were sent away to negotiate a 
settlement. The result was an agreement to a major consultative process to 
review the adequacy of services in every region.
 The list of units is comprehensive; every position in every 
school is listed. The list covers 18 pages. But if the minister had tried to reassure 
himself that each locality would be well served under the new policy, there was 
nothing. It was not even easy to assess what would be lost in each locality, as 
the positions in each school were mixed and spread across the list. The ministry 
promised a report in a month on the impact of the decision and on proposals to 
ensure continuity, but that could not inform the minister’s decision in October. 
On that ground, the court found that the minister was in breach of 
section 98(2) of the Education Act 1964 when he made his decision in October 
1998. Only because of procedural error the Crown lost the case. 
78
                                                 
77 Ministry of Education (1998a).  
78 Deed of Settlement (2003). 
 
This review dominated the work of the Ministry of Education’s Special 
Education Group for the next 18 months. During 2004, staff from head office 
and the districts joined 395 public meetings in 52 town and cities across 
New Zealand. Tens of thousands of invitations were sent plus widespread 
advertising. Some 5,387 people registered their attendance at these meetings, 
and many others did not sign in. Many of these meetings were highly emotional 
as parents voiced their concerns for their children. 
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In early 2005, the ministry produced a 90-page national report and further 
reports for every district.79 The report showed that parents and teachers wanted 
more funds. Later that year, the budget included initiatives for special education 
totalling over $45 million per year; an increase of over 10%. A follow-up report 
in 2006 attributed further increased spending in the 2006 budget to the 2004 
consultation process.80
Good judgment? 
 
Breaking the law had consequences for officials, and for the taxpayer. 
Officials participated in an exhausting series of meetings with frustrated and 
sometimes angry parents. The taxpayer picked up a large bill. Having lost in 
court as the result of an error in process, the new consultation process was 
undoubtedly more thorough and the extra funding has provided extra benefit for 
special needs children. But was it worthwhile? 
The irony is that though the initial process was ruled to be faulty, in 
substance the new policy was already having a major effect. Between 1995, 
when the policy was first contemplated, and 2003, when the judgment was 
finalised, the number of children benefiting from special education support 
increased from 20,000 to 50,000. That is, Mr Creech’s belief that more children 
would be supported was vindicated. But the process failed him. 
The Daniels Case represents a very near miss on the part of those who would 
seek to use the courts to control government policy. If the initial judgment had 
stood it would have had enormous effect on education. The judgment meant 
every school-age student (not just those with special needs) had a legally 
enforceable right to a ‘suitable’ education, and what this meant would probably 
be the subject of more litigation. Here the judge was considering children with 
special needs, but what about gifted and talented students, Māori students, 
students from other ethnic groups, students who would do better in single-sex 
education, or any student who was below average on standardised tests? What 
would be the meaning of the judge’s test for ‘suitable’ then? What was the 
standard to be applied? There were implications beyond education. A similar 
approach could lead to courts formulating rights in other areas such as health 
and welfare. The cost could be enormous. 
Though, in the end, this judicial initiative came to nothing, there will be 
more attempts. In particular, the view that basic points of policy are too broad to 
                                                 
79 Ministry of Education (2005, p 63) provides the data on the consultation process. 
80 Ministry of Education (2006, p 1). 
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be open to judicial review will face continuing attack. Grant Illingworth, the 
lawyer who took the Daniels Case, argued that blanket immunity for any 
category of public decision-making is untenable.81
Another recent case involved the Child Tax Credit, which was available 
only for those in work. The claim was that this requirement unlawfully 
discriminated against the unemployed. The Human Rights Review Tribunal 
decided the discrimination was lawful,
 He is not alone in that view, 
and other lawyers have tried alternative approaches to litigate public policy. 
82 but officials should not assume the 
Crown will always win such cases. For example, in a recent decision the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal ruled that the government’s policy of excluding the 
family of people with disabilities from receiving various support payments is a 
breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.83
Third, though the courts may be taking a greater role in human rights 
matters, there is no tradition in New Zealand for the courts to usurp the role of 
administrative decision-makers, and there is continued respect for legislation; 
 The Crown intends to 
appeal, but if the tribunal’s decision is upheld it will represent a significant 
change in policy. 
The emergence of this field of public interest litigation illustrates several 
points. First, and fundamentally, public servants work under the authority of 
parliament, at the direction of ministers, but under the scrutiny of the courts. All 
must be obeyed. 
Second, while ministers, who are responsible for the use of taxpayers’ 
funds, will tend to push for efficient implementation of policy, and officials will 
tend to look for policies that are generally beneficial, the courts will look to 
protect rights. International trends and our own New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 are promoting increased emphasis on fundamental human rights. This will 
have an ever-stronger effect on the work of officials and politicians, whatever 
their personal views. 
This does not represent a grab for power by the judiciary. Judges have long 
taken a close interest to ensure that the executive and parliament do not overturn 
basic rights. In the 19th century they were more focused on property rights. As a 
result, there is a long-established principle that parliament must use clear words 
before judges will interpret an Act as expropriating property rights. In the 20th 
century the focus has shifted more to protecting human rights. 
                                                 
81 Illingworth (2006, p 173).  
82 Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General [2008] NZHRRT 31. 
83 Atkinson v Ministry of Health [2010] NZHRRT 33/05. 
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that is, the three arms of government endure in their different roles, but as they 
endure they adapt. The important result of the Daniels Case is that the Court of 
Appeal did respect the provisions of the Education Act, and accepted 
parliament’s role in defining the rights at issue. 
Though the broadest implications of the initial Daniels judgment did not 
stand, the Crown still lost the case on appeal. The lesson is that, at the same 
time as officials must be increasingly alert to the risks of rights-based litigation, 
officials should never advise the minister to use a statutory power in an 
unlawful way. If officials get it wrong, they may suffer through months of 
recriminations in public meetings, and the taxpayer may have to pay large sums. 
Filling in the gaps 
The conclusion to this chapter on who makes the law is that judges, as well as 
parliament and its delegates, have a major role. It is like colouring in a picture.84
But what if there is an attempt to grab the pen? Who has the most important 
role? Whose law may trump? Clearly, parliament can override judge-made 
common law. The following chapter considers the obverse; whether judges can 
override legislation. If they can, it could mean that officials standing at the easel 
earnestly colouring in the sketch that parliament has drawn may find a judge 
tearing off a corner of the picture, or even whipping away the drawing to 
replace it with a new drawing in a new hand. 
 
Parliament uses a legislative pen to draw the black and white edges of the law. 
Officials use delegated authority and administrative practice to colour in the 
picture. The judges lean across from time to time to assess the quality of the 
artwork. Where judges consider that officials have drawn over the line, or used 
the wrong shade, they rub out the officials’ work and colour it in again. 
Occasionally, judges will take parliament’s drawing and point out that it can be 
re-interpreted, like an Escher drawing, and it really means something different 
from the first impression. It isn’t a struggle for dominance; it is simply the 
separation of powers, a constitutional conversation around the artist’s easel. 
                                                 
84 I am grateful to Nicola White for suggesting this analogy. 
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6 
Who Is in Charge Here? 
Overturning statute 
The first question in considering the extent of parliament’s sovereignty was who 
may make laws; it turns out that parliament does not have a monopoly. The 
second question is whether parliament’s laws are beyond review. The whole 
purpose of passing a statute is to make law. It seems simple that, having made 
an enactment, the Act so made is law. This was most memorably outlined by a 
prominent 19th century academic, Albert Venn Dicey, who said: 
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor 
less than this, namely that Parliament thus defined has, under the 
English constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatever; 
and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England 
as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.85
This was quoted with approval by the chief justice, Sir Richard Wild, as he 
delivered his judgment in Fitzgerald v Muldoon.
 
86 In that case an otherwise 
little-known public servant,87
Though the judgment in Fitzgerald v Muldoon caused a minor sensation at 
the time, and is often cited in legal texts, it could hardly be said to have carved 
new territory. As early as the 17th century, the then chief justice, Edward Coke, 
had firmly put James I in his place by declaring that the king had no power to 
set aside acts of parliament.
 Mr Fitzgerald, challenged the orders of the 
incoming prime minister, Robert Muldoon, that all collection of contributions 
for the New Zealand Superannuation scheme should cease, pending the repeal 
of the relevant legislation. That is, the government proclaimed that the statutory 
obligations to make and to collect superannuation payments were suspended. 
The chief justice declared that instruction unlawful, even though the new 
government had a clear majority and would soon repeal the law. 
88
                                                 
85 Dicey (1959, pp 39–40). 
86 Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615, 622. 
87 Unlike in other professions, little-known-ness (anonymity?) is an admirable state for public 
servants. 
88 Case of Proclamations (1611) 77 ER 1342. 
 And article 1 of the Bill of Rights of 1688, still 
part of our law, states (with the spelling as quoted by Chief Justice Wild in the 
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Fitzgerald v Muldoon judgment), ‘That the pretended power of suspending of 
laws or the execution of laws by regall authority without consent of Parlyament 
is illegall’.89
The constitutional position in New Zealand … is clear and 
unambiguous. Parliament is supreme and the function of the courts is 
to interpret the law as laid down by Parliament. The courts do not have 
a power to consider the validity of properly enacted laws.
 
The importance of the case was not its newness, but its reaffirmation of 
enduring legal principles; the battles that had been fought in England to assert 
parliamentary control over the king still have legal relevance in New Zealand. 
The message is clear; neither prime ministers nor bureaucrats have the power to 
suspend the law. The executive must operate within the law, as ordained by 
parliament. 
But what of the third arm of government, the courts? Are they also obliged 
to operate under parliament’s laws? A large number of court decisions have 
conceded that parliament does prevail. For example, as recently as 1991 the 
High Court said in a case brought by a tobacco company: 
90
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United 
Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral, 
political and other reasons against them doing them are so strong that 
most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did those 
things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of 
Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them the 
courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.
 
But however strongly one feels about the contractual rights of tobacco 
companies or superannuation contributions, they are not generally regarded as 
touching on basic human rights. Some more interesting questions might arise if 
parliament were to attack such rights. But even here there is strong judicial 
precedent to affirm parliament’s power. For example, a few year before the 
Fitzgerald case a distinguished British judge, Lord Reid, held: 
91
Given this string of legal precedents, what is the issue? Is there any basis 
for the claim from Dame Sian (as quoted at the beginning of this part) that 
parliament is not sovereign? Have courts ever stuck out an Act? Well, yes. The 
same Edward Coke who told James I that he could not overturn statute had, just 
 
                                                 
89 Halsbury Statutes of England (3rd ed) (1968, p 490) quoted in Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 
NZLR 615, 622. 
90 Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v Attorney-General [1991] 2 NZLR 323, 330.  
91 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645, 723. 
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the year before, set aside a statute because it breached natural justice.92
To understand the dimensions of parliamentary sovereignty in 
New Zealand, it may be useful to tease out its components. First, parliament is 
no longer legally subordinate to any external legislature.
 Some 
jurists wistfully look back to those bold days and wonder whether they should 
not behave similarly in similar cases. 
93
In the 21st century, it does not look so clear. Between then and now the 
world has witnessed genocide and the response at Nuremburg. It is well known 
that senior Nazis were tried and condemned for their roles. It may be less well 
known that those who carried out Nazi laws, up to and including judges, were 
also convicted. Their argument that they were simply administering the law was 
not a successful defence. 
 Second, there is no 
superior constitution that divides authority between different legislative bodies, 
as would be found in a federation. Third, the role of the monarch (or governor-
general) is to sign into law any bill duly passed by parliament. Fourth, 
parliament cannot bind its successors (other than procedurally), so any 
parliament may unmake a law made by any previous parliament. All these 
points may raise technical issues, but they are not contentious. 
A critical (fifth) component of the sovereignty doctrine is that the role of 
judges is to interpret and implement legislation, and that they are subordinate to 
parliament (meaning that statutes can override common law). And the strongest 
(sixth) component is that there is no higher principle or law that limits what 
parliament may enact. As a general rule the fifth component is accepted, but 
some hypothetical cases have raised doubt, especially with regard to the sixth 
proposition, that there is no higher principle than the will of parliament. 
An old hypothetical case demonstrates the issues that could be created by 
strict adherence to the proposition that there is no limit to the laws that 
parliament could enact. An example used in the 19th century to illustrate the 
extent of parliamentary sovereignty was the proposition that a law authorising 
the execution of all blue-eyed babies would be valid law. People working for the 
police, prisons, welfare agencies and the courts would be obliged to give effect 
to the law (or resign). Parents presumably might be punished for resisting the 
law. Clearly, the example was put forward precisely because it was offensive 
even to contemplate, and so it effectively demonstrated the extent of 
parliamentary authority. 
                                                 
92 Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b; 77 ER 646. 
93 Practical issues may arise in dealing with external authorities, but that is a different matter and is 
considered later.  
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Just as it is unthinkable that a New Zealand parliament would enact such 
legislation, it is now inconceivable that any New Zealand court would connive 
in the implementation of a blue-eyed-baby-execution law. The previous section 
illustrated the ability of the courts to interpret law to protect rights. It seems 
likely that a baby-killing law would be circumvented, perhaps by demanding 
more precise measurement of blueness, or requiring more precise language to 
override the rights of babies. But what if those technical approaches do not 
work? What about the more frontal issue of whether a court would simply strike 
down the law and declare it unlawful? 
Chapter 2 said that the constitution was based on the consent of the people 
and the rule of law. Most of the rest of the analysis has focused on the 
development of democracy – the consent of the people. But the rule of law is a 
separate issue. To most people it simply means obey the law, but when talking 
about making law it all gets a bit more complex. Any claim that there is some 
higher law that parliament must obey seems to be based on religion or some 
other mysterious source of law. But many legal thinkers, and judges, believe 
that some legal principles must be upheld, and some consider this could justify 
the courts striking out obnoxious legislation. 
To zealous democrats, this seems wrong. To them, the idea that elitist, non-
elected judges might seek to overturn the law as made by the people’s 
representatives is odious. That presumably is why parliament has moved to 
prevent it, by inserting parliamentary sovereignty into key legislation. For 
example, the explanatory note attached to the Constitution Amendment Act 
1973 says its purpose is ‘to make clear that Parliament has sovereign powers to 
make law’. Likewise, section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 includes the 
words, ‘Nothing in this Act affects New Zealand’s continuing commitment to 
the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament’. 
But these provisions simply give an impression of nervousness, not 
confidence. If parliamentarians believed that this provision was necessary to 
shore-up the powers of parliament, they would also realise that it must be 
ineffective. If parliamentary sovereignty was not already effective, an Act of 
parliament could not be the means of correcting the weakness. 
But what is going on here? Why do the chief justice and parliament appear 
to hold different views on the constitution? There are some real issues, but it is 
also another example of the confusion caused as people from different cultures 
talk past each other. A lifetime of considering legal issues and years on the 
bench considering the rights of litigants mean legal principles must weigh more 
heavily with judges than they do with politicians or officials. And it cannot be 
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denied that judges tend to have more knowledge of the law than those in 
parliament who enact statutes. 
Coming as the judiciary does from an environment of reason and respect, it 
is impressive that the judiciary accords deference to the output of parliament’s 
argumentative processes, and hardly surprising that some may wonder whether 
that democratic deference might be carried too far. In addition, in other 
jurisdictions such as the United States and Australia, the highest court has the 
power to strike down legislation; why not here? Given that background, 
consider some of the recent arguments against parliamentary sovereignty. 
Judicial concerns 
In the last decade, there has been considerable academic and judicial comment 
about parliamentary sovereignty; Dame Sian’s comments were not made in 
isolation.94 That debate has sought to clarify the balance of democracy and the 
rule of law, and as a result it is not always cast for a general audience. It tends to 
be at the edge, where statute law is at the same time supreme, but also possibly 
reviewable. Uncertainty prevails; it is as straightforward as quantum mechanics, 
but it may be even harder to apply in daily life. Issues such as ‘who is in charge 
here?’ seem bafflingly simple, but they raise matters at the very basis of the 
constitution and the law.95
A thorough outline of all the points made in this debate is not possible. 
Instead, consider one of the most vigorous arguments for change, put forward 
by a prominent judge, Sir Edmund Thomas. A decade ago, while he was a 
member of New Zealand’s then most senior court, the Court of Appeal, 
Sir Edmund made a speech about the relations between parliament and the 
 
Lawyers are expert in achieving a precise understanding of the law as it 
applies in any given circumstance, but the basic question of ‘what is law?’ is 
much harder, and will keep them debating for as long as the legal profession 
exists. Such things matter to the rest of us only when they imply a shift in the 
operations or structure of the law or the constitution. A change in our 
understanding of who determines the validity of statute law would be such a 
shift. 
                                                 
94 See footnote 41; Sir Robin Cooke, as he then was, also made important comments in this area, 
including in judgments; see footnote 106. 
95 Constitutional Arrangements Committee (2005). There is a good summary of the arguments by 
Matthew Palmer, Claudia Geiringer, and Nicola White in Appendix F of the committee’s report. 
The report also contains a helpful list of references. 
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courts.96
It is generally acknowledged that this radical change [proportional 
representation] was endorsed by a majority as a result of 
disenchantment with politicians rather than Parliament or the electoral 
system as such. The question, it is fair to say, is increasingly asked, are 
representative government and our democratic institutions as stable 
and secure as we might have thought?
 This speech is not selected as being representative of judicial opinion; 
when it comes to opinions on such matters most judicial commentary 
demonstrates a studied opacity, so it is hard to say what the average judge 
thinks. It is likely that Sir Edmund’s views are more radical than most judicial 
opinion, but it is because he stated a radical view that his arguments are clear, 
trenchant and easy to follow. 
Sir Edmund explained that several factors made the issue of parliamentary 
sovereignty more current. These include a world-wide interest in human rights 
issues, continued development of the role of judicial review, increased respect 
for the Treaty of Waitangi, and proportional representation – which he saw as 
increasing the risk of a small group negotiating law changes that more liberal 
majorities might otherwise have resisted. He also saw the role of politicians and 
the soundness of democracy being more subject to question: 
97
If Parliament [enacted] legislation undermining the democratic basis 
on which it exercises the sovereign power of the people, there is 
nothing in the notion of Parliament’s omnipotence which would 
preclude judicial resistance rather than obedience.
 
Sir Edmund suggested that it was inappropriate to think about sovereignty 
as attaching to any institution. He preferred the idea of ‘sovereignty of the 
people’ with parliament and the courts both operating ‘in the democratic service 
of the people’. The courts would protect the people, and their sovereignty, from 
any extreme Acts that parliament might pass. 
98
                                                 
96 Thomas (2000). Though this speech is a decade old, Ted Thomas is still accorded considerable 
respect; in late 2009, Victoria University of Wellington awarded him an honorary Doctor of 
Laws. 
97 Thomas (2000, Part II).  
98 Thomas (2000, Part IV). 
 
The basis for that judicial resistance was, in Sir Edmund’s mind, the inherent 
power of courts to declare what is lawful – either in statute or any other source 
of law. 
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Reduced to a minimum … Parliament’s legislative supremacy exists to 
the extent that courts give it recognition. The conferral of that 
recognition is in the nature of a self denying ordinance.99
Existence of an invalidation power 
 
Sir Edmund suggested it would be preferable if it were accepted that the 
courts have the power to declare statutes invalid in extreme cases. He 
acknowledged there would be some hostility, based on ‘misconceptions’. These, 
however, could be ‘brushed aside’ and a stronger working relationship could 
then be constructed between parliament and the courts. 
Although Sir Edmund’s views carry the arguments further than other 
judicial comment, the general direction of his comments is reflected in some 
extra-judicial commentary from other senior judges. There is a serious 
proposition here that can be analysed in three dimensions: the legal position of 
courts, the possible role of an invalidation power, and the political issues. 
First, can courts strike down statute? Lots of precedent says no, but  
Sir Edmund’s point that that is a self-restraining ordinance would imply a senior 
court could reverse the matter when necessary. The suggestion that parliament is 
sovereign because courts said so raises chicken and egg questions. Did not the 
power of the courts also derive from the king? But the historic fact that courts 
were able to declare both royal proclamations and statutes to be invalid in the 
17th century demonstrates that the power has existed at some time. 
In other parts of the world this power is common, sometimes explicitly 
provided in a written constitution. Perhaps the best known example is the 
United States, where the Supreme Court has used its authority to annul laws 
made by congress. In that case, the power is not explicit in the constitution. It 
was not until 1803, in the case of Marbury v Madision that the power was first 
asserted by the Supreme Court.100
One of the most recent cases in this area comes from Britain, the country 
with a constitution most similar to our own, and a shared legal tradition; it is the 
Foxhunting Case.
 It is now beyond question. If the United 
States Supreme Court could assert that power, why is it unthinkable for the 
New Zealand Supreme Court to do the same? 
101
                                                 
99 Thomas (2000, Part VI). 
100 Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137; 2 L Ed 60 (1803).  
 In this case supporters of blood sports went to the House of 
Lords (then Britain’s highest court), seeking to overturn parliament’s decision to 
101 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General (Foxhunting Case) [2005] 3 WLR 733. 
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outlaw foxhunting. The judgments are fascinating to read, but very 
disappointing for anyone hoping to understand anything about the finer points 
of foxhunting. Virtually all the judges begin their comments with some wistful 
points about the complete absence of any direct reference to hunting in the case. 
It seems that they were regretting that they did not get a last chance at yoicks, 
tally-ho and jumping over hedges. 
The technicalities of the case revolved around how the law had been made. 
The House of Lords (as part of parliament) had never approved the law and it 
was enacted solely by the House of Commons and the Queen, in line with 
empowering legislation made in the 1940s – also by the House of Commons, 
without agreement from the Lords (but in line with earlier empowering 
legislation). In effect the 21st century Foxhunting Case revolved around 
whether the previous 1940s empowering legislation was valid. It is just the kind 
of issue that makes people impatient with lawyers, but it is an essential issue. 
But who is to say whether legislation is valid? Was it a question for the courts? 
The law lords in the House of Lords (as a court) decided yes. 
The appellants have raised a question of law which cannot, as such, be 
resolved by Parliament. But it would not be satisfactory if it could not 
be resolved at all. So it seems to me necessary that the courts should 
resolve it, and that to do so involves no breach of constitutional 
propriety.102
The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of 
place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of 
Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a 
construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that 
is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the 
courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different basis 
of constitutionalism.
 
This rather supports Sir Edmund’s proposition that the sovereignty of 
parliament was a gift from the courts. Lord Justice Steyn went on to envisage a 
scenario when the gift could be taken back. 
103
Clearly, the House of Lords considered it could consider the validity of 
legislation if necessary, which was a significant judgment. The reason why most 
non-lawyers did not notice the case was that, in spite of all the careful reasoning 
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about their powers, the court decided the law was validly made so there was no 
reason to use their power. This means that Lord Steyn’s comments are, in the 
jargon, obiter dicta. That means, roughly, something else that the judge said that 
was too juicy to ignore, but not essential to the judgment so not strictly a 
precedent. All the case really established was that there are grounds on which 
the courts may consider the validity of statute; that in itself is significant. 
As a result of the judicial comments in the Foxhunting Case, and the 
behaviour of courts in other jurisdictions, it seems that the traditional view that 
the courts cannot overturn any part of statute law is no longer open and shut. It 
is at least arguable that in certain circumstances the courts could declare 
statutory provisions to be unlawful. 
Scope of an invalidation power 
The second question to consider about invalidation is, if courts could strike 
down statutes, would they do it? If the courts do have a power to strike down 
legislation, when might they use that power? All those asserting the power are 
careful to point out that it would be used only in limited circumstances when 
fundamental issues are at stake. In general, the power of parliament to legislate 
and the obligation of the courts to uphold that law are not questioned. Issues 
arise only when parliament threatens a basic constitutional provision. 
Perhaps this can be best understood as an example of a constitutional 
conversation. History has not delivered us a finalised constitution, written in 
stone. The constitution is not static; it is constantly being made by the actions of 
office-holders, the passage of legislation and the decisions of the courts. Dicey 
compared it to a honeycomb, constantly built by a hive of bees. If one of the 
three arms of government moves in a way that modifies previous 
understandings that will be noted elsewhere. If the change is generally 
acceptable, behaviours will change to exploit whatever new opportunities are 
created. If the change is not welcomed, a response is likely that either seeks to 
reverse the change or to readjust the constitutional balance elsewhere. In this 
context, the power of judicial invalidation of statute could be the means by 
which the courts would respond to an Act that alters the constitutional balance 
in an unacceptable way.104
legislation which raises a fundamental constitutional issue and places 
in jeopardy the basis of representative government, the rule of law, or 
 
Sir Edmund saw the issue arising in the context of: 
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the fundamental rights and freedoms which are embedded in the 
democratic ideals.105
In contemplating a comprehensive approach to basic rights, Sir Edmund is 
an inheritor of a proud judicial tradition in New Zealand. As long ago as 1984, 
the then president of the Court of Appeal, later Lord Cooke, said, ‘some 
common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not 
override them’.
 
That list comes from Sir edmund’s perception of the courts as the guardians 
of the people’s sovereignty; that require protection of democracy, the law and 
human rights. This would set some limits on the possible invalidation power. 
For example, it would probably not involve the courts defending the rights of 
English squires to set packs of dogs on to foxes (or of New Zealand pig-hunters 
to do the same thing), but it conceivably could raise issues about legislative 
powers to enforce a hunting ban, depending on how draconian such powers 
might be. That is, the issue could come up in all sorts of areas that most people 
would not think of as constitutional. 
106
Enjoyment of the basic human rights are [sic] the entitlement of every 
citizen, and their protection the obligation of every civilised state. 
They are inherent in and essential to the structure of every society. 
They do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in which they 
are declared.
 This represents both a strong suggestion to parliament that 
the courts will put up with only so much and a vague indication of what kind of 
behaviour will be unacceptable. It is a bit like a parent telling a child to be good. 
The child may know there will be consequences from being bad, but badness as 
such is still undefined. 
Another comment from the Court of Appeal in the 1990s adopts a similar 
approach. It was made by Justice Hardie-Boyes, who later went on to be 
governor-general: 
107
For those who look to the courts to protect their rights, this is inspirational 
stuff. For those with a more black and white view of the law, or die-hard 
defenders of parliamentary superiority, it is very scary. If it does not matter how 
the rights are declared, how do the courts know they are rights? Claiming they 
are inherent in society is fraught with risk; for example, feminist thinkers would 
point out that society tends to be patriarchal, and may therefore be a poor source 
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for identifying universal rights. So where do the rights come from? Perhaps 
judges just know these things. But there is no entrance exam for judges, so how 
can we be sure they know the right set of rights? 
The answer, of course, is that their knowledge of rights comes from their 
experience and exposure to professional discourse and legal methodology. But 
those are not directly tested in the wider democratic debate, and from the point 
of view of other players in the system the assertion of a range of variously 
specified rights may seem provocative. In terms of the constitutional 
conversation analogy, if the courts were to invalidate a law on such grounds, it 
would appear to others as the abrupt opening of a new topic for discussion. It 
could well lead to a vigorous argument – shouting and tears before bedtime. 
That is, there might be a political response.108
In exceptional circumstances, involving an attempt to abolish judicial 
review or the ordinary role of the courts, the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords or the new Supreme Court may have to consider 
whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign 
Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons 
cannot abolish.
 
Sir Edmund’s list of the possible grounds for judicial invalidation can be 
contrasted with the approach taken by the British judges in the Foxhunting 
Case. In that case a couple of judges affirmed that a challenge to legislative 
validity could be possible, but it is noticeable that they focused on one example. 
In particular, Lord Steyn, in a continuation from his words quoted in the 
previous section, said: 
109
The courts will treat with considerable suspicions (and may even 
reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing 
governmental action affecting the rights of individuals from all judicial 
scrutiny.
 
Similarly, Baroness Hale said: 
110
                                                 
108 The possible political response is considered in the next section.  
 
That is, the judges were not envisaging some future time when they would 
launch out to open a new topic in the constitutional conversation. Instead, they 
were giving notice of what they thought should be the court’s response if 
parliament were to act against the courts. 
109 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General (Foxhunting Case) [2005] 3 WLR 733, 767. 
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The law lords are quite right to see protection of that role as fundamental, 
and they have picked a compelling example of the kind of issue that might 
justify invalidating a statute. Irrespective of the question of the powers of courts 
to invalidate legislation, the role of the courts in judicial oversight of the 
government is vital. People’s rights and interests may be threatened by 
ministerial policy or official ineptitude; either way, society looks to the courts 
for protection. 
It seems the example did not arise spontaneously. During the last decade 
British ministers have openly contemplated using statute to restrict or prevent 
judicial review. In particular, there has been considerable controversy about a 
proposal that immigration tribunals should be removed from judicial review, 
even on points of law. Immigration cases inevitably involve sensitive issues of 
rights. Being forced to leave a country and live elsewhere is a major upheaval; 
when it was done to citizens, it was called exile and was just below execution in 
the hierarchy of punishments. It is hardly surprising that courts see an important 
role in ensuring that rights are not flouted in such cases. In that context, the 
comments from the judges in the Foxhunting Case do not amount to a claim for 
power so much as a defensive restatement of ancient responsibilities. 
Looking back at the president of the Court of Appeal’s 1984 comment 
about rights that parliament may not override, it is useful to remember the 
context. This comment was made after nine years of government led by  
Sir Robert Muldoon, and in the context of sweeping government controls 
involving the use of regulations to overturn the effect of statutory provisions, 
and in the aftermath of the massive police operation at the time of the Springbok 
tour. The judiciary may well have been feeling provoked at that time. It is not so 
clear what recent government actions would provoke judicial warnings now. 
Response to an invalidation power 
The third question about the possibility of invalidation is, even if courts could 
and would use the power, should they? That is, having established that there is 
an arguable case for an invalidation power, even if any such power would apply 
in only extraordinary circumstances, it is now useful to explore what might 
happen if an order were made to declare a legislative provision invalid. 
If parliament has declared that something is lawful, and the Supreme Court 
says that parliament’s law is unlawful, the instinct of a pugnacious politician 
might be to ignore the court’s order – after all, such a ruling is sufficiently 
unusual as to render it questionable. But that response leads nowhere, because 
there is no court in which the judgment can be questioned. In the interim, 
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officials would be in an invidious position, serving ministers who were giving 
directions that the court had ruled unlawful. Since the first obligation of public 
servants is to obey the law, and the Supreme Court is the arbiter of what is 
lawful, any ministerial instruction to ignore the court would have to be defied. 
Stress within the executive would be enormous. 
But direct resistance is unlikely to be the reaction. Adhering to court orders 
is a regular response for the government, and the consequences of defiance, with 
constitutional crisis and economic uncertainty, would be unpalatable. This 
suggests the court simply needs to chance its arm by declaring some statute 
invalid and it will win. A new constitutional reality would exist. Let’s all run 
down to the Supreme Court and cheer them on. 
Well, maybe, but the constitutional conversation would be only beginning. 
Exactly how parliament might respond would depend on the political 
circumstance of the day. The outcome of a technical constitutional debate would 
most likely depend on public opinion. If it were possible to assemble the votes 
in parliament, the government might simply pass another bill and dare the court 
to try again. Alternatively, the government might have an opportunity to test 
public opinion in an election. If it wins, the court might face a government that 
is strengthened by a strong mandate for the old policy. The game might play out 
all over again. The number of permutations is huge. 
Part of the problem is that in the absence of a codified constitution there is 
no predetermined process for determining the outcome. In countries where 
judges do strike down statute there is generally a written constitution that can be 
appealed to. If the public do not like what the court has done then there is a 
process that can be followed to change the constitution. For example, groups 
that are opposed to abortion have been trying to amend the United States 
constitution for years in order to overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions. In 
New Zealand no clear process is available; in effect, the constitution would be 
seen as whatever the judges say it is. Perhaps a codified constitution would 
emerge. Such a constitution might enshrine judicial authority, but it might also 
limit judges’ powers. 
If an invalidation power became real, the cabinet’s task would change. As 
well as maintaining a majority in parliament to support its policies, it would 
have to persuade the court. That would make the dynamic between the court, the 
government and parliament significantly different. Sir Edmund suggested that 
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once the misconceptions were brushed aside the new relationship would allow 
the evolution of a ‘more mature conception of democracy’111
the relationship of Parliament and the courts is one in the nature of a 
fruitful partnership in the law-making business together, but with 
Parliament the dominant partner working within the constitution.
 in which: 
112
I believe that New Zealanders were, and still are, fundamentally 
suspicious of judges. … [J]udges are unelected, elite, former lawyers. 
Politicians may be trusted even less, but at least they can be ejected 
from government every three years.
 
These comments overlook the implications of the iron rule. Parliament is 
far too preoccupied with its own concerns to be a sensible partner for anyone. 
The idea that parliamentarians would have their misconceptions swept away and 
work happily with the courts in a joint endeavour to create good law forgets the 
competitions and struggles that already consume the time and energy of 
politicians. 
On the contrary, the risk is that as the courts were seen to take a partnership 
role in validating laws made by parliament, they would become subject to some 
of the public and media scrutiny that is now directed at parliament. Judges are 
well used to professional criticism; it is exacting and regular. But public 
criticism and media scrutiny would lift to a new level. The same unpopularity 
that Sir Edmund mentioned in relation to politicians may well spread to judges 
once they are seen as major players in making law. 
In fact, it is not clear that judges are widely loved now. During the lead-up 
to the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, many submissions 
opposed enacting a power for judges to strike down laws that conflicted with the 
rights in the Act. Many submitters did not want to see judicial authority raised 
above parliament. Perhaps it is part of the New Zealand culture; this is an area 
Matthew Palmer has written on: 
113
The politicisation process would not end with public opprobrium. The 
obvious response from the executive faced with a court determined to play a 
more active role in unmaking legislation would be to review the process for the 
appointment of judges. The current process is largely dominated by the judges, 
 
If people voiced concern when the power of invalidation was contemplated, the 
reaction may be even stronger if the power were ever used. 
                                                 
111 Thomas (2000, Part VI). 
112 Thomas (2000, Part VII).  
113 Palmer (2007, p 585). 
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but there seems nothing to stop the attorney-general from putting more weight 
on other factors. Even without changing the current presumption against party 
political considerations, the attorney-general could put more emphasis on the 
views of candidates and their approach to the law. The exacting and highly 
politicised processes followed by the United States senate in confirming judicial 
appointments is largely a result of the Supreme Court’s role in the United States. 
Where judges take an active role in determining schools policy or abortion law, 
then whatever role they may think they are playing they will be seen as acting 
politically. If judges are seen to be playing a political role then others will use 
them for their own ends; inevitably, the iron rule will start to affect them. 
Concluding thoughts on invalidation 
Judges already have considerable flexibility in the process of interpreting 
statutes, and most of the concerns they face can be addressed through 
interpretation, so why would they want to change? Some, it seems would like to 
be more open about their approach. Sir Edmund, again, ‘I know of no rule of 
law or logic which would make judicial disobedience more palatable simply 
because it is done covertly’.114
To sum up, for those who have got a little confused along the way, the 
power for the courts to strike down laws is a power that seems to exist and not 
exist at the same time. It is like quantum physics, where the physicist shoves a 
cat into a box and declares it is both alive and dead at the same time.
 Perhaps this is what someone steeped in the law 
would say. The problem here is that palatability is a matter of taste; it has 
nothing to do with law or logic. It might be more sensible to look to diplomacy 
or politics; these both suggest that finding an acceptable way to express an 
uncomfortable truth can be a more successful strategy than frontal assault. 
Rather than Sir Edmund’s view that the courts have followed a self-denying 
ordinance, it is as reasonable to suggest that they have followed a self-protecting 
ordinance. That does not mean they have shrunk from their duty. Over the years, 
the courts in New Zealand have taken on a succession of governments and 
protected the rights of citizens, without resort to invalidating statutes. Judges are 
influential already, so why would any court jeopardise the current balance? 
Judges are picked for their judgment, not foolhardiness. 
115
                                                 
114 Thomas (2000, Part VI). Dame Sian Elias (2005, p 72) quotes a point to similar effect from Lord 
Leven.  
 
115 This is probably not an accurate reflection of quantum physics or the behaviour of physicists.  
Do not use this book as an authority on quantum; it is not a physics textbook, even more than it 
is not a legal textbook. 
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Likewise, with views on the judicial power to rescind statute; they could do it, 
and maybe not; they would do it and they certainly would not; they should do it 
and they should not. The position is crystallised by an authority on confusion, 
Terry Pratchett, ‘Everybody may be right, all at the same time. That’s the thing 
about quantum’.116
Having dealt with making and unmaking laws, the next issue is getting 
things done. 
 Unfortunately, unlike quantum, when you open the box and 
look inside to see whether the judges do or do not have the power to unmake 
statute, you definitely will not find a cat to stroke. 
That may suggest that this whole discussion of invalidation has been a 
diversion, but it has served to illustrate the issues that arise between the areas of 
jurisdictions under the separation of powers. It also serves as a reminder; if a 
future government does act against fundamental provisions of the constitution, 
the court might strike it down. 
This has relevance for officials. Sometimes frustrated ministers or select 
committees may contemplate a change in the law to enforce their will. The 
frustration may even be focused on the courts, and the proposed new law might 
abrogate judicial authority. In that context the official should remind politicians 
that the theoretical threat of invalidation could become real. Ministers and 
parliament might not like the response that their actions could provoke. 
Offering unwanted advice in such a context can feel scary, but that advice 
would be in everyone’s interest, including officialdom. Staying within the law is 
complex enough in the present constitutional conversation. Provoking a crisis in 
which the invalidation debate was crystallised could make thing worse. 
                                                 
116 Pratchett (1992). 
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7 
Who Makes Things Happen? 
Controllers of all they survey? 
Continuing the theme on the limits of parliament’s powers, this chapter 
introduces practicalities that limit parliament’s reach. There is still a focus on 
laws, but this chapter touches on parliament’s capacity in other areas, including 
some more everyday activities of government workers. It starts to discuss 
government in its wider sense; not just policy-makers in Wellington, but people 
working in communities throughout New Zealand. However, though the focus 
widens, this is not a book on government management; inner processes of 
public service agencies, and the details of public service interactions with 
ministers remain beyond the scope of this work. 
The idea of a sovereign and all-powerful parliament conveys the impression 
of an institution that can do anything. Surely, an all-powerful parliament could 
stop droughts; or, if that is too hard, it could save children from being beaten by 
their parents; or, if social engineering is beyond them, members of parliament 
(MPs) could connect communities by building roads wherever they are needed. 
In fact, parliament can do none of those things. 
Though we now understand that humanity is affecting the climate, the 
weather is still mainly controlled by the laws of physics, not parliamentary 
statute. As a rule, parliament does not try to repeal the laws of physics. This was 
not always so. In the past, there was one basic fact of physics that parliament 
presumed to control; the passage of time. When parliament took urgency the 
Speaker would order that the clocks be stopped, so as to create the fiction that 
the session was contained in one sitting day. By this means parliament created a 
miraculous time-warp; in the chamber the exhausted MPs were still in 
Thursday, while others were watching their children play Saturday sport. Sadly, 
in these more prosaic days, parliament has abandoned that whimsy; all MPs are 
now supposed to know what day it is. 
As to protecting children from their parents, there is a world of difference 
between enacting a statute and controlling behaviour. Parliament can make 
laws, but it cannot make people be nice to each other. During the Foxhunting 
Case Lord Hope mused on this social limitation on sovereignty: 
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Parliamentary sovereignty is an empty principle if legislation is passed 
which is so absurd or so unacceptable that the population at large 
refuse to recognise it as law.117
Authorising or directing 
 
Fortunately, most parents do not beat their children, but that may not have much 
to do with the law. 
Recognising the laws of physics and the realities of social interaction are 
one thing, but surely parliament can build a road. Well, in theory it could make 
a law requiring that a particular road be built; and creating a duty that a certain 
person or entity builds the road; and providing the funds for the land, labour and 
materials; and setting aside all local and central government permit 
requirements; and determining the precise location and specification for every 
camber and layer of tar seal; and even making it an offence if the responsible 
entity does not get the road built by next year; and probably making it an 
offence to hinder the operations of the road builders; and maybe creating a 
public duty to assist the road builders. But none of that is the same as building a 
road – nor would it be a good use of parliament’s time. 
The point is that it is not parliament’s role to deliver government 
programmes. It is not even parliament’s role to say what shall happen; 
parliament says what may or may not happen. To accomplish anything, 
parliament needs the executive. The central point of this chapter is that though 
the executive is accountable through ministers to parliament, it does not run, 
direct or control the executive. 
Parliament does not exist to make things happen; it either authorises or funds 
activities or forbids them. It is for ministers to direct what shall happen; 
parliament sets the boundaries around ministers’ powers. 
This can be very frustrating for those MPs not in cabinet. It is common at 
select committee hearings that a first-term MP will demand that a public servant 
do as they are told by the MP. Public servants, however, appear to assist the 
committee, at the direction of the minister.118
Sometimes ministers and MPs seek to blur the distinctions between the 
legislature and the executive, perhaps hoping to reduce the frustrations of sitting 
on parliament’s backbenches. Ministers, especially those new to office, 
 They do not work for the 
committee or for parliament; they work for the minister of the day. 
                                                 
117 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General (Foxhunting Case) [2005] 3 WLR 733, 773. 
118 The role of officials at select committees is outlined in State Services Commission (2007). 
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occasionally direct officials to act on the instructions of another MP. This is a 
mistake that generally leads to confusion or worse. The problem is that the 
backbenchers are not subject to any of the disciplines of the executive: they do 
not negotiate priorities with their colleagues, they do not account to parliament 
for their performance, and they have no ongoing relationship with officials 
which might otherwise moderate unreasonable behaviour. An example of this 
was seen in 2009. Hone Harawira, a Māori party MP, was given control over a 
consultation process. That would seem a simple task, but within months he was 
sending expletive-laden threatening emails to officials.119
Delegations to backbenchers are not the norm; the reality is that the 
executive is led by ministers. But even they are fully occupied leading and 
accounting for government activity; they do not do the work of government. It is 
the tens of thousands of public servants and the hundreds of thousands in the 
wider state service who do the government’s work. They act under the authority 
of parliamentary statutes,
 It is difficult to do 
much about such behaviour; if a minister loses control, the prime minister can 
act, but the prime minister has very little influence over backbenchers. 
120
                                                 
119 Hartevelt (2009).  
120 Or some ancient prerogatives. 
 but not under parliamentary direction. 
The cabinet is commonly referred to as the government. This makes some 
sense, because it is cabinet that stands in parliament to be accountable for all 
government activity. But the government is not 20 people in the Beehive. They 
are the political directors of the government, with oversight and responsibility, 
but the government is a much bigger and diverse thing. 
On a remote East Coast beach, the fisheries inspector who accosts 
suspected poachers is the government. In an alpine valley, the Department of 
Consrvation ranger who collects hut fees is the government. In a Work and 
Income New Zealand office in Manukau, the clerk who declines an application 
for a benefit is the government. In an office in Wellington, the Environmental 
Risk Management Authority committee that authorises the use of a hazardous 
chemical is the government. 
During the 20th century the role of government steadily grew, taking in 
social services as well as economic development and regulation. This meant that 
the task of managing has grown. But it is not just a matter of scale, or even of 
diversity; it is the particular responsibilities involved in exercising the powers of 
government that create unique issues. 
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State servants treat the sick, teach children and support the poor, but anyone 
could do that. State servants also imprison people, compel households and 
businesses to pay taxes, use force to maintain order, and take children from their 
parents, and nobody else may do those things. The executive is the biggest and 
most powerful force in the land. Its impact on daily lives is huge, and people 
may not choose not to have dealings with it. 
To manage these executive processes ministers and officials do many tasks 
without reference to parliament. These tasks include making appointments to 
key positions, contracting for the provision of services, borrowing funds and 
conducting international diplomacy. In the process, they make long-term 
commitments that must be met by future taxpayers. 
Given the significance of the executive, it is not surprising that the iron rule 
drives parliamentarians to struggle for control. It is also not surprising that the 
everyday paradox will regularly ensnare officials when they come near 
parliament. Officials deal with so many issues of such significance to the lives 
of New Zealanders that parliamentarians cannot ignore officialdom. But being 
in the sights of backbench MPs is not the same as being under their direction. 
Executive law-making 
The executive is accountable to parliament, but not under the control of 
parliament; that is simply another statement of the separation of powers. But, as 
with all of the boundaries in this constitutional structure, there are ambiguities 
and frictions. Contrary to the general picture of parliament being supreme, it is 
very often the actions of officials in the executive that push the boundaries. This 
is most graphic in making laws. Law-making is pre-eminently a role of 
parliament but, though parliament may keep out of executive activities, the 
executive does not keep out of law-making. This occurs explicitly, under 
delegation; implicitly, by the creation of practices and conventions; and 
effectively, by the creation of new realities. These are the processes by which 
officials colour in the picture to make the law; sometimes extending the picture 
beyond the outlines that parliament has sketched. 
The process of making law by regulations and rules was considered in 
chapter 5. This process is explicitly mandated by parliament and supervised by 
the Regulation Review Committee of parliament. 
Delegated law-making is explicit, but creating conventions is more subtle 
and implicit. Conventions are not merely the generally accepted practices of the 
day, but are those regularly observed behaviours that serve to make the 
constitution operate. They are created by the actions of various office-holders, 
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many from the executive. They require continued observance by all involved or 
they disappear. Disappearance is not hard for something that is as insubstantial 
and inchoate as constitutional convention. 
Though they are hard to grasp, there is general agreement as to the 
significance of constitutional conventions, ‘Shorn of conventional rules actually 
observed, the legal constitution would be an irrelevant metaphor’.121
Some of the major conventions are more significant than the laws recorded 
in the Constitution Act 1986.
 
122 For example, section 16 of the Act simply says 
that statutes become law when signed by the governor-general. It does not refer 
to the convention that the governor-general will assent to bills, despite personal 
views. This convention has been binding since 1829; at that time George IV 
signed a bill that he opposed, because he accepted it was his duty to do so. In 
1877 the convention applied in New Zealand when the governor-general signed 
a bill that parliament had passed in the face of advice from the premier,  
Sir George Grey, that he should refuse his assent.123
One convention that has recently been clarified and complied with is the 
caretaker convention. This convention is recorded in the Cabinet Manual and 
has applied on several occasions during the period between an election and the 
formation of a new government. However, though the general idea of caretaker 
government has a long history, in New Zealand it was little more than a 
curiosity until the aftermath of the 1984 election, when Sir Robert Muldoon 
refused to act on the advice of the incoming government. In the following years, 
the Cabinet Manual was expanded to outline a series of steps for the 
transition.
 
It would be a rare MP who would see any problem in the convention that 
the governor-general should assent to bills, but other conventions are not so 
entrenched or even widely agreed. And if it is not absolutely clear which are the 
conventions of the day, it is even less clear how they emerge. 
124
                                                 
121 Joseph (2007, p 215). 
122 Joseph (2007, p 217). 
123 Joseph (2007, p 310). 
124 Cabinet Office (2008, p 75).  
 This convention has become much more significant with the 
introduction of proportional representation and the new reality that government 
formation can take some time. The rules reflect a similar approach to that taken 
in other Westminster countries, but they are not identical. For example, in 
New Zealand, our caretaker convention applies only after an election; in 
Australia, the caretaker period applies during the election campaign. There is no 
legal basis for the difference, just history. 
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But other conventions develop all the time. For example, in 2002 the 
ombudsmen recognised the significance of the need for confidentiality of advice 
from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.125
International agreements 
 Successive chief 
executives of the department and successive prime ministers had regarded the 
briefings as confidential. This was, in part, to allow the inclusion of information 
that could assist prime ministers to carry out their obligation to assess the 
effectiveness of individual ministers; this assessment would be inhibited if the 
information were public. The department was established only in 1987, but by 
2002 the actions of three chief executives and five prime ministers had 
established a pattern that the ombudsmen acknowledged. The ombudsmen did 
not use the term ‘convention’ but they accepted the practice as something to 
assist the prime minister to do her job. 
Neither of these examples was ever the subject of parliamentary debate or 
acceptance; that is not how conventions are made. The action of officials 
working with ministers develops practices that harden into conventions. That is, 
the constitution (but not strictly the law) is amended implicitly. 
But as well as the explicit process of regulation and the implicit process of 
evolving practice, there are other areas where executive action effectively 
creates reality that shapes the law. The use of manuals and directives creates 
procedures and criteria that apply in many aspects of government decision-
making. From the point of view of citizens dealing with the government these 
are binding constraints, even if not spelled out in the law. Unlike formal rules or 
regulations, they cannot be rescinded by parliament’s Regulations Review 
Committee. They exist at the behest of officials, until they are tested by judicial 
review. 
A more significant area where executive action can create legal reality is in 
international relations. Once an international treaty has been made, there is an 
obligation in international law to put it into effect. This may require amendment 
to legislation to ensure compliance. Such treaties inhibit parliament from future 
legislation that would breach the treaty. That is, treaties have a major legal 
impact. But treaties are negotiated and agreed by the executive. 
Historically, it is obvious why treaties belonged to the executive; they 
related primarily to national security, which is the executive’s responsibility. 
But in the last century, treaties have been transformed to cover matters such as 
                                                 
125 Office of the Ombudsmen (2002, pp 29–34). 
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international law-making (the law of the sea), trade (the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, and various bilateral trade deals), social matters (the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), and 
environmental matters (the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change). As the world 
has become more interconnected it has become necessary to coordinate policies 
and laws in many more areas. 
In response to this, parliament has introduced a procedure for it to review 
treaties before they are ratified. A treaty must be put before parliament with a 
national interest report explaining why the treaty will benefit New Zealand. The 
treaty is then referred to a select committee, which considers the treaty and 
reports back on matters of concern. It remains the government’s decision 
whether or not to ratify the treaty. 
This is not an empty process. In 2004, a treaty was agreed between 
Australia and New Zealand to establish a trans-Tasman therapeutics board that 
would regulate the production and sale of therapeutic goods in both countries. 
The officials who had negotiated the deal were particularly proud because they 
had achieved a structure that improved effectiveness of regulation while 
achieving substantially equal control with Australia. But the select committee 
recommended against the treaty.126
                                                 
126 Health Select Committee (2004, p 9). 
 Despite that recommendation, the 
government went ahead and introduced legislation to bring the new agency into 
being. To the acute embarrassment of ministers and officials, there were not 
enough votes to pass the bill. There is still no such body regulating therapeutics, 
and New Zealand is in breach of a treaty. 
The important constitutional point here is, how far should the democratic 
requirement for parliamentary affairs give way to the practical reality of 
international diplomacy, which is so complex that it is not amenable to 
negotiation by a parliament of 120 MPs? Parliamentary control has precedent 
here. In the United States, the senate must agree to accede to a treaty. This is 
commendably democratic, but the uncertainty involved for other counties faced 
with the risk that a treaty might be amended in the senate has inhibited some 
diplomacy. Presumably, such inhibition would be even greater for countries 
contemplating a deal with a tiny country in the South Pacific. 
If making treaties is a little complex, what about going to war? The 
following case study illustrates how matters can unfold when parliament tries to 
participate in an executive function, even one as grave as going to war. 
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Case study – going to war 
On 3 October 2001, just three weeks after the attack on the World Trade Centre 
in New York, parliament considered New Zealand’s response – joining the 
international military operation in Afghanistan.127
That this House declares its support for the offer of Special Air 
Services troops and other assistance as part of the response of the 
United States and the international coalition to the terrorist attacks that 
were carried out on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington and 
Pennsylvania.
 Parliament had already 
recorded its outrage and distress on 12 September, when it resolved to work 
with others to stamp out terrorism. Now it was time for something more 
specific. As the debate began, the Speaker noted the significance of the matter 
and asked for more decorum than is usual for most debates. 
The prime minster, Helen Clark, began by outlining recent events, 
including New Zealand’s work with the Americans and others since the 9/11 
attacks. She moved the following motion: 
128
As is usual at such times, the prime minister was followed by the leader of 
the opposition, Jenny Shipley. She noted her concern that the government had 
not made earlier strong comments in support of the United States, but welcomed 
the decision to send the Special Air Services (SAS) to Afghanistan. She then 
moved an amendment
 
129
The third speaker was Jim Anderton, the deputy prime minister and leader 
of the next largest party, the Alliance. He responded to Jenny Shipley’s 
concerns about lateness by referring to comments he had made on  
12 September, when he was acting prime minister, and went on to focus  
on the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council that had called  
for international action against terrorists. He moved a further amendment to 
insert after the words ‘declares its support’, ‘for United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373’.
 to add at the end of the resolution the words, ‘and 
totally supports the actions of the United States’. 
130
                                                 
127 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, pp 11,996–
12,017).  
128 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 11,996). 
129 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 11,998). 
130 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 11,999). This 
amendment lapsed because it was not consistent with Standing Orders; even senior members can 
have difficulty remembering all the rules. 
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Then it was the turn of Richard Prebble from ACT. He was all in favour of 
sending the SAS, but was concerned that past diplomatic strains had prevented 
joint training with American troops. He moved that the amendment to the 
motion be further amended by adding after the words ‘United States’, the 
words: 
this House notes New Zealand is still legally a member of the ANZUS 
Alliance and further that the Australian House of Representatives has 
passed a resolution that the terrorist attack of 11 September is an attack 
under article IV and V of ANZUS, and therefore this House declares 
the terrorist attack on America to be under article IV and V of the 
ANZUS agreement to be an attack on New Zealand. 131
and in accordance with international law, with the objective of 
apprehending terrorists and bringing them to trial, not for revenge or 
retaliation.
 
It was during Richard Prebble’s speech that Labour ministers started to interject. 
The next speaker was Keith Locke, representing the Green Party. He 
opened with appreciation that the government had agreed to have the debate 
before troops were deployed and deplored the 9/11 attacks. However, he 
expressed doubt whether military deployment would succeed in bringing 
terrorists to justice; perhaps it would be better to send investigatory officers to 
help identify the culprits. He moved a further amendment to the amendment by 
adding after the words ‘New Zealand’, the words: 
132
We have now got an amendment, an amendment to an amendment, and 
an amendment to an amendment to an amendment, and it is going on 
and on.
 
There was understandable procedural confusion by this time. Wyatt Creech, 
the deputy leader of the National party, sought clarity, saying: 
133
The next speaker, Winston Peters, largely confined his comments to 
attacking Keith Locke, in the face of various points of order as his direct attacks 
were ruled to go too far. He supported the government motion, and refrained 
 
The Speaker tried to simplify things by having the House debate the 
amendments one by one, but this was not agreed. 
                                                 
131 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 12,001). 
132 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 12,004).  
He seems to be amending the ACT amendment, but his amendment is hard to follow. 
133 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 12,010). 
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from further amendments. Peter Dunne also spoke to support the motion without 
further amendment. 
The House dealt with the amendments from the Green Party and from 
ACT. There were 17 votes for the Green Party’s motion, including 10 votes 
from the Alliance; that is, one of the parties in a government that was sending 
troops into battle voted to limit the SAS objective to apprehending terrorists. It 
is unclear how the SAS could do that in the middle of a battle between United 
States–led troops and Afghan fighters; it looks like a dangerous job. The ACT 
amendment to revise history by re-creating the ANZUS alliance also failed, but 
it attracted 53 votes from ACT, National, New Zealand First and the United party. 
After further speeches the minister of defence, Mark Burton, moved to tidy 
things up by moving a further amendment to the amendment (that is, the 
National party amendment) by omitting all the words after ‘supports’, and 
inserting the following words: 
the approach taken by the United States of America, and further 
declares its support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1368 and 1373.134
That this House declares its support for the offer of Special Air 
Services troops and other assistance as part of the response of the 
United States and the international coalition to the terrorist attacks that 
were carried out on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, and 
Pennsylvania and totally supports the approach taken by the United 
States of America, and further declares its support for United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373.
 
After more speakers but no further amendment, the amendments were 
agreed to, but, understandably, members asked for clarification on what they 
were voting for. They all knew it was about Afghanistan and the SAS, but 
beyond that it was a little confusing. The motion was finally put as follows: 
135
Democracy or farce? 
 
This motion was finally carried with the votes of every party except the Green 
Party, which voted against. 
The background to this debate is instructive. It had not been normal practice for 
parliament to vote on a deployment of troops before. There is certainly no legal 
                                                 
134 ‘Debate: Terrorist attacks – Special Air Services commitment’ (Hansard, 2001, p 12,012). 
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necessity for such a motion. In 1999, when the previous government had made a 
much larger deployment of troops to East Timor there was a special sitting of 
parliament to debate the matter. But on that occasion, the motion was less 
ambitious. On 17 September 1999, the prime minister, Jenny Shipley, began the 
debate on the deployment with the following motion, ‘That the House do now 
adjourn until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, 5 October 1999’.136
Jim Anderton is not alone in seeking to increase the role of parliament. In 
2007, as Gordon Brown, the new British prime minister came to office, he 
announced his intention to hand over a range of royal prerogatives to 
parliament. The proposals included the powers to declare war and to ratify 
 
It might suggest some lack of commitment to start a debate by proposing to 
take a break, but that is parliamentary code for a general debate. It may be more 
emotionally satisfying to move a specific motion as happened in 2001, but the 
Afghanistan example demonstrates the risk in decision-making by parliament. 
Parliament can, and does, make big decisions. Every statute is a result of 
parliamentary decision-making. When parliament speaks by enacting a bill it 
makes law. But this was different; when parliament speaks by passing a 
resolution, it simply makes a noise. Though members were aware of the 
solemnity of the moment, the iron rule compelled political point-scoring. 
The resolution did not authorise sending troops; the government had that 
authority already. If the government motion were lost, the legal position would 
not have changed. It would have become a political matter, and the government 
would probably have fallen if it had lost such a motion. 
And that makes the basic point. Going to war or not going to war is a 
fundamental responsibility of any government. If MPs do not like the 
government’s approach, they can seek to remove the government by means of a 
no-confidence motion. Such a motion would have been the more appropriate 
debate, rather than strangulation by a thousand amendments. It is for the 
government to set the rules of battle (technically known as the rules of 
engagement), and for parliament to decide if it still has confidence in the 
government. 
So how did the 2001 debate happen? It is noticeable that in the 1999 Timor 
debate, Jim Anderton welcomed the debate, but foreshadowed a time when he 
hoped that parliament would be entrusted with such decisions. In 2001, he was a 
senior member of the government and he got his wish, but it was not a pretty 
sight. 
                                                 
136 ‘Debate: East Timor’ (Hansard, 1999, p 19,461). 
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treaties, as well as powers over senior appointments and the civil service.137
concluded that it is unnecessary, and would be inappropriate, to 
propose further major reform at present. Our constitution has 
developed organically over many centuries and change should not be 
proposed for change’s sake. Without ruling out further changes aimed 
at increasing Parliamentary oversight of the prerogative powers 
exercised by Ministers, the Government believes that any further 
reforms in this area should be considered on a case-by-case basis, in 
the light of changing circumstances.
 In 
the subsequent couple of years parliament saw more details in a green paper, 
then a white paper and a draft bill. Some of the changes have not yet crystallised 
but in October 2009 the United Kingdom government: 
138
Executive discretion 
 
The British have shown commendable flexibility in considering these 
matters; just because royal prerogatives are ancient it does not mean they are 
appropriate. On the other hand, it is equally true that being old does not 
necessarily mean the prerogatives are inappropriate. Democracy is vital to 
responsible and accountable government, but the practicalities of executive 
action mean parliament is often unsuited to controlling executive action. It is not 
surprising that reflection has led the British to be more cautious than they 
initially contemplated. 
The experience of the Afghanistan debate demonstrates the complications that 
arise as parliament moves beyond authorising government action into the more 
complex area of controlling government action. This is not just a constitutional 
nicety; it can have profound impact on the work of officials. For the SAS the 
impact could be life or death. And if SAS troopers do not meet the usual 
definition of officials, the top brass do. It is the generals who are responsible for 
giving clear orders to the troops under the direction of ministers. In this case, 
parliament was flirting with setting a mission (apprehending terrorists) that 
would have been highly dangerous, but the chief of defence force had no 
opportunity to advise parliament. 
Everything the government does, including sending troops to Afghanistan, 
is of interest to parliament. Everything should have appropriate legal authority 
and everything may be questioned. All public servants, and the wider grouping 
                                                 
137 Ministry of Justice (United Kingdom) (2007). 
138 Ministry of Justice (United Kingdom) (2009). 
Who Makes Things Happen? 
 117 
of state servants, are potentially liable to have their actions questioned in 
parliament. The military is not exempt from scrutiny, any more than nurses, 
teachers or social workers are exempt. In that sense, everything in government 
is the business of parliament. But that does not mean parliament is able to direct 
officials. As an institution, parliament is neither constitutionally nor effectively 
capable of filling that role. Instead, the control of the executive is the 
responsibility of ministers, who are accountable to parliament. 
Responsible and accountable government is the heart of our democracy. 
The role of the non-political public service, including the military, is to serve 
the government in office. That way ministers maintain control, and may be held 
to account for their failings. Activist MPs who seek to exert control over the 
actions of the government without accepting the disciplines of executive 
accountability jeopardise a fundamental constitutional principle. 
This begs the question: if parliament cannot control the government’s 
actions, can it control anything? In particular, can it control itself? 
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Who Controls Parliament? 
It’s their privilege 
Previous chapters have suggested that our sovereign parliament does not control 
the government and does not even control all law-making. But, when it comes 
to its own procedures, there is no question, parliament controls its own affairs. 
This may not seem unusual; businesses and clubs control their own affairs, why 
not parliament? The difference is that if shareholders or club members believe 
the directors or club committee have acted inappropriately they may test their 
concerns in court. But the courts will not pass judgment on parliament’s 
processes. 
Parliamentary privilege evolved over centuries in Britain. During the 
struggles between king and parliament, while it took real courage to stand and 
defy the king, it was essential if parliament was to play a serious role. 
Accordingly, parliament regularly asserted customary rights to freedom of 
speech and asked the Crown to respect that right. Over time, that customary 
right and a wide variety of associated rights became recognised as the privileges 
of parliament. The whole idea of parliamentary privilege revolves around 
protected behaviours that are necessary for parliament to do its job. If 
parliament could be controlled from outside then it could not discharge its 
democratic mandate. 
Enshrining the privileges of parliament was one of the results of the 
Glorious Revolution; article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1688 says: 
That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament.139
Though privilege may serve to protect an individual member of parliament 
(MP) from the consequences of their utterances, it is not MPs who the privilege 
protects; privilege protects the proceedings of parliament. If public affairs are to 
be debated openly, parliament must be able to hear the views of all its members. 
That may involve an MP saying things in parliament that, if said elsewhere, 
 
                                                 
139 Quoted in Joseph (2007, p 410). 
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would be libellous. But because parliamentary proceeding cannot be questioned 
outside parliament, the courts will not rule on comments made there. 
The precise boundaries of this privilege are a matter of intense interest to 
MPs, and courts have ruled on the question regularly. Recent New Zealand 
cases have held that comments made in parliament cannot be used by a 
committee of inquiry to draw adverse inferences about an MP;140 a defendant in 
a libel case cannot draw on parliamentary speeches to substantiate impugning 
the reputation of an MP,141 but where an MP endorses their own parliamentary 
comments outside the chamber, that may be deemed a repetition of the 
comments and be actionable.142
Contempt of parliament 
 But the issue of interest to non-MPs is those 
aspects of privilege that create obligations on others. And, though the scope of 
these privileges is defined by the courts, in enforcing them parliament is the 
judge in its own cause. 
History has given us the term ‘contempt’ as a word describing an offence 
against parliament. However, the issue is not whether someone’s behaviour has 
been contemptuous. Parliamentarians do not like being insulted anymore than 
anyone else does, but they do not exact formal punishment for an insult. The 
issue of contempt arises for actions that obstruct the functions of parliament. 
Many actions may constitute contempt of parliament. No one may detain an 
MP while parliament is sitting, or obstruct them as they make their way to the 
chamber, or intimidate them, or disadvantage them on account of their conduct 
in the house. It is also contempt to disrupt the proceedings of parliament. In 
1946, Peter Verschaffelt, a former public service commissioner, was found 
guilty of contempt when he shouted his disapproval of public service legislation 
from the gallery of the House. As a result he was banned from parliament and 
its grounds.143
                                                 
140 Peters v Davison [1999] 3 NZLR 744. 
141 Prebble v TVNZ [1993] 3 NZLR 513. 
142 Jennings v Buchanan [2005] 2 NZLR 577.  
143 Henderson (1990, p 187).  
 Some would see that as little hardship, but at that time this was a 
real sanction, creating genuine inconvenience, even for those who did not wish 
to watch parliamentary debates. Before the introduction of security measures 
and locked doors, it was common for Wellingtonians to walk through 
parliament as they went from the city to Thorndon; in bad weather it was the 
best route. Peter Verschaffelt was literally left out in the cold. 
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But, despite the ability of a retired commissioner to cause a disturbance, the 
list above would seem to hold few terrors for public servants. Much as some 
might like to, there is little chance of a public servant intimidating or detaining 
an MP. But other causes of contempt are relevant to officials. These causes 
generally revolve around the right of parliament to receive truthful and timely 
information. 
Parliament’s function would be severely harmed if it could not receive 
information whenever it wanted. This need does not arise solely at predictable 
and convenient times when the budget or legislation is being considered. The 
same need may arise whenever parliament acts to hold the government to 
account. That may happen at inconvenient times, because examining the actions 
of the government happens whenever it is politically expedient; and the iron rule 
means it is expedient always. 
Key parts of parliamentary process are set up to permit ongoing scrutiny; 
these include daily oral and written questions to ministers and select committee 
hearings. In every case, questions must always be answered truthfully. The 
urgent process of assembling answers before question time is a daily pressure 
point in Wellington; senior officials frequently must abandon other tasks to 
ensure that correct information is made available within a couple of hours. The 
grind of responding to written questions can be more debilitating; the same 
truthfulness is required without the excitement of a two-hour turnaround. If an 
incorrect answer is provided, the liability falls technically on the minister, who 
must correct matters in parliament without delay. Generally, however, ministers 
are able to transmit their discomfort onto officials. 
At select committees, senior officials are personally responsible for 
ensuring that their answers are correct and appropriate. It is contempt to 
deliberately mislead the house, to refuse to answer questions or to present 
altered documents. Committees are understandably annoyed whenever they 
think they have been misled, but they seem to reserve special irritation for any 
official who transgresses. Parliamentarians think officials should know better. 
That seems quite reasonable, because senior officials are paid to know their 
obligations to parliament. 
Telling the truth while working as a loyal servant of the government of the 
day and not criticising government policy is a skill that needs much practice. 
Doing all that while avoiding irritating committee members is an art. 
Other issues can arise when staff members appear before a select 
committee, perhaps to testify about their concerns with their employer. The 
following case study is an object lesson. 
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Case study – Televison New Zealand  
On 22 December 2005, the chairman of the board of Television New Zealand 
(TVNZ) wrote to Ian Fraser, the chief executive, relieving him of any further 
duties and asking him to return all TVNZ property.144 This letter arose because a 
week earlier Ian Fraser had attended a select committee meeting to testify about 
various matters of concern at TVNZ, including his own impending departure. 
He had told the committee that he had lost confidence in the board,145
For Opposition MPs, it was manna from heaven. Here was Ian Fraser, 
head of TVNZ, baring his soul about his board of directors and how he 
wanted to kill them.
 and his 
appearance at the committee made for an exciting hearing: 
146
The board was understandably upset by those comments and, having taken 
legal advice, it terminated Mr Fraser’s involvement with TVNZ. However, in 
doing so the board had not considered privilege, and the obligation that a 
witness not be disadvantaged for answers given to parliament. Once MPs 
complained the board quickly apologised for the oversight, but the Speaker 
referred the complaint to the Privileges Committee.
 
147
The board chair was summoned to appear before the committee, where he 
apologised again. The committee considered that the board’s actions amounted 
to ‘assaulting, threatening or disadvantaging’,
 
148 and that the board’s actions 
might deter others from testifying in future.149 The committee concluded the 
board had committed contempt. When the chairman was advised of this finding 
in the draft report, he apologised again.150
The committee noted that this was not the first time that the board of a 
Crown entity or state-owned enterprise had failed to consider its responsibilities 
to parliament, and criticised board staff and the external legal advisers for the 
quality of their advice. Apparently, the committee’s draft report named  
the external adviser, but the adviser wrote asking that the name of the law firm 
be removed from the report. Perhaps with an eye to administering acute pain, 
 
                                                 
144 Privileges Committee (2006, Appendix C, letter to Ian Fraser). 
145 ‘Questions TVNZ must answer’ (2005, p B4). 
146 ‘TVNZ: no more mates rates’ (2005, p B4). 
147 In the media the committee is commonly referred to as ‘parliament’s powerful privileges 
committee’, but though the alliteration is seductive that is not its correct name.  
148 Standing Order 444(w). 
149 Standing Order 400(t). 
150 Privileges Committee (2006). 
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the committee complied, but then reproduced the letter, on Bell Gully 
letterhead, as an appendix to the report.151
Penalties for breach of privilege 
 
The committee was so concerned at repeated lapses by state enterprises, 
including by TVNZ on a previous occasion, that it recommended exemplary 
punishment. As well as requiring a formal written apology to the House, the 
committee proposed a fine of $1,000. This was endorsed by parliament. 
TVNZ proffered its fourth apology and paid the fine. 
The TVNZ case demonstrates that government officials can be punished for 
contempt of parliament. This is a rare event; parliament may sometimes seem a 
little precious, but it can be quite forbearing in the face of annoying behaviour. 
An official’s testimony would probably need to be reckless and egregious 
before it would be adjudged to be a contempt of parliament. But a threat to a 
witness or a leak of information are real possibilities, so what punishments 
could be inflicted? 
The most common punishment that parliament administers is a demand for 
an apology. As TVNZ learned, apologising three times already does not avoid 
that threat. In spite of such experience, if you are in trouble apology is a good 
first step to redemption, so it may be beneficial to everyone involved. 
Another punishment is censure. To someone working outside the 
government system that may not seem too serious, but for those within the 
government it is a stain on the record. An official who had been censured would 
be likely to meet very little trust in any future dealings with parliament and 
possibly much more overt hostility than is usually directed at officials. It would 
be hard to continue in a senior role. 
Exclusion from the precincts of parliament could occur. That would be 
extremely inconvenient for a senior official; appearing before select committees 
to represent the department is a basic responsibility of senior staff. Others may 
also be affected. For example, in 1992 three courier companies were banned 
from making deliveries to the parliamentary complex because the owner had 
refused to inform parliament of the source of a leak of confidential select 
committee material.152
                                                 
151 Simcock (2006) in Privileges Committee (2006, Appendix G). 
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The TVNZ case also demonstrates that parliament is prepared to impose 
fines. This case was the first fine for over 100 years. Though $1,000 may seem a 
modest sum to impose on TVNZ, the committee said higher fines might be 
imposed in future. However, though TVNZ paid the fine, there is real doubt that 
parliament has the power to fine.153
Finally, there is the power to detain or imprison. That is, once there was the 
power to imprison. Professor Joseph cites estimates of nearly 1,000 committals 
for contempt between 1547 and 1810 by the House of Commons.
 Parliament’s powers are derived from those 
enjoyed by the House of Commons in 1865, the year that parliament assumed its 
privileges. The British House of Commons has not fined anyone since 1666. 
And, whether or not parliament has the power to fine, it does not have the 
means to extract payment from an unwilling payer. If parliament were to fine a 
private individual for contempt, the individual might ignore the bill. Though a 
private creditor might resort to the courts to enforce payment, the courts might 
not confirm parliament’s power to fine. So long as the person had no need to 
deal with parliament in the future, then the bill may remain unpaid. But that is 
not an option for someone working in the government system. A state official 
cannot afford to be formally off-side with parliament. Even if the official had no 
need to deal directly with parliament, the strain of parliament’s wrath would 
corrode working relationships. Irrespective of doubts about parliament’s powers 
and in spite of its lack of any system of enforcement, officials should not hope 
to avoid punishments exacted by parliament while remaining in the job. 
154
                                                 
153 Joseph (2007, p 462). 
154 Joseph (2007, p 460, citing Erskine May). 
 Parliament 
would imprison offenders (or, strictly speaking, contemnors) until they 
expressed contrition for their contempt or until the end of the parliamentary 
session. In New Zealand, parliament has never used the imprisonment power, 
and its use in modern times requires a stretch of the imagination. Where would 
parliament put a prisoner? And, though parliament has not expressly repudiated 
its power, section 315(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that no person may 
be arrested without a warrant issued under a statute, and imprisonment for 
contempt does not exist in statute. Therefore, it seems unlikely that anyone 
should be concerned at the risk of detention at the will of an angry parliament. 
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Maintaining respect 
Parliament’s privileges are important and are particularly significant for anyone 
who deals regularly with parliament. This may seem onerous to an individual 
official involved in complex tasks, but parliament must maintain its ability to 
perform its functions. Parliament needs good information, hence the obligations 
to tell the truth and to protect witnesses. Parliament must be able to hear the 
opinions of its members, hence the right of free speech. Parliament’s 
committees need to consider draft reports in private, hence the obligation to 
protect confidential evidence and private information about deliberations.155
A significant number of officials can be directly affected by the 
requirements of privilege. The government provides officials to act as advisers 
to select committees; law drafting is done by staff from the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office;
 
Respecting these privileges may involve an official in a lot of care, but that does 
not justify breaching privilege. 
156
While it is quite possible to comply with parliament’s needs, it requires 
concentration. Guidance is available.
 ministerial office staff (technically part of the public service) 
interact closely with parliament; officials frequently provide information to 
select committees; and senior officials appear regularly before select 
committees. All those people need to understand parliament’s rules as they do 
their part to assist parliament to do its job. 
157 Circumstances as difficult as those 
faced by TVNZ have been handled in the past. For example, in the select 
committee inquiry into the Inland Revenue Department, the department had to 
cope with staff testifying about a succession of claims about mismanagement.158
                                                 
155 This is still protected by Standing Orders, but parliament seems to have stopped worrying about 
submissions being published and leaks from committee members seem common. Officials 
attending committees should still be discreet, however. 
156 Parliamentary counsel are not public servants in the strict meaning of the term, but they are part 
of the executive accountable to the attorney-general. 
157 See, for example, State Services Commission (2007).  
158 This inquiry is the subject of a case study in chapter 12. 
 
Those matters were managed without falling foul of parliament. 
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Conclusion to Part Two 
Parliament is sovereign because it says so, some legislation says so, and much 
academic thought has said so. Parliament is at the heart of our government 
system, the principal source of law and the democratic foundation for 
government; in that sense it is sovereign. But that does not mean it is all-
powerful. We have a separation of powers, and both the executive and the 
courts have authorities that go beyond parliament. 
For an official working in the system, this means that parliament deserves 
great respect, but it is not the only centre of authority. It is not enough to have 
regard to statute; a wider range of law, including administrative law, must be 
considered. 
Public servants cannot rely on sponsorship from parliament to bless every 
efficiency-promoting scheme that they may devise. Even if ministers manage to 
achieve a majority and enabling legislation is passed, the courts may still insist 
that human rights are protected. The courts will look beyond parliament for 
authority as they set about protecting those rights. In the words of Sir Kenneth 
Keith, commenting on a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal: 
While not denying they were confined by the words of the statute they 
did not see themselves as confined to them.159
And when parliament legislates to confer powers upon the executive 
which may erode human rights, it can expect scrutiny of the exercise of 
those powers … in a manner which is commensurate with the 
legislative and international recognition of rights as constitutional in a 
broad sense.
  
And, in the same speech in which Dame Sian questioned parliament’s 
sovereignty, she said: 
160
                                                 
159 Keith (2004, emphasis in original). 
160 Elias (2003, p 162).  
 
Many public servants, imbued with respect for parliament and democracy, 
and focused on schemes for technocratic efficiency, may be frustrated by this 
judicial fixation with rights. But a little thought would remind them that 
everyone stands to benefit from an independent judiciary – especially from a 
judiciary with a concern for human rights. Even public servants can have their 
rights threatened, and the machinations of democratic politics do not always put 
great weight on the rights of public servants. It is a comfort to know that all 
constitutional powers are balanced by other powers. 
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It may be confusing, but for officials the law is critical for it is at the heart 
of all official actions. The law is both the source of authority for officials and a 
constraint on their actions. A glib assertion of parliamentary sovereignty is 
inadequate and could lead ministers and officials into constitutional blind alleys. 
In the words of Sir Kenneth Keith: 
Beware of slogans. Look past the familiar words and formulas … And 
ask yourself – is your reference to sovereignty, whether of Parliament 
or of the state, correct? Is it helpful?161
After all that, perhaps sovereign is a good word for how we should see 
parliament. Sovereignty is like an ancient coin, still very valuable and hugely 
respected, but over the years its edges have been clipped and it cannot buy 
everything. 
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Introduction to Part Three 
The previous part was concerned with the limits of parliamentary power. 
Constant repetition of those limits may have created an impression that all these 
checks and balances mean parliament is not very important. That would be the 
wrong impression. Parliament’s importance does not come from symbolism. 
While it is true Parliament does operate from a grand-looking building on a hill, 
that is its least significant characteristic. Its importance comes from what it does. 
Professor Joseph identifies five functions for parliament.162
To bring out the relations between parliament and public servants, the 
functions of parliament may be slightly rephrased. First, parliament makes the 
government of the day; parliament provides the cabinet and ministers who lead 
the work of the executive. Second, parliament makes legislation; those laws 
provide the authority and boundaries of government action. Third, parliament 
provides funds; without parliamentary authority, there can be no taxation and no 
spending. Fourth, parliament scrutinises government action; regular review 
enables parliamentarians to call the government to account. Fifth, parliament 
represents the people; that is, members of parliament assist their constituents in 
their dealings with the government. All of these functions have great 
significance for the work of public servants. In the following chapters, these 
functions are considered in turn. 
 Those functions 
are provider of government, passage of legislation, consent to taxation and 
public expenditure, scrutiny of executive government, and representation of the 
government and the people. These tasks are huge; they are of sufficient daily 
moment that they provide a substantial part of our nightly news entertainment, 
squeezed between traffic accidents and the misdemeanours of celebrities. And 
not only is the task a big one, it is done by democratic contest – probably the 
hardest possible approach.  
It is the democratic mandate of parliament that gives all of government its 
moral authority. Members of parliament are accountable to the electorate every 
three years. Nobody else in national government faces that regular requirement 
to renew their authority, and all others engaged in any part of government must 
respect the weight of a democratic mandate. It is through the exercise of that 
mandate that parliament provides the means for all of the government to 
function; this is particularly clear when considering the executive. 
                                                 
162 Joseph (2007, pp 295 and 296–337). The order of the functions is changed. Other authorities 
such as Palmer and Palmer (2004, p 158) and McGee (2005, pp 3–5) give different lists of 
functions, but for our purposes the Joseph list provides sufficient scope to cover the issues. 
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Making Governments 
Parliament’s business 
The making, maintenance and dislodging of representative governments is 
perhaps the highest achievement of democracy. Ministers collectively form the 
government of the day. While in office, ministers direct the operation of the 
executive and bring their programme to parliament for enactment. Formally, 
their right to hold office is embodied in a warrant issued by the governor-
general. In fact, their power comes from their supporters in parliament; those 
who have support from a majority in parliament may serve as ministers because 
they enjoy the confidence of parliament. As with many other parts of our 
unwritten constitution, the formalities of the law continue the fiction that the 
monarch (the governor-general) has the power. In truth, the power lies with 
parliament. 
That parliament decides who is to govern is simple and obvious, but legal 
sources are generally silent on how that occurs. The first parliamentary function 
identified by Professor Joseph is the provision of a government, but everything 
he has to say on the matter can be squeezed into just over a page.163
Where are the codes, manuals and guidelines? Is this not a vacuum at the 
centre of the constitution, crying out for some orderly minded public servant to 
introduce some process, transparency and clarity? Well, no. On the contrary, the 
theme of this section is that the formation of governments is not the realm of the 
 In a 
textbook laden with source notes, he cites no court cases on the formation of a 
government. The Constitution Act 1986 (section 6) mentions that all ministers 
must be members of parliament (MPs), but does not say how they are selected. 
Parliament’s Standing Orders are also silent; there are provisions for the 
election of a Speaker, the appointment of parliamentary officers and the identity 
of the leader of the opposition, but nothing about the election of a prime 
minister or cabinet. Even Standing Orders make no explicit provision for testing 
whether the government has the confidence of parliament; various votes and 
processes are provided for, but none is identified in Standing Orders as a 
confidence motion. 
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public service. Just because ministers are the most important people in the 
professional lives of senior public servants, it does not follow that public 
servants have (or ought to have) any contribution to make in the formation of a 
government. This is, quite properly, the preserve of politicians; if they choose to 
exclude or involve others, they may. On some occasions and in a few roles, 
politicians have involved public servants, but as a rule this aspect of 
parliament’s work is not the business of public servants. 
Where do governments come from? 
Though New Zealand is a democracy, governments are not elected by the 
people. Elections are held regularly, but the public does not get to vote for a 
prime minister; the votes are for candidates for parliament. It is parliament that 
decides the government. The question is, how? There is no motion in parliament 
to appoint ministers, not even the prime minister. Technically, the government 
is appointed by the governor-general, but the appointment is of a prime minister 
(and his or her nominees as ministers) who has the support of parliament. So 
how does the governor-general decide who has the support of parliament? 
For most of the last century, the question was academic. From the 1930s 
under the first-past-the-post electoral system it was generally clear on election 
night or soon after that either the Labour party or the National party had a 
majority of MPs. The leader of the majority party became the prime minister. 
Niceties of process could be ignored when the need arose. For example, in the 
days after the election in 1984 during an exchange-rate crisis, senior Treasury 
and Reserve Bank officials called on David Lange, the incoming prime minister, 
to brief him on urgent measures needed to stabilise the economy. In fact,  
Sir Robert Muldoon was still the minister of finance and prime minister at the 
time; Sir Robert then generated a constitutional mini-crisis when he refused to 
act on the incoming prime minister’s request that he devalue the currency. The 
resolution of this issue was the origin of the caretaker convention, obliging an 
outgoing prime minister to act on the request of an incoming prime minister. 
With hindsight, it is not just Sir Robert’s behaviour that seems incorrect. It 
would now be very dangerous for public servants to assume that they can call on 
the person they think is the incoming prime minister on the day after the 
election. That is because, since the introduction of proportional representation, 
no party has achieved a majority of parliamentary seats. Between the election 
and the appointment of a government either the Labour party or the National 
party has needed to organise support arrangements with other parties before 
they could claim to lead a government. It is now more obvious that parliament 
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must determine who is to govern; the election simply determines who may 
participate in that government-formation process. Public servants do not have a 
vote in that process, and for most of them the formation of the government is as 
mysterious as it is to other New Zealanders. 
The most authoritative official source on the formation of governments is 
the Cabinet Manual. The Cabinet Office’s knowledge of such matters comes 
from the fact that the cabinet secretary also holds the position of clerk of the 
Executive Council. In that role, the clerk advises the governor-general, 
including during the sensitive steps of a transition between governments. This 
can involve liaison with various party leaders about process and progress with 
government formation.164
If it is not the cabinet secretary who makes it all happen, perhaps it is the 
governor-general who takes charge? Again, no. The Cabinet Manual makes it 
clear that the governor-general waits until a clear political outcome has emerged 
between the parties before appointing the prime minister and those ministers 
that the incoming prime minister proposes.
 In addition, the cabinet secretary discusses portfolio 
allocations and committee structures with the incoming prime minister. That is, 
in the normal course of events, the cabinet secretary is the only public servant 
who plays any role in the formation of a government. But there is no need to get 
excited, for it does not mean that we have found the real power in the land. The 
cabinet secretary’s role is liaison between politicians and the governor-general, 
and adviser on process and precedent; it is not a negotiating or coordinating 
role. 
165
During the 1990s, in the run-up to the first election under proportional 
representation the then governor-general, Sir Michael Hardie Boys, publicly 
explained the vice-regal role under the new electoral system.
 
166
                                                 
164 Cabinet Office (2008, para 6.41). 
165 Cabinet Office (2008, paras 6.39–6.40). 
 He expected that 
a passive role, patiently awaiting a political outcome, would be all that was 
needed; so far, he has been proved right. He contrasted the likely approach with 
the approaches found in other countries. In Denmark, the Queen remains non-
partisan, but is expected to talk with all party leaders before appointing someone 
(the probable next prime minister) to explore options to form a government. In 
Ireland, the president is equally non-partisan, but awaits a parliamentary vote 
(which must be held within a month of the election) before appointing the victor 
166 Hardie Boys (1996).  
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to lead the government.167
if anything is amiss in the body politic, the Governor-General is (to 
borrow a phrase from P G Wodehouse) ‘the chap to kiss the place and 
make it well’.
 In New Zealand, the politicians sort it out and make 
the result public, so the governor-general can then appoint the government. 
Sir Michael’s speech on the role of the governor-general closed with the 
thought that he did not see himself as an active and powerful player, such that: 
168
‘Once,’ said the Mock Turtle at last with a deep sigh, ‘I was a real 
Turtle.’
 
On the other hand, Sir Michael also considered that he was not an historic relic 
with only symbolic value, comparable to the Mock Turtle from ‘Alice in 
Wonderland’: 
169
To understand what the politicians do, look at the Cabinet Manual. Unlike 
other official sources, it is prepared to offer a comment. In one cryptic 
paragraph the manual records, ‘The process of forming a government is 
political, and the decision to form a government must be arrived at by 
politicians’.
 
Sir Michael saw himself somewhere between those two extremes: not an active 
player but filling a real role. Despite his view, it turns out that in the processes 
of government formation since the mid-1990s the role of the governor-general 
has been more mock than real; the real thing in government formation is done 
by the politicians. 
170
The message is as clear as it is short; this is not an area for reports, public 
deliberation or legal proceedings. It is about consenting, elected adults 
interacting in private. Having just endured weeks of mutual criticism during an 
election campaign, politicians demonstrate their professionalism by sitting down 
together in private to see if they can work out a deal to form a government. If 
they can agree on a programme, the allocation of jobs and procedures to work 
together in parliament, they have the makings of a government. If they cannot 
arrive at such a deal, it is unlikely that public servants, judges or the governor-
general could do it for them.
 
171
                                                 
167 More information on government formation in other countries is in Boston (1998). 
168 Hardie Boys (1996).  
169  Carroll (1865, p 83). 
170 Cabinet Office (2008, para 6.37). 
171 Jonathan Boston has published studies on the politics of government formation after each of the 
elections since 1996, see Boston and McLeay (1997, p 207), Boston (2000, p 239), Boston and 
Church (2003, p 333), Boston (2007, p 389), and Boston (2010, p 206). 
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There will always be some, however, who are convinced that with the 
opportunity to access a little more wisdom the politicians could do a better job. 
With appropriate advice they could avoid foolish policies. Some of those 
holding such views are public servants, and the wisdom they believe that 
politicians need would be found in advice from the public service. ‘Surely’, they 
think wistfully, ‘if negotiating parties had officials in the room with them, or at 
least offering reports, they could start their governments on a sounder footing’. 
As it happens, this proposition is one that has been tested; there is no need to 
rely on theoretical musings. A look at a time when there was some public 
service input into government formation will reveal whether it contributed a 
useful dose of wisdom. 
The election on 12 October 1996 was the first under the new proportional 
representation voting system. The result was that both the Labour party and the 
National party had a real chance of forming a government; the decision lay with 
New Zealand First, led by a former National party minister, Winston Peters. 
Comment before the election had suggested he might favour the Labour party, 
but after the election, he made it clear he would talk with both major parties 
before New Zealand First would determine its preference. There followed seven 
weeks of media stake-outs in the corridors of parliament, with journalists 
looking for comments from politicians as they paraded to and from confidential 
negotiating sessions. Finally, nearly two months later, Mr Peters announced that 
New Zealand First would enter a coalition with the National party. 
The focus of the next case study is not on the political machinations, but on 
the role played by officials during the negotiations. 
Case study – government formation in 1996 
Within a week of the 1996 election, with mounting public speculation about a 
hung parliament, both Winston Peters and Helen Clark (the leader of the Labour 
party) wrote to the prime minister seeking access to the advice of officials. 
Mr Peters wrote: 
my Party wishes to avail itself of ministry advisers as deemed 
necessary from time to time. Can you please confirm we will have 
access as required.172
                                                 
172 IPRO (1998, p 10, quoting Winston Peters’ letter). 
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Ms Clark wrote: 
During this period of finalising the makeup of the new government, it 
will be important that all potential members of a government have 
access to factual information on which to base their negotiations.  
I presume that work has been done by the public service regarding how 
best this should be facilitated in a way which protects both the 
confidentiality of the request and the impartiality of the public 
servants. 
There are a number of areas where I envisage I may wish to receive 
such information and I would appreciate your advice on what 
procedures can be put in place.173
Ms Clark was correct in her surmise that the public service had made 
preparations, but the focus was more on impartiality rather than long-term 
confidentiality. As the first proportional representation election approached, the 
likelihood of some kind of post-election negotiation to form a government had 
been obvious. Officials had prepared, as they do, by forming a committee.
 
174
To address these risks cabinet approved a process in mid-1996 by which the 
incumbent prime minister (presumably a caretaker prime minister) would 
authorise the provision of information by the public service to assist parties in 
negotiation to form a government. 
 
A major pre-occupation of that committee was to maintain the work of the 
public service during political uncertainty, without threatening the non-political 
nature of the public service. In particular, the enthusiasm of some senior public 
servants to offer advice during government formation created a risk that they 
would be seen as participants in the process, and therefore politically aligned. 
On the other hand, if a minister were to give an instruction requiring a 
department to offer advice to negotiating parties that would be lawful and could 
not be ignored and that, too, would create a risk of perceived political 
alignment. 
175
During the week after the election officials met again with the prime 
minister and the minister of finance; they agreed that a careful process to 
provide information should be used, under the control of the state services 
 However, though the process was agreed, 
it had not been promulgated at the time of the election. 
                                                 
173 IPRO (1998, p 10, quoting Helen Clark’s letter). 
174 The Officials Committee on the Implementation of Proportional Representation (IPRO) was led 
by the State Services Commissioner and the cabinet secretary, and included officials from the 
prime minister’s department and The Treasury. 
175 Cabinet Office (1996b).  
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commissioner. This process was confirmed at a meeting of the caretaker cabinet 
on 21 October,176 and the state services commissioner issued guidelines to all 
chief executives that afternoon.177
In essence, the guideline was (and remains) that the prime minister had a 
‘threshold responsibility’ for authorising contact between negotiating parties 
and the public service.
 
178
For ministers and officials who were used to working closely together this 
was a cumbersome process, but it was used. Within two days of the cabinet 
decision Wyatt Creech, the minister of education, wrote to the commissioner, 
attaching written authority from the prime minister, seeking answers to  
11 detailed questions of education policy.
 The state services commissioner, supported by a 
committee of central agency colleagues from the prime minister’s department 
and The Treasury, was the point of contact. Requests would be directed to the 
commissioner and allocated to departments for response. Responses would be 
reviewed by the coordinating committee to avoid overenthusiastic advice (rather 
than the more sober provision of information), and then provided to the 
negotiating party that made the request. Ministers were forbidden from 
approaching departments directly for information or advice to assist with 
negotiations. The commissioner (and only the commissioner) was to inform the 
prime minister ‘in general terms’ of the assistance provided; this was not to 
include details of a request or a response, unless the question was from the 
prime minister’s party. It was acknowledged that the Official Information Act 
1982 applied to the whole process of request and response, so information 
would probably be released in the future. 
179
Answers began to flow back to the National party a day later, the end of the 
same week in which cabinet had authorised the process, but ministers were 
‘dissatisfied’.
 Mr Creech expressly asked that the 
question be referred to the secretary for education for urgent answer. Ironically, 
one of the first decisions of the officials’ committee when it met the following 
day was to refer the questions to The Treasury, because most of the questions 
involved costings, and all costings were to be coordinated by The Treasury. 
180
                                                 
176 Cabinet Office (1996a). 
177 State Services Commission (1996). 
178 State Services Commission (2008). 
179 Creech (1996).  
180 IPRO (1998, p 13). 
 Ministers had been used to having their requests clarified in 
discussion with senior officials, and receiving explanations and analysis about 
the practical implications of their proposals. The initial answers, however, 
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showed the cautious influence of the officials’ committee, and were restricted to 
factual answers to the questions as asked. After further discussions with 
ministers the guidance was clarified; departments were now to provide fuller 
answers, including practical implications, and some explanation of existing 
policy (while still avoiding advice). In addition, the process was changed to 
allow the commissioner to clarify questions when departments needed more 
information.181
Although most of the questions were lodged by the National party (in 
effect, by caretaker ministers), on 14 November, nearly four weeks after the 
system was under way, the Labour party also lodged a few requests; two on 
housing and one on school staffing. In the end, of 28 separate requests (many 
consisting of multiple questions), 25 were from National and 3 from Labour. In 
total, the information supplied to the parties during the negotiating period 
amounted to 600 pages of material.
 
182
All of the answers were prepared at speed, and some included a 
comprehensive analysis of the relevant issues. At times officials worked through 
the night to prepare prompt responses.
 
183 One matter that proved to be of major 
significance was compulsory superannuation. A request for an evaluation of 
compulsory superannuation was received on 4 November. On 8 November 
officials provided 18 pages discussing economic implications, possible fiscal 
impacts, equity issues and administration. In particular, the officials said it 
would take nearly three years to design and introduce a superannuation 
scheme.184 It seems that politicians may not have concentrated closely on the 
answers they received, as the eventual coalition agreement committed them to 
completing design and legislation for a new scheme before being put to a 
referendum and then implemented within 18 months of the new government 
taking office.185
All this feverish writing occurred at the same time as ministers suffered the 
frustration of leading a caretaker administration, forbidden (by its own decree) 
from taking any initiatives. Senior officials were similarly frustrated that the 
briefings they had prepared for an incoming government, outlining issues of the 
day that required ministerial attention, could not be made available to assist the 
negotiating parties. Requests for information in the ministerial briefings or for 
 
                                                 
181 IPRO (1998, p 13) 
182 State Services Commission (1997a). 
183 IPRO (1998, p 14). 
184 State Services Commission (1997b, p 15). 
185 Coalition Agreement (1996, p 79). 
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information supplied to political parties in negotiation were refused until the 
negotiations were complete. Those on the inside of government were frustrated 
that they could not talk directly to each other on policy matters, and those 
outside were frustrated that they could not find out what was going on. The 
tension eventually surfaced in media comment. 
In December, it was reported in the Listener that ministers had been 
‘rendered choleric’, and that Richard Prebble, the leader of ACT (a group not 
involved in any negotiations) wanted ‘ears boxed’. He was quoted as saying: 
Look, there’s been an illegal revolution by public servants, and no 
one’s noticed … These bureaucrats are working off a convention 
which they made up themselves … Who elected them?186
The constitutional convention is whatever the constitutional advisers 
tell you the convention is. They’ve got you over a barrel because, if 
they give you advice not to do something, and you do it, and then it 
comes out under the Official Information Act [1982] that you defied 
constitutional advice, then you are going to look pretty awful.
 
Similarly the minister of education had difficulty completing funding decisions 
relating to tertiary education in the following year; he was advised this was a 
new policy and beyond the remit of the caretaker administration. He said: 
187
two unnatural tasks to perform: Chinese-walling politicians away from 
officials, and stopping officials climbing the walls to make helpful 
suggestions … Acknowledging the tensions [the state services 
commissioner] reckons it has been just as traumatic for officials having 
to disoblige their political masters.
 
And mandarins seemed to be equally aggrieved at being misunderstood. The 
state services commissioner was described as having: 
188
Despite all the angst, by the time the Listener article emerged a coalition 
agreement was concluded on 10 December and published as a 109-page 
document outlining detail in 50 policy areas.
 
189 In early 1997, in response to 
many requests, the state services commissioner published all the questions and 
answers that were exchanged during the negotiation process.190
                                                 
186 Clifton (1996, p 16, quoting Richard Prebble). 
187 Clifton (1996, p 16, quoting Wyatt Creech). 
188 Clifton (1996, p 14). 
189 Coalition Agreement (1996). 
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Making governments work, not doing the work of 
government 
Clearly, the case study demonstrates that the public service is capable of 
providing information during coalition negotiations, and that the information 
may even be helpful sometimes. In their own review after the event, officials 
could see means of tweaking the system to make it more flexible, but generally 
they thought it useful enough to retain.191
Problems of complexity 
 As a result, the guidelines remain in 
place largely in the same form that they were promulgated in 1996, with the 
biggest change being their extension to cover all of the state services, rather than 
simply focusing on the public service. But, although officials may have thought 
it worth retaining, this system is one that nobody has sought to use again. Since 
1996, there have been four elections. Each election has been followed by 
negotiations to form a government, but no parties have asked for information or 
advice from the public service. Why? 
There may be several reasons why politicians have found it expedient to act 
without relying on the words of the public service’s best and brightest. Some are 
simply the realities of politics; in 1999, 2002 and 2008, there was no serious 
question who would lead the government, so negotiations on policy were less 
significant. And in 2002 and 2005 the government continued under the same 
leadership, so less assistance was needed. But there are other issues inherent in 
the process of government formation that discourage the use of advice from 
officials. First, the process of government formation is complex enough without 
adding more voices that may confuse with extra information. Second, the risks 
inherent in future public knowledge of topics discussed is not worth the 
potential gains of access to public service expertise. Third, coalition agreements 
(or support agreements) have become simpler and more political rather than 
policy-based. 
A rationalist view of decision-making will tend to favour the use of all available 
information. But politicians are people, not computers, and there comes a point 
where extra information may confuse, not inform. 
Negotiations to form a government are inherently complex. They involve at 
least two parties; in recent cases, they have involved more, and the current 
government includes ministers from National, the Māori Party, ACT and United 
Future. The negotiating parties must involve at least 61 MPs (more if the voting 
                                                 
191 IPRO (1998, p 17). 
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system has produced extra MPs). A majority government has at least that 
number and a minority government must organise some form of support 
arrangements to enable it to survive a confidence vote; even an agreement to 
abstain comes at a price. And all those parties must take account of the views of 
their members. 
The policies to be discussed can be wide-ranging, from the introduction (or 
maintenance) of a families commission to the devolution of control of services 
to Māori. They may be as contentious as the control of the seabed and foreshore 
or the future of superannuation policy. And then there is the issue of who holds 
what office. It seems that the decision of the National party to offer the position 
of treasurer to Winston Peters in 1996 may have finally tipped the balance in the 
formation of that coalition government. 
In the middle of all this the arrival of 600 pages of bureaucratic analysis, 
even if it is in answer to questions put by the negotiating parties, can be a mixed 
blessing. Certainly the evidence from the eventual coalition agreement in 1996 
is that the parties did not seize on the officials’ thoughts as the solution to their 
problems; far from it. The example of the superannuation referendum shows 
that the political imperative for New Zealand First trumped the cautious advice 
of officials.192
The possible provision of ministerial briefing papers to assist negotiating 
parties seems to be even more unwelcome. After the 1996 negotiations, the 
State Services Commission surveyed the views of chief executives. About a 
third of respondents supported a proposal to release briefing material just after 
the election.
 
193 Presumably, this was with a view to ensuring that politicians 
were advised on the matters that seemed most pressing to officials. There was 
some public support for this from ACT,194 but little other public comment from 
politicians. In private, there is no evidence that politicians involved in 
negotiations wanted the reports. For example, the records refer to private 
communication from the Labour party resisting the early release of briefings: 
‘the Labour Party did not want them floating around for a month before 
ministers got a chance to address the issues’.195
                                                 
192 With hindsight, perhaps the politicians were right. A scheme was designed at high speed and, 
though it was voted down resoundingly, The Economist recognised it as a well-designed policy. 
But implementation would still have been a challenge: ‘When pay stops’ (1997, p 37). 
193 IPRO (1998, p 6). Some even wanted release before the election, which suggests a frustrated 
desire to enter politics. 
194 Derek Quigley MP was among those who requested the briefings during the time that 
negotiations were continuing. 
195 IPRO (1998, p 6). 
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During negotiations the parties must focus on making a government; 
governing comes later. They know that once in government they will have to 
deal with issues as they arise. They also know that officials are often an 
unwelcome source of the issues that must be addressed. But that does not mean 
they should address all the issues of government during the few days or weeks 
while they assemble a cabinet. 
The advice to ‘keep it simple’ is just as apt for government formation as it 
is in any other endeavour. Extra information or advice from officials would tend 
to complicate, not simplify. 
The risk of exposure 
To officials and analysts the fact a decision-maker has weighed the benefits of 
different policy options is simply evidence of professionalism. To a politician, 
locked in combat by the iron rule, it can be a chink in the armour. Evidence that 
the leader of the party seriously considered ‘selling out’ a plank of election 
policy, possibly dear to the hearts of zealous party supporters, is always 
problematic. When such sell-outs are considered as part of the process of 
clambering into ministerial office it can be a bad look. That is the essence of 
why the political negotiations are usually conducted in private. 
Officials have long demonstrated their ability to give private advice and to 
keep confidences. But in New Zealand most advice will generally become 
public when released under the operation of the Official Information Act 1982. 
It is certain that any information provided by officials to assist government 
formation will be requested by somebody; it is almost certain that information 
on policy advice will be released. That is a thoroughly good thing; public 
knowledge of the work of officials is hugely beneficial. But to a politician 
involved in negotiations it adds a large and avoidable risk. 
Being explicit in private negotiations is a lot easier than considering options 
in public. Discreet as officials may be, they work as public servants, and the 
presumption in New Zealand is that their work is (eventually) public. The use of 
public service information to inform political negotiations towards a 
government that may never happen is, therefore, very unattractive to many 
politicians. 
The nature of coalition agreements 
With hindsight it is clear that 1996 was a very odd year. The process of dual 
negotiations over seven weeks, with multiple questions of officials, culminating 
in a detailed policy-laden coalition agreement, may never return. While officials 
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seemed to think that their part of the process went reasonably well, the 
behaviour of politicians suggests they learnt rather more; they learnt not to do it 
again. 
All subsequent coalition agreements and support arrangements have been 
much simpler than the 1996 documents. Since that time they have tended to 
identify just a small number of policies of particular importance to the parties, 
and have focused mostly on process. In particular the innovation of ‘agreement 
to disagree’, now enshrined in the Cabinet Manual has allowed the glossing 
over of irreconcilable differences.196
Ministers and servants 
 It is no longer necessary to resolve every 
issue before the government is formed; issues need not even be resolved during 
the term of the government, so long as all members of the government hang 
together on agreed issues and on confidence matters. 
That is, coalition agreements are not a means of predetermining all the 
decisions of government. Officials need not fear that all policies will be 
predetermined in a coalition agreement before they can talk with a minister. On 
the contrary, the agreement is a highly political document about political 
processes, and the negotiation is an inter-party political process. That is not the 
place for non-political officials, and there is little room for briefings or reports. 
The selection of a government is important to all New Zealanders, and 
especially important to officials, particularly senior officials. Working for a 
minister who reverses a much-loved policy can be depressing. Working for a 
minister who is querulous and uncertain can be stressful. Working for a minister 
who is abusive can be hell. It is not surprising that some officials would like to 
find a means of informing the process of government formation; it could be that 
this will influence the agenda of their future minister (or even who their minister 
will be). But, though it might be nice for a public servant to influence the choice 
of the minister, just as many people might like to choose their boss, it will not 
and should not happen. 
More significantly, there are occasions in the aftermath of an election 
where urgent advice might be needed to manage a crisis; this occurred in 1984 
and in 1990. If officials cannot get the information to the negotiating parties, 
what is to be done? But this is not an excuse to involve officials in government 
formation as other methods are available. Since the passage of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994, The Treasury produces a public economic and fiscal 
                                                 
196 Cabinet Office (2008, paras 5.25–5.27). 
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update in the weeks before the election; the report must identify emerging risks. 
There is now less chance of politicians being ignorant of problems needing 
attention. In addition, if any matter needs urgent attention, officials can always 
talk with the caretaker government, and the prime minister can authorise 
discussion with other parties. 
Officials have privileged access to ministers and have the opportunity to 
influence affairs by the provision of careful analysis. But in the selection of a 
government officials have the same voting rights as any other member of the 
public. The reality is that making governments is parliament’s business. Of all 
the activities of parliament it is the most significant to the work of officials, and 
it is the area in which officials have the least involvement. That is as it should 
be. 
 147 
10 
Making Laws 
How are laws made 
Statute law is perhaps the most enduring of parliament’s products. Long after 
the debates and political compromises have been forgotten a statute will remain 
as part of the law of the land, continuing to affect the lives of New Zealanders. 
Statutes cover all sorts of topics. There are the grand constitutional measures, 
establishing the institutions of government; social provisions defining the law 
around personal relationships; law and order matters, protecting people in the 
streets and their homes; economic laws, establishing rules in the marketplace; 
environmental Acts protecting species and habitats; and there are many local 
Acts and private Acts that establish or empower people in various ways – 
Christ’s College, for example, has no fewer than five Acts with the most recent 
being made in 1999. 
Making statutes is a parliamentary function. A member of parliament (MP) 
introduces a bill, MPs consider the bill in select committee, and it is the votes of 
MPs that pass the bill. But there is also a large public service role, providing 
advice and drafting the clauses of the bill.197 There is no single process for the 
creation of statutes. Some statutes arise from political upheaval, some emerge 
from a crisis, some arise from manifesto commitments or coalition agreements, 
and some reflect ongoing deliberations of groups such as the Law Commission 
as it aims to tidy up the law. Most government bills are introduced following an 
extensive process of policy debate as the public service interacts with ministers. 
A brief review of the making of laws illustrates the interactions between 
officials and politicians. The account that follows is stylised.198
Many bills originate from policy papers prepared by a government agency 
for the minister. As officials and the minister consider how to address the public 
policy issue that concerns them, it may appear that a change in the law would be 
 
                                                 
197 Here the focus is principally on the process for making public Acts. Local Acts and private Acts 
are sponsored by a local MP to meet a local need; they generally have less significance for 
relations between parliament and the public service. 
198 There are valuable sources for those needing more detail. Cabinet Office (2008, p 86) outlines 
the key steps. Malone (2008) contains an account of how law-making has changed since the 
introduction of proportional representation.  
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helpful. Though any MP could introduce a bill, the minister is part of the 
government and must have the support of colleagues to introduce a government 
bill. This need to achieve cabinet agreement is the reason for interdepartmental 
working groups; if a joint view can be achieved between departments, so much 
the better. The minister takes a paper to cabinet so that ministers can ponder the 
issue; if there is support, then work can get under way on a bill. 
One of the first steps is to get the bill on the government’s legislation 
programme. This programme is the list of all the bills the government aims to 
enact in the coming year. The legislation programme is assembled by the 
Cabinet Office from bids put forward by ministers. The bills are organised into 
various priority categories and agreed by cabinet (often after considerable 
debate). 
The essential purpose of the list is to ration the work that is put into bills; 
those with no hope or low priority are not worth wasting time on. This 
prioritisation can sometimes seem odd to officials. While they may be 
enthusiastic to put in the necessary effort to sort out the policy and 
administrative issues and that seems to them to remove the need to ration effort, 
policy analysis is not usually the constraining factor. 
There are two ever-present constraints on the production of statutes; 
drafting time and parliamentary time. As a general rule, statutes are drafted by 
the experts in the Parliamentary Counsel Office. Compared to other officials and 
other lawyers, parliamentary counsel are a breed apart. They have legal training, 
but they are also expert in writing law. They have to cope with urgent demands 
of zealous officials and dogmatic select committees, and grab peaceful moments 
to write complex provisions that will stand up to scrutiny in the courts. Officials 
will often take months to consider policy matters, and a judge may spend weeks 
considering the meaning of a section in an Act, but parliamentary counsel may 
only have hours (sometimes less) to get the words right. Though thousands of 
officials work as policy analysts, only around 30 people work as parliamentary 
counsel; it is vital they work only on bills that have some future, hence the need 
for prioritisation. 
The second constraint is parliamentary time. Every bill must pass through a 
series of stages in parliament. Each stage takes a certain amount of time, with a 
certain number of speeches each of a certain length; this is all laid out in 
parliament’s Standing Orders. But parliament will not generally keep working 
until it has enacted every law that the government wants; parliament is in 
session for limited hours, three days per week, three weeks per month, with 
adjournments at various points through the year. It is the government’s job to 
ensure that it has priority legislation ready and drafted to use the time available. 
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The job of organising the government’s legislation falls to the leader of the 
House, supported by the legislation coordinator, a public servant based in the 
Cabinet Office. It is an amazingly complex task; juggling the priorities of  
20 ministers, ensuring time is available for key provisions such as money bills, 
and making deals with other parties to make progress in parliament.199
The job of assisting the committee is subtle. The official is a public servant 
employed by a government department, responsible to the minister. But while 
working with the committee, attending its private deliberations, (unless the 
minister instructs otherwise) the official must assist the committee to do its job, 
even though the committee may get into conflict with the minister’s priorities. 
The same officials will commonly advise the minister on how to deal with the 
amendments the committee has made.
 The 
saviour is urgency, by which parliament can agree to take more time to 
complete the passage of some bills. But urgency requires a majority vote in 
parliament and under proportional representation that needs the support of a 
minor party. Commonly, in exchange for their support the minor party may 
extract some policy concession. Officials may look on in bewilderment as the 
minister agrees to a change in the bill. Unknown to officials the change may be 
needed to allow the bill to move at all. 
The most detailed scrutiny of legislation happens at parliament’s select 
committees. These are committees of members drawn from across parliament. 
The select committee will commonly call for public submissions and may hold 
public hearings. Following those hearings, the committee will deliberate in 
private to decide any changes it considers necessary. The minister will normally 
agree that the committee may retain one or two officials from the department 
that originated the bill to assist the committee. 
200
The committee may make substantial changes to the legislation before it 
reports back to parliament. If the government does not like the amendments it 
can delay further progress on the bill or it can look for support from other 
parties to restore the bill to the policies that the government favours. Getting 
that majority may involve concessions; once again the logic of those 
concessions is not always apparent to officials. The brutal truth is that the 
 
                                                 
199 It is remarkable that for several years Dr Cullen was both minister of finance and leader of the 
House; this meant he was responsible for two of the government’s critical constraining factors 
(money and parliament minutes). He must have had numbers drifting past his eyes whenever he 
tried to sleep. 
200 State Services Commission (2007, paras 38–49). 
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opinions of officials do not count; all officials can offer is analysis, while what 
the government needs is a majority. 
Some of the issues that can come up in the passage of legislation are shown 
in the next case study. 
Case study – Real Estate Agents Act 2008 
In late 2009, a search of the government website showed the existence of the 
Real Estate Agents Authority. It looked like a well-established office, showing 
many of the signs of a fully mature government entity: a chair, a board, a chief 
executive/registrar, 12 brochures and 25 forms available for downloading from 
its website,201 four sets of regulations, a set of rules and a fees notice.202
It was not always like this. The authority came into existence only on 
17 November 2009. Real estate agents were previously supervised by an 
industry body, the Real Estate Institute of New Zealand. Following some sharp 
practices in the industry and reviews that led nowhere, the institute felt the 
delicate touch of Clayton Cosgrove, the associate minister of justice. He 
repeatedly expressed his concern about malpractice in the real estate industry, 
referring to ‘land sharks’, ‘cowboys’ and ‘rogues’, and the weakness of the 
institute (‘a B-grade Goon Show’).
 
203
in that John Wayne meets Buzz Lightyear style – … there to shoot up 
the town, to reform this industry, and to drag it kicking and screaming 
into the new century
 Eventually, in late 2007 he persuaded his 
colleagues to support a Real Estate Agents Bill to abolish industry-led 
supervision and introduce a government agency. 
Though public debate had been going on for some time, detailed policy 
work was not complete. Parliamentary counsel started drafting the Real Estate 
Agents Bill while officials were still preparing policy papers for cabinet. After 
some high-speed work the bill was introduced on 3 December 2007, early 
enough to have a reasonable prospect of passing before the election that was due 
in late 2008. 
In the bill’s first reading, it met with scepticism. Katherine Rich responded 
to the tone that had been set by the minister: 
204
                                                 
201 Real Estate Agents Authority (2009). 
202 Parliamentary Counsel Office (2009). 
203 ‘Real Estate Agents Bill: First reading’ (Hansard, 2007, p 13,819, Katherine Rich MP, quoting 
the minister during the first reading debate). 
204 ‘Real Estate Agents Bill: First reading’ (Hansard, 2007, p 13,813). 
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Much of the ongoing debate throughout the passage of the bill was characterised 
by colour and heat rather than clarity or light. 
The select committee called for submissions, and the Real Estate Institute 
worked hard to make sure there were submissions. The committee received 
1,328 submissions,205
After all that rush things came to a halt. It seems that though the bill had 
passed the select committee there was not a majority in the House. After some 
weeks the minister had officials advise him on discussions with Winston Peters, 
the leader of New Zealand First, during which he achieved agreement. The price 
of that agreement was several provisions the Real Estate Institute had sought, 
including the removal of provisions that would have tightened up the rules for 
 many of them on form letters. This was an early sign of a 
very active lobbying effort. The institute retained a prominent Wellington 
lawyer to act on their behalf. The lawyer prepared two submissions, the first of 
402 pages and a follow-up of a further 76 pages; she also appeared before the 
committee and argued with vigour. Once the committee had endured all that 
argumentation it is safe to assume any sympathy it might previously have had 
for the institute was thoroughly tested. 
The committee’s sympathy was further strained by the process of hearing 
public submissions. Many estate agents had ticked the box seeking to be heard 
orally and the committee put aside several days (including a special session in 
Auckland) to hear 767 submissions. It transpired that many of the submitters 
had not read or understood the bill, and could not explain the views they put 
forward. 
One issue that came up repeatedly was the absence of controls on property 
managers. Though some tenanted properties are managed by real estate agents, 
many other property managers are not real estate agents. The institute argued 
that the absence of controls on property managers meant that a new risk was 
being unleashed on the public. If this argument had succeeded, it would have 
required a massive re-write of the bill, jeopardising its passage. The drafters 
were saved by the clerk of the House, who advised that property management 
was beyond the scope of the bill as introduced, so its inclusion would be against 
Standing Orders. 
The select committee reported back on 6 June 2008, having made 
substantial revisions to the bill; a word count shows that the committee changed 
25% of the bill. That looks like a lot of amendments, but it is not an unusual 
amount of change, particularly for legislation that was prepared in haste. 
                                                 
205 Justice and Electoral Committee (2008).  
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auctions. In many respects, however, the bill still contained much that the 
institute did not like, including its own demise. 
On 2 September 2008, the House took urgency. Several pieces of 
legislation were progressed, including the bill; it went through all remaining 
stages, the second reading, the committee stage (which involves the whole of 
the House) and the third reading, in one day. During that process, the 
amendments agreed with New Zealand First were incorporated. The officials 
attending to support the minister were required at parliament for 13 hours as 
they waited to do their job. 
It was a day of some drama; Winston Peters, who was central to the 
passage of the bill, was simultaneously deeply embroiled in a privileges hearing 
into his declaration of pecuniary interests. It is an example of parliamentary 
multi-tasking that the bill ploughed on regardless, and was signed into law on  
16 September 2008. 
It’s about votes 
In the above account, officials are a recurrent presence, but they are not always 
at the centre. The fundamental responsibility in making an Act lies with MPs, 
not officials. In that context the iron rule of political contest is more important 
than rules of logic. Analysis does not pass statutes; votes do. 
Officials were important in sorting out the policy issues in the Real Estate 
Agents Bill, but that largely came after the minister had announced his plans. 
Officials did participate during the select committee process and were called on 
to advise the minister as he negotiated amendments with New Zealand First, but 
the decision to omit property managers was largely the result of a procedural 
ruling, not policy analysis. It is parliament’s processes and political priorities 
that dominate, not reports from officials. 
The extent of lobbying on this bill is also educational for officials. Though 
officials often have the time, resources and expertise to apply to an issue, those 
will not always be enough. In part, this is because of the differences between the 
communication methods of officials and lobbyists. 
Officials deal with ministers; generally, this means two or three ministers in 
a parliament of 120 are exposed to the full detail of officials’ thinking. The 
ministers get reports that examine the issues. Where possible, the reports are 
supported by data and costings. Using that information, officials expect that 
ministers will lead parliament to a new rationality. 
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Lobbyists, on the other hand, will talk with any MP who will listen. They 
aim to get into the room with any influential MP, including select committee 
members, and senior party members. Those they cannot talk with may receive 
emails and pamphlets. Where possible, lobbyists will marshal facts and analysis. 
Sometimes the facts will be different from those that seem significant to 
officials. The lobbyist will not be restricted to the society-wide effects of a bill; 
instead, the lobbyist may put more emphasis on the number of supporters 
feeling strongly about the proposed legislation. In some cases, backbench 
members may receive more information on a bill from lobbyists than they do 
from the government. 
However, the Real Estate Agents Bill demonstrated that intensive lobbying 
will not always work, especially if it is on behalf of a commercial interest group. 
Select committees do not like being told what to do. Committees will put up 
with the occasional lecture from an upset voter, but they expect professionals to 
know better than to browbeat or patronise parliament. Officials must not hector 
committees or waste their time with excess material. Similarly, spending a lot of 
money on massive submissions and wasting the time of the committee by 
organising submissions from people with nothing original to say may irritate 
more than persuade. 
But, irrespective of the role of officials and lobbyists, the deals that make 
legislation are the work of members. As they make those deals, they are always 
mindful of the iron rule. Decisions on whether to support or oppose a bill will 
depend on the merits of the case, but also on parliamentary tactics. Many bills 
are passed with little controversy; presumably, the opposition has no major 
concern and can see no gain to be made from differentiating its position from 
the government. But in other cases, an opposition spokesperson may see an 
opportunity to enhance her reputation or to put extra pressure on a minister who 
is in trouble; as a result, the bill may be fought at every stage, using substance, 
rhetoric and process. To complete the bill in such circumstances the party 
leading the government may need support on substance and procedure from a 
minor party. There is always a price for such support. 
The laws that parliament makes are made in good faith and are intended to 
do what they say they will do, but they are also the product of tactics. This 
means attempts to appraise the work of parliament solely in terms of the clarity 
and rationality of statute will never see the full picture. 
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Law-making and politics 
It is not possible to assess the quality of legislation that parliament produces. 
That assessment would be a massive task. But a few issues can be explored. The 
first two issues show how parliamentary tactics can affect the content and form 
of statutes. The third shows how parliament has moved away from an 
oppressive form of legislation. 
Log-rolling 
Log-rolling is an activity identified with the United States congress. It relates to 
the means by which congress members give their support to a bill, at the price of 
requiring their colleagues to support an unrelated provision. As a result, 
legislation may become a bundle of local and sectoral measures, intended to 
benefit small groups rather than society as a whole. 
The term comes from the timber industry, where it applies to the assembly 
of rafts of logs, ready to float down river to a mill. To organise the logs, the 
workers jump onto a log as it floats, use spikes on their boots to get the log 
spinning, and then roll the log into the raft. Similarly, members of congress use 
their influence to get traction for a favourite piece of policy, and then roll the 
item into the bill. By that means the item favoured by the individual gets 
momentum from the rest of the bill and may make its way into legislation. 
Log-rolling used to be unknown in New Zealand for a couple of reasons. 
First, unlike in the United States, our parliament has adopted procedures to stop 
irrelevant items from being attached to a bill.206
But recently the first signs of log-rolling are emerging. In late 2009 passage 
of the amended emissions trading legislation
 As with the example of the Real 
Estate Agents Bill, matters that are outside of the scope of the bill may not be 
added to it. Second, log-rolling is not feasible in a parliament where large and 
disciplined parties have tight control; a strong party leadership in a dominant 
party is unlikely to be beholden to individual members. 
207 depended on an agreement 
between National and the Māori party. The debate in parliament made it quite 
clear that part of the price for support from the Māori party was a settlement of a 
Treaty of Waitangi claim, to the benefit of various iwi.208
                                                 
206 Standing Order 156 (1) says a bill must relate to one subject area only. 
207 Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2009. 
208 ‘Third reading debate: Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment 
Bill’ (Hansard, 2009, 8,052).  
 This was well outside 
the range of matters that the government had envisaged when it introduced the 
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bill, but was of particular interest to the Māori party. The Māori party was able 
to roll its log (a Treaty of Waitangi settlement) into the deal. 
The emissions trading treaty settlement did not incorporate a new element 
into the bill, but other processes can see legislative amendments being made 
across different areas to secure a deal. To progress legislation the government 
must often seek support for urgency. A minor party may agree to support 
passage of the government’s priority bill, but only at the cost of progress on its 
preferred agenda item, which may be in a completely different bill. The minor 
party may even extract an amendment to its (unrelated) priority, in exchange for 
its support for urgency on government business. Log-rolling can happen in 
New Zealand. 
Recently, a small-scale version of log-rolling emerged. On 29 September 
2009, the Primary Production Select Committee reported back on its 
consideration of the Reserves and Other Lands Disposal Bill. The bill is a good 
example of the miscellaneous work that parliament must attend to. It covers 
reserves across the country, proposing various detailed changes to amend the 
powers available to reserve authorities. As introduced, all the provisions seem to 
have been for some public purpose, such as for the benefit of the Auckland Art 
Gallery, the users of the Dunedin Octagon, and the Nelson–Marlborough 
District Health Board. 
The select committee report added some new clauses relating to the Opua 
esplanade reserve, administered by the Far North District Council. Unlike the 
other provisions, however, these clauses relate specifically to the current 
registered proprietor of the adjoining land’;209
There is probably little concern in many households across New Zealand 
whether or not Doug Schmuck can operate his business on the Opua esplanade 
reserve, but there is debate in Opua.
 the clauses would permit the 
district council to issue an easement over the reserve so that the owner (Doug 
Schmuck) may carry on his boat-building business. 
210
In December 2009, the Speaker ruled that the amendment was 
unacceptable,
 Not all the locals agree with this use of 
the esplanade. Introducing such a clause into a public bill at the select 
committee implies dominance of one private interest over other priorities. 
211
                                                 
209 Clause 34C(3). 
210 There is a very long history to this case, and Doug Schmuck has strong arguments to support his 
case; see Schmuck (2007), a submission he made on the Regulatory Responsibility Bill. The 
concern expressed here is not about the substance of the argument, it is about process. 
211 ‘Clauses don’t belong in bill, says Smith’ (2009, p A2). 
 but this seems to be because the wording relates to a particular 
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person. More general wording to the same effect may be acceptable. The 
concern remains that, if ‘Schmuck clauses’ are deemed acceptable in public 
bills, private interests may override public interest. 
Purpose clauses 
The purpose of a statute is to make law. It is the law that counts, and it is the 
law that must be followed. It is generally held among lawyers that laws should 
be as clear as possible. They should be simple. They should omit unnecessary 
words. The more words there are, the more opportunity for confusion, as 
various parts of a bill pull in different ways. 
Parliamentarians also seek to make clear law, but the theatre of the 
courtroom is not the only place that matters to them. It is not sufficient to make 
technically precise laws, it is also necessary that supporters know that the law 
will do good things. If it takes a lawyer to explain what the law will do, then it is 
unlikely to be good politics. Politicians solve this problem by inserting 
preambles and purpose clauses. 
A law setting up complex provisions for registering and trading property is 
easy to oppose; its bureaucratic processes or its market orientation are both big 
targets. But if the purpose clause explains that this bill will help fight global 
warming, and make life safe for our grandchildren, then those who oppose it are 
climate change deniers. In that context MPs and the public may endorse a set of 
technical measures that would otherwise be unacceptable. Similarly, the courts 
will interpret the Act with that purpose in mind. 
According to legal traditionalists purpose clauses are bad law. They would 
say that the law should be clear and a statute should be interpreted only from the 
words in its sections. But the law is never that simple; statutes are always 
interpreted in context, and with common law presumptions in mind. The 
Interpretation Act 1999 decrees how parliament wants Acts to be interpreted; it 
says in section 5(1) that the meaning of an Act must be found ‘in the light of its 
purpose’. In recent decades, purpose clauses have assisted that. 
Some lawyers still abhor this change. A debate between lawyers on this 
topic can kill social events. Alert hosts will quickly change the subject to 
something more diverting like drying paint or their last golf round. 
Henry VIII laws 
Some recent changes are definitely for the better. In particular, in the last couple 
of decades parliament has reduced the use of measures that would give the 
executive greater authority, most noticeably Henry VIII laws. 
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The term comes from a device that Henry VIII used to circumvent 
parliamentary control. He used powers to set aside statutes when he deemed it 
expedient. In modern times that seems extraordinary, but such powers were 
used in New Zealand only 30 years ago. 
In 1979, parliament passed three laws controlling wages and commerce; 
these laws authorised the making of regulations notwithstanding any Act or 
specified Acts. That is, rather than regulations being confined by statute, 
regulations could overturn statute. In 1982, the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 
was amended to ensure the regulations of the wage and price freeze would 
override other legislation.212
Parliament and officials in law-making 
 
This was not simply a technical or transition provision. The wage and price 
freeze was an extraordinary regulatory device to control the economy; it 
affected every workplace, every business and every household. The attraction in 
using regulation was speed; most of the provisions of the freeze were drafted 
and in place within days of the announced policy. For those who hope to use the 
power of the state to control activity, such speed and certainty are seductive. For 
those who value democracy, they are abhorrent. 
But, as with all discussion of the constitution, the matter is not black and 
white. Flexibility in government means in some areas it is sensible to allow 
some discretion. For example, the State Sector Act 1988 contains a schedule 
that lists all the government departments that comprise the public service (as 
strictly defined). Under section 30A of the Act, the list of departments in the Act 
may be modified by the government using an order in council. This seems 
reasonable; the various reorganisations of government departments might excite 
officials but they need not use parliament’s time. 
The restriction of Henry VIII clauses to technical matters is not a matter of 
widespread interest now; most people have no idea what they are. But changes 
in recent decades are a welcome blow for democracy and officials should 
remember that attempts to circumvent parliament are not encouraged. 
More than many of parliament’s other activities, law-making involves officials. 
The role of select committee adviser brings a few officials into proximity with 
MPs. As they carry out that role officials must be careful not to trespass on 
parliament’s business, lest they feel the pain from the everyday paradox; they 
are non-political officials supporting a political process. The officials who are 
                                                 
212 Joseph (2007, p 504). 
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closest to the process are policy advisers and law drafters. The policy advisers 
tend to be mid-level head office staff; the law drafters may be very experienced 
at their craft. 
But, though officials are involved, making statutes is not the work of public 
servants; it is parliament’s business. Parliament is quite capable in law of 
enacting statutes without any reference to officials. This means officials must 
offer clear analysis and advice. It also means officials must suffer mortification 
as others contribute their opinions. An official who has spent years working on 
an issue may see parliament being swayed by the emotional contributions of the 
public or even the self-seeking input of vested interests. Such is life. It may not 
be tidy or technocratic, but it is democracy. 
 159 
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Funding Governments 
An ancient role 
The provision of taxes for the monarch was one of the first functions of 
parliament. The regular necessity for funds was the reason successive kings 
continued to call parliaments. The need for funds is still the main imperative 
that drives calling parliament. 
Without the permission of parliament, the government has no access to 
funds. This permission is enshrined in section 22 of the Constitution Act 1986: 
It shall not be lawful for the Crown, except by or under an Act of 
Parliament,— 
(a) To levy a tax; or 
(b) To borrow money or to receive money borrowed from any 
person; or 
(c) To spend any public money. 
This is comprehensive; all sources and uses of funds are covered. Perhaps some 
imaginative government could try going into business as a means of making 
money, but they could not get an overdraft without parliamentary permission. 
And even if they made money in the business, they could not spend it without 
permission. 
The need to have an Act of parliament to spend a dollar sounds impossibly 
restrictive. The legislation process outlined in the previous section demonstrates 
that getting an Act of parliament is not a simple matter.213
On top of the controls on funds (known as supply), parliament also 
demands information on the use of money; the government must account to 
parliament every year for all money raised and spent. This is no different from 
any company that must account to its shareholders, but the government’s 
 Nobody could run a 
business or a household like that. And, to make it even more restrictive, taxes 
and spending have to be authorised annually; most of the government’s income 
and outlays must be authorised by parliament every year. 
                                                 
213 Parliament’s Standing Orders provide some different and simpler processes for budgetary 
matters, but the basic point applies. 
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business is uniquely large and diverse so the process of accounting raises many 
challenges. A full treatment of these matters would need a book on 
accounting;214
Raising money 
 here the focus is on the issues raised by parliamentary control and 
supervision of government funds. 
It is complex, but processes have been developed to make it work. As 
always, they are not the simplest or most efficient processes; democracy is 
never simple or efficient. The processes cover both raising money and spending 
money. 
Governments are different from other beings. Most businesses and individuals 
get their money through some kind of exchange, such as selling their labour for 
wages or selling goods for profit. Governments, on the other hand, get money 
by their power to collect tax. Anyone within range of the government’s reach 
may be required to pay. Those who resist do not suffer physical duress, but the 
government might simply remove the money from their bank accounts. If 
anyone else used such methods to support their activities it would be a crime, 
even organised crime. But when the government does it, with the democratic 
consent of the people’s representatives in parliament, it is called tax. 
All modern economies have a wide variety of taxes, and tax policy is an 
important part of public policy. Taxes intrude in many parts of daily life. Every 
employer must subtract tax from every employee’s pay-packet. And virtually 
every seller whether providing medical advice, movies or marmite must add tax 
to every bill. Computers have made many tax payments simple and fast, but 
though the process may be easy tax remains a major imposition. The democratic 
control of the government’s power to impose taxes is a vital function of 
parliament. It is entirely proper that parliament should maintain a close 
oversight on taxation. 
All taxes are authorised by tax Acts. These Acts lay out the transactions or 
goods to be taxed, the information that taxpayers must supply and requirements 
about the time and means of payment. In addition, the law sets the tax rate. For 
the largest tax, income tax, the law requires that the rates of tax be confirmed by 
parliament every year. Whether there has been a change in the rates of tax is 
                                                 
214 The Treasury (2005) provides an introduction.  
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irrelevant; for income tax to be valid in any tax year parliament must pass an 
annual taxing Act to confirm the rate of tax.215
The administrative implications are just a start; there also would be a 
financial and economic impact. Something over half of all the government’s 
income for the year would be lost at a stroke. The government would still have 
the power to fill the gap by borrowing, because the power to borrow is a 
separate power conferred by the Public Finance Act 1989.
 
This means that every year parliament must make time to consider income 
tax, and pass the bill by 31 March. Just as importantly, it means the government 
must convene parliament and subject itself to all the associated inconvenience, 
such as parliamentary questions. If the government wants income tax, then it has 
to have parliament too. 
If an annual tax bill were not passed by 31 March, the consequences would 
be extraordinary. All PAYE payments that employers had made during the year 
and provisional taxes paid by the self-employed would be due to be refunded. 
Inland Revenue Department staff and computers would have a massive job 
handling the repayments. Though the Inland Revenue Department makes 
hundreds of thousands of payments each year, the logistics of refunding all 
PAYE and provisional tax payments would be impossible. 
216
Those technical and economic consequences are scary, but they are not the 
main issue that would preoccupy a government faced with the prospect of being 
unable to pass the annual tax bill. Before matters played through to a financial 
crisis, there would be a constitutional crisis. A government that cannot get 
money bills (including annual tax rates
 But lenders would 
be wary of providing funds to a government that could not organise its taxes; 
interest rates could be ruinous. If the government’s cost of funds rose, then 
interest rates would rise for everyone. Recession would be inevitable. 
217
                                                 
215 Income Tax Act 2007, section BB1 (similar provisions existed in earlier versions of the Income 
Tax Act). 
216 Under sections 46 and 47 of the Public Finance Act 1989, the minister of finance (and only the 
minister of finance) may borrow as required. For more detail, see The Treasury (2005). 
217 McGee (2005, p 98). 
) through parliament is a government 
that has lost the confidence of parliament. Without the confidence of parliament 
a government falls. A focus on the theoretical possibility of administrative 
chaos, financial ruin and economic collapse would miss the point. Under the 
iron rule of political conflict the issue for parliament is the struggle for control. 
A government that cannot maintain its tax flow has lost control. 
A similar imperative can be seen on the spending side of the ledger. 
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Spending money 
The central provision to control spending is in section 4 of the Public Finance 
Act 1989. In the characteristically negative language of statute, the section says: 
The Crown … must not incur expenses or capital expenditure, except 
as expressly authorised by an appropriation, or other authority, by or 
under an Act. 
The jargon translates to say that the government may not spend (expenses) or 
acquire assets (capital expenditure) without a specific, usually annual, approval 
from parliament (appropriation) or another explicit authorisation in a statute. 
A small number of ongoing approvals are found in statute; these are known 
as permanent legislative authorities. For example, the Public Finance Act 1989 
includes an ongoing authority to repay debt without specific authority from 
parliament. That recognises that few bankers would be prepared to lend if their 
repayment were dependent on the goodwill of some future parliament. 
Similarly, the independence of the judiciary is protected in the Judicature Act 
1908, which provides an ongoing authority to pay judges’ salaries without 
separate parliamentary approval. The Civil List Act 1979 provides funding to 
pay the salaries of members of parliament (MPs) and ministers; that avoids the 
risk of an uncomfortable debate on parliamentary salaries each year. 
More generally, the power to spend is contained in annual appropriations. 
Each appropriation allows a designated minister to spend up to a specified sum, 
for a particular purpose. The government does not get an open right to spend or 
a simple overall limit. The approval is much more detailed. A few decades ago 
the approval was to spend money on certain things; that is each department had 
a limit for salaries, for travel and communication, and for office expenses. In the 
1980s, the focus changed from those inputs departments buy to the things that 
departments do and the purposes of expenditure. The approval now is for the 
purchase of various departmental products (outputs) to achieve results 
(outcomes). Parliament now has the chance to consider not just what the money 
is to be spent on, but what it is to be spent for. 
Similarly, until the 1980s, parliamentary appropriations were for cash to 
allow the government to pay its bills. That was updated when, in a world-
leading move, parliamentary authority was changed to an accrual basis. Without 
going into a technical discourse on accrual versus cash accounting, the essential 
point is that this change has allowed parliament to take much firmer grip on 
government spending. By authorising accruals, parliament is permitting 
departments to operate with total costs up to a certain value; without such 
approval departments may not do business, including hiring staff or buying 
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office equipment. The old cash approval was silent on the question of 
departments making commitments and took effect only at a later stage when 
determining whether bills could be paid. If parliamentary authority is to be 
meaningful, it is a little late if authorisation arises only after liabilities have been 
incurred. In addition, some operating costs, such as depreciation, are ignored by 
a cash system, but are covered by the accruals system. The current system of 
approval to do business to achieve particular results provides parliament with 
detailed oversight of all of the government’s planned activities. 
Every year at budget time, the minister of finance presents a schedule of 
spending plans for every minister supported by details relating to each planned 
expenditure. These are brought together in the Estimates, which offer 
parliamentarians 10 volumes of plans and goals. Once passed, the Estimates 
become the appropriations that license all spending by every department. Chief 
executives report monthly to their ministers and The Treasury, comparing 
expenditure with appropriation. Any risk of spending more than parliament has 
appropriated causes a flurry of concerned reports. Sometimes the minister of 
finance seeks more funds in the end-of-year Supplementary Estimates. 
Sometimes systems fail and the department spends more than is appropriated 
(over-expenditure). This always leads to negative management reports for those 
concerned, often with consequences for their income, and the embarrassing 
requirement for retrospective parliamentary approval for the extra funds. 
Though all government spending must be authorised by a parliamentary 
appropriation, it is not always possible for funds to be appropriated before they 
are spent. Each year the Estimates are introduced with the budget in May, 
before the beginning of the next financial year on 1 July. But it takes some 
weeks for parliament to consider the Estimates, so appropriations are not usually 
passed until August. That means that for the first couple of months of the 
financial year no appropriations are in place and no spending is authorised. If no 
other facility existed, the government would have no power to spend and would 
have to resign because (in the jargon) it had no supply. Parliament has addressed 
this need by using imprest supply bills. 
Imprest is a means by which parliament provides a lump sum that the 
government may spend, so long as it later seeks an appropriation to authorise 
the spending. Where an appropriation offers a specific authority, imprest offers 
a blanket power to spend. This power was tested in court when archivists 
objected to the secretary of internal affairs using savings in the archives area of 
the department to offset spending elsewhere. They claimed he was unlawfully 
diverting money appropriated for archives and using it for another purpose. The 
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court found he was lawfully spending from imprest, using a legal fiction that he 
had funds available, and that the spending could properly be validated later.218
Imprest bills are not widely known; among those who are aware of them 
they are generally seen as a technicality, a parliamentary debate that offers some 
 
In a normal year, there are two imprest bills. The first imprest bill is passed 
just before the financial year begins to tide the government over until the 
Appropriation Bill is passed in August. The second imprest bill is passed with 
the Appropriation Bill to take account of the risk that there may be spending 
beyond the levels set by appropriations (or perhaps outside any appropriation) 
that will not be validated until the Supplementary Estimates are passed at the 
end of the financial year. Each imprest bill provides a sum for expenses (current 
spending) and another sum for capital expenditure. 
Calculating the amount that should be requested in the imprest bill is a job 
to make treasury managers nervous. Ask for too much and the government 
seems to be writing itself a blank cheque. Ask for too little and the government 
might run out of supply. In the normal course of events running out of supply 
would require another imprest bill. That is significant because the Leader of the 
House must find time for a three-hour debate; more importantly, any imprest 
debate is a confidence matter in parliament and the prime minister will not look 
warmly on the public servant whose incompetent forecasting required an extra 
confidence vote. 
But parliamentary procedure is only part of the point; what if the 
government loses the motion? In that case the government would no longer have 
supply, and the governor-general might call for an election. In the interim, until 
a new government is formed, funding might run out. 
If the loss of income taxes would be extraordinary, the loss of supply would 
be catastrophic. Once appropriations were used up, then without imprest the 
government would not be able to employ staff, retain consultants or rent offices. 
It could not even hire polling clerks to run an election. 
When the government ran its business on a cash basis the problem of 
running out of supply was expressed as an inability to pay staff or suppliers. 
Now that funding is organised on an accrual basis it would not be lawful to 
employ them at all, because offering an IOU still involves accruing expenses. 
Police could not be employed to maintain order nor corrections officers to guard 
prisons. The Treasury could not continue to employ its staff to work on the 
problem 
                                                 
218 Archives and Records Association of New Zealand v Blakeley [2000] 1 NZLR 607, 630. 
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entertainment because it is wide-ranging. But it is not just an entertaining 
political sideline; it is the historic basis of parliamentary authority. And as well 
as the historic interest, in recent years, as the following case study illustrates, 
extraordinary circumstances have forced the government to introduce a third 
imprest bill to maintain supply. 
Case study – buying Air New Zealand 
September 12, 2001 (New Zealand time), was a critical day in New Zealand 
aviation. In the small hours of the morning, people woke to turn on their 
televisions where they saw appalling images of aeroplanes destroying the World 
Trade Centre in New York. By the time the first domestic flights took off that 
morning an early-morning meeting of officials in Wellington had agreed to have 
security measures in place across New Zealand to check all passengers boarding 
flights. Those security measures continue to this day. 
But terrorism over the United States was not the only issue affecting 
New Zealand aviation that day. Jockeying for space on page 1 of the news was 
another aviation item: Air New Zealand placed its Australian subsidiary, Ansett, 
into voluntary administration that evening.219 After a day coming to grips with 
the state of the company, at 2am on 14 September the administrator abruptly 
stopped all Ansett flights. There was chaos that morning at airports across 
Australia. In Melbourne, baggage handlers blockaded a flight to New Zealand, 
which had the effect of capturing Helen Clark, New Zealand’s prime minister, 
as she was passing through the airport. It took the combined efforts of the 
Australian and New Zealand air forces to rescue her and get her back to 
New Zealand.220
As well as changing the face of trans-Tasman flying, these events had a 
major financial impact as the government grappled with the results of Air 
New Zealand’s disastrous attempt to operate in Australia. The close of Ansett 
was sudden, but not completely out of the blue. In previous months Air 
New Zealand had flirted with Singapore Airlines and Qantas attempting to find 
a friendly investor.
 
221 By 11 September Air New Zealand was trying to sell 
Ansett for one dollar.222
                                                 
219 ‘Ansett Australia in voluntary administration’ (2001, p 1). 
220 ‘Air force rescues Clark’ (2001, p 1). 
221 ‘Rivals put Air NZ cases for last time’ (2001, p 2). 
222 ‘“Qantas verdict on Ansett expected today” says PM’ (2001, p 2). 
 Negotiations failed and the collapse of Ansett followed 
immediately. But the severing of Ansett still left Air New Zealand in a critical 
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state with massive debts. Within a day the government came to the rescue with a 
loan of half a billion dollars.223
That loan was a stopgap that kept Air New Zealand flying while a real 
rescue was hastily arranged. The losses were already well over $1 billion 
dollars, and Air New Zealand’s balance sheet could not handle more debt. If the 
airline were to survive, it needed a buyer to bring more capital. Three weeks 
later the government announced that it would put up funds and buy an issue of 
new shares, giving it ownership of 80% of Air New Zealand; this was expected 
to cost nearly $900 million.
 
224
The government may be rich, but $900 million is a lot of money; money 
that parliament had not yet authorised. The funds would have to come from 
imprest. Through the second Imprest Supply Bill for that year the government 
already had access to $1.4 billion for capital expenditure (this was referred to as 
liabilities in 2001, but the effect is the same). But that sum included planned 
investments in railways, the health system, electricity and schools.
 
225
In October, The Treasury recommended a third Imprest Supply Bill, to 
provide $585 million to invest in Air New Zealand, plus a further sum to 
provide for investment in a new superannuation fund.
 Some 
allowance had been made for Air New Zealand; sufficient funds existed to cover 
the initial loan, but there was not enough for a bail-out of this size. 
226 By the time the bill was 
introduced in December, the total for Air New Zealand had increased to 
$735 million to allow a planned further $150 million to be paid later in the 
year.227 In total, the bill sought funding of $1.35 billion for Air New Zealand 
and the superannuation fund, on top of the existing funds available through 
appropriations and imprest.228
After months of officials’ reports on aviation and commercial issues, 
forecasts of finances, and intense negotiation with airline representatives, 
parliament was to deliberate on a major financial outlay. Those involved with 
the detail might have hoped for a considered debate on the government’s 
approach to Air New Zealand, aviation policy or financial management. But of 
the 18 speeches in the debate only four gave any serious consideration to the 
 
                                                 
223 ‘Taxpayers rescue Air NZ with $550 million loan’ (2001, p 1). 
224 ‘Air New Zealand rescue package’ (2001, p 1). 
225 Imprest Supply (Second for 2001/02, p 4) Bill, explanatory note. 
226 The Treasury (2001).  
227 ‘Second reading debate on the Imprest Supply (Third for 2001/02) Bill’ (Hansard, 2001).  
228 Imprest Supply (Third for 2001/02, p 2) Bill, explanatory note. 
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investment in Air New Zealand.229
The main topic in the debate, and the only item to be reported in the media, 
was a decision by the Green Party to abstain from voting on the bill.
 For the rest, the iron rule of political conflict 
meant there were much more interesting issues to discuss. Even the speech from 
the minister of transport made no reference to Air New Zealand. 
During that week, a strike at Christchurch Hospital required patients to fly 
around the country for treatment. National devoted most of its speeches to a 
demand for more funds for health care. There was also a scandal about the 
expenses and salary for a member of the Employment Relations Authority. ACT 
had requested an urgent debate on the scandal that day; when the debate was 
declined parliamentary tactics dictated that one of its two speakers had to devote 
his whole speech to the Employment Relations Authority, missing a golden 
opportunity to outline ACT’s views on nationalising airlines. 
230
Money matters 
 This was 
news, because all imprest bills are confidence measures, and the Green Party 
had offered its vote to the government on confidence matters. The abstention 
did not affect the result, however, because it was still clear that the government 
had the votes to pass the bill. 
In the event, the bill passed by 64 votes to 46, with 7 abstentions. Later in 
the year this was confirmed when, in the Supplementary Estimates, parliament 
approved a total of $1,035 million for the investment in Air New Zealand. 
Appropriations and imprest supply may be antiquated names, but the system 
works. Parliament continues its ancient role of authorising the government’s 
raising and spending of money. Since the reforms of the 1980s, New Zealand’s 
fiscal management system is one of the most complete and coherent in the 
world. But examples from recent decades show risks that still affect the 
coherence of parliament’s oversight of spending. The first issue is the 
management of changes that affect parliament’s responsibilities. The second 
issue is the quality of scrutiny offered by parliament. 
                                                 
229 ‘Second reading debate on the Imprest Supply (Third for 2001/02) Bill’ (Hansard, 2001). This 
and the subsequent comments on the debate are based on this second reading debate. 
230 ‘Greens rebel on Government vote’ (2001, p 2). 
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Fiscal regulator and financial veto 
In recent years tax cuts have been a matter of political controversy. Supporters 
have claimed that cuts would reduce the burden of government and improve 
incentives to work. In the 1970s, tax rates were seen as a device to regulate 
economic activity; a timely tax cut might improve spending power and stave off 
a looming recession. The problem was it could take months for parliament to 
authorise a change in tax rates, and in that time a recession could already occur. 
In the 1979 budget Robert Muldoon, the prime minister and minister of 
finance, proposed a solution: 
The effectiveness of our present policy instruments would be improved 
if the Government was empowered to reduce income tax rates when 
the House was not in session. With such legislation, action could be 
taken in the summer months when Parliament is not traditionally in 
session, thus permitting more flexible and precise policy responses for 
changing circumstances.231
The financial veto, on the other hand, is the result of a constitutional change 
that has occurred with virtually no debate. For many years up to the 1990s 
backbench MPs could not introduce any measure to parliament if that measure 
involved new or increased spending. All spending proposals had to be moved by 
 
Robert Muldoon went on to announce that the government planned to introduce 
enabling legislation later that year. 
This was a remarkable proposition. There are many technical arguments 
about this idea. It is not clear that economic forecasting was then, or may ever 
be, accurate enough to allow such fine tuning of the economy. In addition, the 
administrative lead time required to introduce tax cuts is many months; 
parliamentary approval is simply one step of the process. But irrespective of the 
technical debate, it represented a substantial constitutional proposal. 
The fiscal regulator, as it became known, was another attempt to introduce 
a Henry VIII law: tax rates as set by parliament could be changed by executive 
power. But this was an extension of the Henry VIII proposition into 
parliament’s earliest power; parliament’s historic hold over the government 
would be loosened. It is reassuring to constitutionalists that the subsequent 
debate was so vigorous that the idea died. On the contrary, the traditional 
summer parliamentary recess that Robert Muldoon used to justify the proposal 
has been replaced by sittings that now run through most of the year; if the 
government wants a change to tax rates, parliament is there to consider it. 
                                                 
231 Muldoon (1979, p 8). 
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a minister. The idea was that financial control is central to the government’s 
programme and, though parliament might approve or disapprove that 
programme, the government could not add its own priorities. This was an old 
practice that was codified as section 21 of the Constitution Act 1986. 
Before the introduction of proportional representation, parliament’s 
Standing Orders Committee conducted a special review to see what changes 
might be needed to reflect the new reality of a weaker government and a more 
powerful parliament. One change the committee made (despite the provision of 
the Constitution Act 1986) was a new power for MPs to propose spending. The 
government’s need to manage fiscal risks was protected by a new veto power. If 
an MP moves a proposal that the government considers ‘would have more than 
a minor impact on the government’s fiscal aggregates if it became law’232
But when combined with the discussion of log-rolling in the previous 
chapter, this power for MPs to propose spending has the seeds of a new risk: 
pork-barrel politics. In the United States, the term ‘pork-barrel politics’ relates 
to the practice of congressmen and women attaching provisions to legislation so 
that government money will be spent in their electoral district. In New Zealand, 
though local MPs will commonly draw attention to the construction of new 
roads and schools in the district, they have not previously had the power to 
initiate such spending. That could change; if it is acceptable to move Schmuck 
clauses, will pork-barrel practices be next? The protection is a provision in 
Standing Orders that forbids amendments that are irrelevant to the bill; pressure 
on that provision would create a threat to fiscal management and a path to pork-
barrel politics.
 then 
the house will not pass that proposal. Some 10 years after the change was 
brought into practice, the Constitution Act was amended in 2005 to repeal 
section 21, and so the law was changed to reflect parliamentary practice. 
Unlike the fiscal regulator, the introduction of the power for MPs to 
propose spending attracted little interest. A few dozen staff members in The 
Treasury were shaken to the core by this attack on government control, and 
some constitutional lawyers were mildly intrigued, but others took no notice. So 
far, it seems the majority were right; this constitutional change has not 
destroyed fiscal rectitude. 
233
                                                 
232 Standing Order 316(1). 
233 Standing Order 119. 
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Parliament’s oversight 
Parliament’s scrutiny of tax and spending is important because these are big 
issues. Fiscal mismanagement can lead to heavy debts that taxpayers must 
service for years to come. Poor tax regimes can undermine the economy. Weak 
financial controls lead to waste or even corruption. Informed scrutiny from 
parliament is one of the most substantial protections against these threats. 
Much is strong and robust about the financial management systems of the 
New Zealand government. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, for example, recently compared New Zealand favourably to other 
countries on the flexibility of budget management and the use of performance 
monitoring, and found that medium-term systems for managing expenditure (the 
third area of the budget that it monitored) was in line with the standards of other 
member countries.234
The quality of select committee scrutiny can be seen in the questionnaires 
sent to every department as they consider their financial performance. For 
example, the questionnaires sent by the Government Administration Committee 
in 2009 for response by the State Services Commission, including the answers 
from the commission, are available on parliament’s website.
 But if these systems are to remain strong parliament needs 
to maintain a close and intelligent interest. That interest should be revealed in 
probing scrutiny from select committees and debate in parliament about major 
fiscal developments. Sadly, neither of those practices is the norm. 
235
If select committees can get lost in trivia, perhaps things are better in the 
debating chamber. The performance of parliament as a whole can be seen in the 
quality of the major debates. The imprest debates provide a good opportunity 
for the government to defend its record and for the opposition to explore any 
 There were a 
total of 78 questions. To the committee’s credit about a third of its questions 
related to aspects of the department’s performance and its plans. But over 50 of 
the questions sought detail on departmental spending. This detail related to 
numbers of media staff, polls conducted by the department, credit cards, every 
consultancy over $5,000, renovations, advertising, conferences, software 
licenses, fringe benefits, personal grievances, stress consultants, and every 
overseas trip paid for by the department. Far from reflecting a wish to debate the 
big picture, select committee questionnaires reflect the reality of the iron rule; 
they are a list that contains the echoes of every scandal and mismanagement that 
has hit the headlines in the last decade. 
                                                 
234 OECD (2009). 
235 Government Administration Committee (2009).  
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financial issue. During 2008 and 2009, government finances suffered a massive 
reversal of fortune. The surpluses of the last decade were gone; deficits were 
forecast to remain for years and debt to rise. It is hard to think of a more telling 
fiscal issue to probe in an imprest debate, but the two imprest debates of 2009 
contain little reflection of fiscal matters.236
                                                 
236 ‘Supplementary Estimates, imprest supply debate’ (Hansard, 2009, p 4,511); ‘Appropriation 
(2009/10) Bill: Third reading, imprest supply debate’ (Hansard, 2009, p 5,905). 
 
The debates had a total of 36 speeches. Since, like any imprest debate, these 
were confidence matters there was strong participation from senior members. 
Bill English, the minister of finance, opened both debates. He focused on the 
fiscal position and the implications of the prospect of years of deficits. Few 
other speakers explored that topic. 
In August, for example, Phil Goff (leader of the opposition) led the attack. 
But he had little to say on fiscal matters. Instead, he seized on a recent war of 
words between a backbench National MP and the minister of local government 
(the leader of ACT) on the issue of whether Māori representatives should have 
dedicated seats on the planned Auckland super-city council. The opportunity to 
expose division between coalition parties was an irresistible gift, and the iron 
law said the opposition must exploit it. Other speakers also wandered wide 
during both debates; some focused on economic matters such as unemployment, 
but others went into education policy, violence in society, climate change, 
police numbers, health, the probation service and migrant workers. One devoted 
his whole speech to the right of parents to smack their children; the Speaker did 
interrupt that speech to find some connection with spending, but the right to 
smack continued for 10 minutes. 
A careful reading of all the speeches showed that some did discuss fiscal 
matters including the possible impact of rising debt on New Zealand’s credit 
ratings. A generous estimate of the proportion of speech content devoted to 
fiscal matters would be around 5% of the debate; that is, during a time of major 
fiscal difficulty, parliamentarians spent about 20 minutes on fiscal issues during 
the total of six hours allowed for the debates on imprest. Of those 20 minutes, 
more than half were accounted for by Bill English. Between them, all other MPs 
spent less than 10 minutes on the prospects of a decade of fiscal difficulties. It 
does not inspire a lot of confidence. 
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Financial overseers and financial managers 
Senior public servants spend a lot of time on financial management; the 
requirements of meeting parliamentary appropriations and regular reporting 
demand that effort. That, combined with careful long-term systems planning 
from The Treasury, has produced robust financial management for taxpayer 
funds. That management is conducted under the authority of parliament, but the 
oversight is not always as robust as the management. 
The meeting between parliament and officialdom on financial matters tends 
to be at two levels. The production of the massive documents of the Estimates, 
and the follow-up through parliamentary reporting and questionnaires, involves 
middle- to junior-level finance and planning staff across Wellington supported 
by managers throughout the government system. For most of the year, those 
staff focus on systems to achieve efficiency and results from government 
activity. When select committee questionnaires arrive, the same staff turn to 
details on individual spending items. The explanation and defence of 
departmental performance falls to senior officials as they appear before select 
committees. 
It is a constant disappointment to officials when parliamentarians focus on 
trivia, but that is to be expected under the iron rule. More attention is to be 
captured in an attack on apparent mismanagement than in a debate about 
medium-term prospects. 
Parliamentarians are not wrong to focus on mismanagement; it can be 
harmful. But officials wistfully hope for a focus on the future implications of 
policy. The frustration felt by officials is clearly another result of the everyday 
paradox; those arriving at parliament with a non-political managerial message 
must cope with MPs whose efforts are driven by the need to win the political 
struggle. 
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Scrutinising Government 
Thirst for information 
Parliament is supposed to hold the government to account. Formally, this means 
parliament has the power to bring down a government by passing a motion of no 
confidence. This, however, is the nuclear total-destruction option. Before that, 
there are a great many tactical opportunities to criticise, embarrass and 
humiliate. Every mistake and mishap is liable to be held up for ridicule. While 
this serves the worthy goal of assisting the government to learn from 
experience, it mainly serves to reduce the government’s credibility, and so to 
improve the opposition’s prospects. It is all about the iron rule. 
If mistakes and mishaps are to be publicised by the opposition, first it must 
know what is going on. Ministers and officials have a huge advantage; they are 
part of the executive, with direct access to information. Much of the work 
involved in scrutinising the government revolves around members using the 
processes of Standing Orders to extract information. Providing information for 
parliament is a large industry, involving officials all across Wellington and 
beyond. 
Annual reports 
The first item is the departmental annual report. Every department and agency 
of state prepares an annual report, which is tabled in parliament. The report 
outlines the achievements for the year, including data on finances and 
employment. Members use the report in select committee as they conduct the 
annual review. Senior officials appear before the select committee for 
questioning, commonly for up to one or two hours. Members leaf through 
annual reports, looking for curly questions. 
Sometimes the conversation is so desultory that it seems members have 
found the report a little dull. They can comfort themselves with the knowledge 
that the annual report that they find so uninteresting will have previously ruined 
a weekend for each of the senior departmental staff who now sits before them. 
No chief executive can afford to release the annual report without having pored 
over it for unexploded munitions. Some years ago, in a fit of managerialism, 
some agencies produced exciting annual reports, with glossy paper and smiling 
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pictures of the boss. That was a mistake; the report may be public, but it is not a 
report to the public, it is a report to parliament. Members of parliament (MPs) 
want information, not razzmatazz. Officials should not attempt to use their 
select committees hearings as an opportunity for self-promotion. 
The annual report, however, is but the first and most predictable step in the 
annual review. In addition, the select committee will generally send a list of 
questions, about a week before the hearing. It is common that there will be over 
50 questions to be answered in a few days.237
                                                 
237 One set of questions was analysed in the previous chapter; see footnote 
 The questions might be about 
anything: the use of information technology, employment disputes, contracts for 
consultants, rent for offices, energy conservation, overseas travel or compliance 
with government policies. Teams of people work long hours to provide answers 
at speed. 
Generally, nothing further is ever heard about the questions. That is 
because they are not necessarily for use by an MP during the forthcoming 
hearing; often the questions are placed on behalf of party research groups for 
use later. In theory, the questions are from the committee, and have the authority 
of parliament to demand an answer. Around 20 years ago, committees gave 
careful thought to their questionnaires, removing duplication and aiming for 
consistency of questions. The practice has changed, and committees generally 
include any question a member asks; the procedural grief that could be 
generated by an MP whose questions are declined is too high to buy a fight. As 
a result, the cost is transferred to departments. 
Annual reviews are not always a matter of tedious compliance. 
Occasionally, the annual review hearings are exciting; perhaps there is some 
controversy. A normally quiet committee room fills with journalists and 
television cameras. Members take turns to ask pointed questions; officials 
slowly turn on the spit. There is an art in such circumstances. For the official, it 
is a very good day at the office when two hours of questioning with cameras 
rolling lead to nothing on television that night. Journalists’ eyes droop as the 
bureaucrat gives a series of measured answers, carefully avoiding quotable 
quotes. 
235 and the 
accompanying text. 
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Questions 
Moving on from the annual review, a much larger source of information is the 
parliamentary question, oral or written. Oral questions occur on most sitting 
days, with 12 questions each day. Questions are lodged at the clerk’s office 
between 10 and 10.30 each morning. Each question is referred to the appropriate 
minister’s office, and on to the department. At about 11 o’clock Blackberries 
start to buzz as senior officials are informed of the question. Generally, the 
department has about one and a half hours to prepare a draft answer, plus 
material that may be useful for supplementary questions. It can often be very 
difficult to anticipate the areas that may be explored in supplementary questions. 
Between one and two o’clock many ministers require senior officials in their 
office as they go over possible questions and answers; that is not a good time to 
eat lunch. During that time, ministers and their senior political staff work on 
their tactics, asking officials for the facts and evidence they need to make their 
case. Then, in parliament, it is all on for an hour as members and ministers 
compete for supremacy. The careful non-political process of assembling 
information within departments translates into political tactics in the minister’s 
office and magically mutates into political confrontation the moment question 
time begins. This process occurs throughout the year, every sitting week. In 
2009, over 1,100 oral questions were asked. 
Oral questions provide great theatre, but written questions are a much more 
serious process for collecting information. The questions and the answers are 
published in the parliamentary order paper for all to see. Any member may ask 
questions of any minister but, unlike oral questions where political balance 
demands that government MPs use their share of question time, most written 
questions come from the opposition. Written questions have always been a 
major enterprise, but over the years changes to the rules have seen their numbers 
grow. There was a time when they were asked only while parliament was 
sitting; now they run throughout the year. They used to be produced on 
typewriters over the signature of the MP; now they are submitted electronically. 
Electronic questions have been a huge boon for the opposition; the same 
question may be put to every minister by means of file merges, and work is 
generated all over Wellington. 
In 2009, there were over 20,000 written questions, every one demanding an 
answer. Each question needs some assembly of facts, drafting, checking and 
sign-off by a senior manager; then they are reviewed by the minister’s office 
and the minister before the answer is lodged. Using a very conservative estimate 
that each question takes only about two hours’ work, that means the equivalent 
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of at least 20 people worked full time through 2009, providing answers to 
written questions; the real number is probably much higher. 
On top of written questions, parliamentarians and their research groups 
have the same rights as anyone else to ask for information under the Official 
Information Act 1982. Every day departments receive requests from MPs for 
information on policies and practices. 
Inquiries 
All these processes of review and question are time consuming, but none is 
feared as much as a select committee inquiry. A select committee may initiate 
an inquiry within its area of expertise.238
Only a few dozen staff members support the work of parliament’s select 
committees. Between them, they produce between 300 and 420 reports per 
year.
 Though a parliamentary inquiry is not 
a commission of inquiry, the committee may ask the Speaker to summon 
witnesses; those who ignore a summons may be in contempt of parliament. 
Likewise, a committee may ask for information for its inquiry; a refusal could 
also constitute contempt. 
A select committee inquiry is inherently less predictable than other forms 
of inquiry; a room full of competing politicians is not conducive to measured 
cross-examination. Though parliament is bound by the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and must respect natural justice, that does not stop members 
bringing strong political views into inquiries. Whereas other inquiries are 
focused on the report, some select committee members seem more interested in 
the process of public questioning; there are often more headlines to be gained in 
the questioning than there are in the report. Because of the politicised process, 
reports of inquiries are sometimes neither cogent nor convincing, but they are 
generally measured and clear documents. That is largely attributable to hard-
working staff in the office of the clerk of the House. 
239
In the last few decades, there have been several major select committee 
inquiries into some aspect of public sector performance. One of the most 
demanding was the Scampi inquiry in 2003.
 For legislation, they are supported by officials from government 
departments. For inquiries into the work of those departments that is not 
feasible. 
240
                                                 
238 Standing Order 185(2). 
239 Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives (2009).  
240 Primary Production Committee (2003). 
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corruption in the Ministry of Fisheries, officials found themselves in front of a 
parliamentary inquiry and a State Service Commission inquiry at the same time. 
After many months of tension officials were completely exonerated by both 
inquiries; there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations. I have been 
caught up in two parliamentary inquiries; one into the management of a 
demonstration in the streets of Christchurch in 1999241 and one into an alleged 
release of genetically modified corn seed.242
Case study – inquiry into the Inland Revenue 
Department 
 During the proceedings, the 
pressure generated by an inquiry looms so large it seems to fill the horizon; the 
only sensible response is to trust the process and tell the truth. 
But the review of the Inland Revenue Department in 1999 was larger and 
more significant than fisheries, demonstrations or corn. It is the subject of the 
next case study. 
On 18 February 1998, Rodney Hide, then a first-term ACT MP, rose in 
parliament to criticise the Inland Revenue Department (IRD): 
the Department has not lived up to its commitments … it has not 
performed up to section 6 of the Tax Administration Act [1994]. We 
can also see the Commissioner has not lived up to section 6 of the Tax 
Administration Act243
That criticism snowballed into a bad couple of years for the IRD. The 
National Business Review carried frequent criticism, particularly in its weekly 
‘Inside Cover’ column. Newspapers carried reports of taxpayers driven to 
suicide by outstanding tax debt.
 
The section that Rodney Hide was concerned about requires officials to protect 
the integrity of the tax system. These comments marked the beginning of a 
series of concerns that Mr Hide raised about the IRD during the following year. 
244 Morale was affected as staff members from 
the IRD faced the repeated suggestion that they came to work to kill people.245
                                                 
241 Justice and Electoral Committee (1999). 
242 Local Government and Environment Committee (2004). 
243 ‘Debate on the Prime Minister’s Statement’ (Hansard, 1998, p 6,588).  
244 See, for example, ‘MPs to look into IRD’s methods of collecting’ (1999, p A2), referring to the 
reports that a Kapiti Coast woman said her husband was driven to suicide by the IRD. 
245 Peters (1999b): ‘Staff morale is low, hate mail is flooding in and scepticism at the IRD’s claim 
to fairness is endemic’. 
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In March 1999, after a year of mounting pressure, the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee decided to conduct an inquiry into the powers and 
operations of the IRD. The committee had 12 members, including the chief 
critic, Rodney Hide. The committee also included Michael Cullen (within a year 
he would become the new minister of revenue) and was chaired by Peter Dunne 
(a past and future minister of revenue). 
The committee called for submissions from the public. It also required the 
IRD to supply every internal document that outlined policies and processes of 
tax administration.246
The committee was advised by both the solicitor-general and the clerk of 
the House that the secrecy provisions should prevail. Accordingly, the 
committee decided to ask the IRD to respond to correct errors of fact and to 
provide information at a general level without revealing taxpayer specific 
details.
 
These steps had immediate legal and practical consequences. First, it was 
clear the committee would be hearing from individual taxpayers with allegations 
of mistreatment of their tax affairs. It was also obvious that IRD staff members 
might come forward to offer evidence. The issue was not procedural, as the IRD 
had assured the committee and staff members there would be no recrimination 
against any witness for their testimony. The concern was how the department 
would be able to respond on the substance of submissions. The IRD and the 
committee had to consider how the requirements of disclosure to parliament 
would interact with the commissioner of inland revenue’s obligation to maintain 
tax secrecy. 
247
The second consequence of the committee’s request was administrative. 
The IRD set up a small team of about eight people (including two lawyers 
provided by the Crown Law Office) to handle all aspects of the department’s 
response to the inquiry. The first task was to assemble and review all 
departmental documents covered by the committee request. This was complex, 
as it did not just include head office manuals, but also included regional and 
local systems. In just five weeks, the IRD provided 37,000 pages of 
documents.
 
248
                                                 
246 Inland Revenue Department (1999c). IRD files show that this was a result of a request from  
Mr Hide; he tabled a request with 10 questions on 17 March, and the select committee referred 
them to the IRD for answer. The requests covered reports, memoranda, manuals, circulars, 
training courses, procedures, plans and documents.  
247 Finance and Expenditure Committee (1999, p 10).  
248 Finance and Expenditure Committee (1999, p 58). 
 In addition, the select committee report lists 21 submissions from 
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the IRD, totalling hundreds of pages. These departmental submissions included 
a broad initial briefing; 11 responses to requests for information; 6 responses to 
issues raised in specific submissions; and final submissions, including 2 in 
response to draft adverse findings. All submissions involved extensive input 
from senior staff. 
Most of the 37,000 pages of departmental documents were unremarkable 
but a couple caused headlines. The first headline was ‘IRD admits flouting law 
on large debtors’.249
The second headline related to the clip-art scandal. The documents included 
a guideline on tax penalties produced in the Auckland office. Regrettably, the 
cover of the document showed a taxpayer strung on a meathook, presumably in 
an attempt to introduce some levity. In addition, a newsletter sent to all staff 
nationwide included a picture of a taxpayer stabbed through the heart by an IRD 
officer, wielding a spear-like pen. That image was widely reproduced as an 
indication of the joy felt by IRD staff as they imposed tax penalties.
 This arose because the IRD acknowledged it was writing 
off tax debt without seeking the appropriate ministerial authority. The irony that 
this demonstrated flexibility by the department at a time when it was accused of 
excessive rigidity was largely ignored. Instead, the focus of attention was on the 
IRD for breaking the same laws it was penalising taxpayers for breaking. 
250
Some MPs are becoming increasingly intolerant of what they see as 
belligerent and aggressively defensive position that the department  
is taking in seemingly indefensible illustrations of poor performance. 
 
In that context, the public hearings were highly charged. A succession of 
submitters outlined their concerns about their tax assessments, their dealings 
with the IRD, and the distress they felt. 
In the interests of natural justice, the committee provided those submissions 
to the IRD before the public hearings. Staff around the country hurriedly 
assembled background on each case. Initially, the IRD used this material to 
provide the select committee with an account of what had happened. The 
committee, still in the spirit of natural justice, passed those departmental 
comments on to the individuals before their appearance before the committee. 
The outcome was not a measured discussion that sorted out confusion. 
Instead, the IRD’s rebuttals were seen by some submitters as a further 
provocation and sometimes they became the centre of more public complaint 
about the IRD. Committee members tended to side with taxpayers. 
                                                 
249 ‘IRD admits flouting law on large debtors’ (1999, p A2). 
250 See, for example, ‘No excuse for IRD meathook cartoon’ (1999, p A2). 
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An emerging sympathy is present even among the National MPs who 
opposed the enquiry … [They] are now incredulous at some of the 
department’s responses251
Stress rose further as some staff members outlined their concerns. One 
former staff member claimed on television that a colleague had been proud 
about driving taxpayers to suicide.
 
A review of the submissions shows how the IRD reacted. The initial 
lengthy responses to submitters’ concerns were replaced by more cryptic 
departmental submissions as the inquiry continued. Apparently, the view that 
full responses would be helpful was modified in the face of experience. 
252 The number of suicides attributed to IRD 
pressure eventually rose to seven.253
In the end, after the IRD had opportunities to respond to allegations and to 
a draft of adverse findings, the committee issued its report in October 1999, just 
weeks before the election. The report itself was a measured and thoughtful 
paper. Much of it covered issues of tax law, but there were also significant 
findings about various areas of administration. The report acknowledged several 
areas where the IRD was already improving its processes, and it acknowledged 
‘that examples of the department misapplying its powers are relatively rare’.
 During the hearings, management sent out 
at least 17 updates to staff to keep them informed on the inquiry process. These 
updates contained over 90 pages of explanations, in addition to the departmental 
submissions. Several staff meetings were held to explain proceedings. 
In the middle of this furore, the IRD appeared for over 12 hours of 
evidence, largely in public, and largely led by the commissioner, Graham 
Holland. The pressure must have been intense. 
254
While fault was not always one-sided, the department in our view 
sometimes dealt with … taxpayers in a heavy-handed and dictatorial 
fashion. When the department’s officers act towards taxpayers in such 
a way it can only serve to undermine the integrity of the tax system.
 
However, the report also concluded: 
255
                                                 
251 Parliamentary Monitor Select Committee Information and Analysis Service (1999).  
252 Brockett (1999). 
253 Peters (1999a).  
254 Finance and Expenditure Committee (1999, p 13).  
255 Finance and Expenditure Committee (1999, pp 13–14). 
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Consequences of the inquiry 
The case study tells a story of public revelations, taxpayer distress and pressure 
on senior officials, but that was merely what appeared on the surface. Any 
inquiry has an immediate impact on those involved, and some have lasting 
effects, for good or bad. 
One valuable source of information on the effect of the inquiry is the IRD’s 
annual internal management document, the Health Report. The report does not 
make happy reading, concluding: 
The inquiry has … had significant impact on both: 
• taxpayers’ behaviour with regard to overdue debt collection (i.e. 
they are now less likely to pay overdue tax in full) and their 
perceptions of the fairness and integrity of the tax administration 
• staff morale, particularly with regard to the collection of overdue 
tax.256
The report included no quantified data on staff morale, but presumably the 
authors saw no need to substantiate that assertion for an internal audience. It 
seems that IRD management staff took it as read that morale was down. Other 
assertions were supported by evidence, as outlined below. 
Internal impacts, however, are only part of the story; what about long-term 
effects? A complete appraisal of this inquiry would be a major research task, but 
some impacts are apparent from the record. It is helpful to look at several areas 
including departmental leadership, taxpayer perceptions, payment of taxes, 
policies and practices, and politics. 
 
Departmental leadership 
Leading the IRD is never an easy job. Thousands of staff are handling billions 
of dollars, with millions of public interactions every year. The IRD has one of 
the largest computer systems in the country, handling complex transactions of 
great importance to every taxpayer. Even when things are going well, it can be a 
thankless task: tax gatherer is not a popular profession. Public complaints are 
always hard to handle because the law prevents the IRD from disclosing 
taxpayer details, but that does not go well on television. The addition of a public 
inquiry, with public testimony spread over four months, was an extra burden on 
the camel’s back. 
                                                 
256 Inland Revenue Department (1999a, p 6). 
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A few months after the committee produced its report, the commissioner of 
inland revenue, Graham Holland, announced that he did not intend to renew his 
contract when it came due in early 2000. It is not clear whether the process of 
the inquiry had encouraged that decision, but the select committee process must 
have used a lot of his energy. 
The difficulty of leading the IRD in such circumstances was apparent to 
others. Evidence of this comes from comments made by the new minister of 
revenue, Dr Cullen, who was asked in parliament about progress toward the 
appointment of a new commissioner. In response, he gave an unusual public 
insight into the work of the state services commissioner as he expressed concern 
about the time taken, and the need for an acting appointment, saying: 
it clearly would be preferable for a permanent appointment to be made 
but circumstances have made that very difficult; notably, the number 
of people who have been approached and who cited the continued 
personal attacks upon the outgoing commissioner … especially by  
Mr Rodney Hide … as reasons for not wanting to take up the job.257
Taxpayer perceptions 
 
In time, a capable acting commissioner was found, and eventually a very 
good appointee for the permanent job was found in Australia. The ongoing 
uncertainty through the transition must have been unsettling for the senior team 
at the IRD. 
The IRD’s Health Report shows that public perceptions of the department 
deteriorated in 1999. The IRD regularly surveyed public views on whether the 
department administered tax laws fairly; whether it did a good job administering 
tax laws; whether it treated ‘your business’ as an honest taxpayer; and whether 
it did a better job in administering tax laws than it had a few years earlier. Every 
one of these results fell in 1999. In particular, whereas in 1998 51% of 
respondents thought the IRD was performing better than it had a few years 
earlier, that figure fell to 38% in 1999.258
Of those respondents whose impression of the Department had 
changed, what they read, saw or heard in the media and what they had 
 
The IRD went further to check whether this change in perception came 
from personal contact with the IRD or from other influences. It was clear that 
personal experience was not the main factor driving the results for 1999: 
                                                 
257 Question for oral answer’ (Hansard, 2000, p 1,278).  
258 Inland Revenue Department (1999a, p 18). 
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heard from others they trusted had the greatest negative impact on their 
impressions.259
In 1999, 70% of respondents said their perceptions had been influenced by the 
media. and of those 91% had been negatively influenced.
 
260
Clearly, the IRD’s public relations took a pounding. That is not just a feel-
good issue; perceptions seem to influence tax payments. In the same survey, 
taxpayers were asked whether their decision to comply with their tax obligations 
was influenced by their view of the IRD’s fairness towards businesses. In 1999, 
73% said perceptions of fairness were important or very important in their 
decision to comply; that was an increase of 10% on the result for the previous 
year.
 
261
Tax payments 
 
Combining this result with the figures for the previous paragraph suggests 
that in 1999 nearly half of all taxpayers may have been less inclined to comply 
with their tax obligations because of material they saw in the media that year – 
and the inquiry dominated media coverage of IRD. 
Tax flows in New Zealand are largely made up from automatic deductions; such 
payments proceed with proverbial inevitability. But some tax payments permit 
more variability. One area where taxpayers can exert more (temporary) 
influence is the settlement of tax debts. Since this was a major focus of the 
inquiry, it is interesting to see whether there was any fluctuation in debt 
repayments around that time. IRD annual reports contain the data shown in 
Table 1. 
In almost every year, collectable debt rose, but cash collected shows a large 
fluctuation. Part of that fluctuation is attributable to changes in the amount of 
debt the IRD had agreed could be paid by instalments, but the fluctuation in 
1999 is too big to explain on that basis. 
In 1999/2000, cash collected fell nearly 30%; this is the largest fall in the 
table, and came on top of a fall in the previous year. The 2000 annual report said 
the IRD had predicted a fall in that year, but only to a target of $855 million; 
that leaves an unexpected fall of $171 million. 
                                                 
259 Inland Revenue Department (1999a, p 19). 
260 Inland Revenue Department (1999a, p 19). 
261 Inland Revenue Department (1999a, p 24). 
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Table 1: Settlement of tax debts, 1996/97–2004/05 
Year 
Collectable debt 
($m) 
Cash collected 
($m) 
Under instalment 
arrangement ($m) 
1996/97 750 1,186 287 
1997/98 804 1,050 213 
1998/99 802 972 231 
1999/2000 887 684 295 
2000/01 1,108 838 327 
2001/02 1,219 771 359 
2002/03 1,360 1,042 450 
2003/04 1,296 1,099 570 
2004/05 1,553 1,492 639 
Source: Table provided by the Inland Revenue Department in December 2009, 
compiled from annual reports of the Inland Revenue Department, 1996/97–2004/05. 
Among the explanations the IRD identified in its annual report was, 
‘adverse media publicity about Inland Revenue created a difficult environment 
for our debt collection staff’.262
correspondence as a result of the [Finance and Expenditure 
Committee] Inquiry, as taxpayers sought to enter into instalment 
arrangements or apply for penalty remissions – most of the effort 
devoted to this correspondence did not result in debt reduction.
 In addition, the IRD reported that debt 
collection staff were diverted to: 
263
Clearly, the inquiry had an effect on cash collections, but what did that 
cost? The cost was felt through the government’s finances as it paid for more 
government debt than it would otherwise have had. Yields on government debt 
were about 7% during 1999/2000.
 
264
                                                 
262 Inland Revenue Department (2000, p 16).  
263 Inland Revenue Department (2000, p 16). 
264 Calculated by averaging the tender results on the New Zealand Debt Management Office 
website; see New Zealand Debt Management Office (2009). 
 This suggests that if only $100 million of 
the decline in cash payments is attributable to the inquiry and if the delayed debt 
was repaid after only one year, the government’s financial loss attributable to 
the inquiry would be about $7 million. Any other tax losses caused by taxpayers 
reducing their level of voluntary compliance or staff being less productive as a 
result of lowered morale would be on top of that estimate. 
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Changes to policy and practice 
The impact of the inquiry, however, is not just about costs: there were 
significant changes in management practices and tax legislation. The select 
committee made 26 proposals in its report. When the government tabled its 
response in May 2000, it agreed to most of the changes.265
Responding to the [Finance and Expenditure Committee] Inquiry was 
afforded the highest priority by the department’s senior management. 
To date, the department has completed, or is working on 
implementing, all of the FEC recommendations that were agreed to by 
the Government.
 
Straight after the select committee reported, a review of the compliance and 
penalties regime of the tax system was undertaken. In the following months and 
years, there was a series of changes such as reducing the incremental penalty on 
overdue taxes from 2% per month to 1% per month and increasing the grace 
period before use-of-money interest starts to accrue. Further legislation, the 
Taxation (Relief, Refunds and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, was introduced 
in 2001, as a response to the report. 
The IRD followed on from that government endorsement by modifying its 
practices. In the first annual report after the inquiry report, the acting 
commissioner said: 
266
Major changes in the following years included a new taxpayers’ charter, a 
new complaints management process and a new code of conduct. These changes 
were supported by training in the new standards and a system to monitor 
computer use, to detect unauthorised access to data. Management demonstrated 
its commitment to the standards when four staff members were dismissed for 
inappropriate use of taxpayer information.
 
267
                                                 
265 Government (2000).  
266 Inland Revenue Department (2000, p 11). 
267 The points in this paragraph are drawn from the IRD’s annual reports for 2000 and 2001. 
 
These changes all contributed to a steady improvement in the image of the 
IRD. During 2009, it was again in the headlines for tax enforcement matters. It 
was striking, however, that the IRD received widespread plaudits for its (and the 
Crown Law Office’s) success in achieving judgments for substantial sums 
against major banks. Successful tax collection is not always unpopular. 
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Political implications 
Many factors led to the IRD inquiry, but Rodney Hide could reasonably claim 
that his repeated criticism of the department was a major factor; eventually, 
parliament responds to a steady drum-beat of complaint. There is no doubt Mr 
Hide was motivated by the concerns he was hearing from taxpayers, but it is 
also apparent that the iron rule was operating. Tax is at the heart of any 
government; attack on the government is the function of opposition members; 
Mr Hide was then an opposition MP. 
The inquiry happened well before Mr Hide appeared in the living rooms of 
the land, wearing glitter and dropping his dancing partner.268
In other contexts, it is unacceptable to launch a series of accusations, and 
then participate in the inquiry considering those concerns; in parliament it is 
normal. Standing Orders do contain natural justice provisions, but this simply 
prevents participation on an inquiry where the member has alleged criminal 
behaviour.
 It was a major step 
in establishing his reputation as an effective opposition politician. For a first-
term MP it was a big achievement, one that could happen only in parliament. 
269 There was no allegation of criminal behaviour, so he could 
participate in the inquiry. Mr Hide provoked the inquiry, required many 
thousands of pages of documents, examined witnesses and was a party to the 
conclusions. During that time he was active in ensuring the issues remained 
before the public; he even monitored the IRD’s internal communications, 
presumably to ensure the department was telling the truth to its employees.270
Scrutineers and scrutinees 
 
All that effort created a new political reality. Irrespective of whether the 
new government would have made tax administration a priority issue, by 2000 it 
had no option. The level of concern the inquiry revealed could not be ignored. 
It was to be another five years before the vote for the leadership of ACT 
and many things must have played a factor in that vote. His success with the 
IRD inquiry cannot have harmed Mr Hide’s candidacy. 
Parliament’s role in reviewing the government is the activity that most brings 
senior officials and parliamentarians into direct contact. It is also an activity that 
causes much disquiet among officials. They know they should celebrate 
                                                 
268  Rodney Hide appeared in the New Zealand television series Dancing with the Stars in 2006. 
269 Standing Order 228. This begs the question of why parliament would investigate allegations of 
crime; most of us call the police, but parliament controls its own process. 
270 Inland Revenue Department (1999b).  
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democratic accountability, but some cannot understand why it should be so 
uncomfortable. 
The issue arises as people confuse management ideas about accountability 
with political ideas about scrutiny. Many managers aim to avoid blame and 
shame; they want people to own their mistakes, fix them and learn from them. 
But democracy is not a management theory, it is a political contest. The 
opposition does not criticise the government in order to improve it; it criticises 
with the hope of replacing the government. 
It is inevitable that the everyday paradox will trap unwary non-political 
managers. These events are not a sign of failure of systems and processes; they 
occur as a result of democracy working as it should. Of course it is 
uncomfortable for bureaucrats; they have been brought out of their comfort zone 
into a public political fray. There they stand, unarmed, hoping to avoid injury. 
It is hard to think of further steps IRD managers could have taken to reduce 
damage during the IRD inquiry. They cooperated with the inquiry; they 
informed staff of their right to appear; they supported staff who endured 
personal attacks; they assembled vast amounts of information for MPs; they 
kept staff informed as events unfolded; and the boss appeared to take the heat. 
After all that, was the inquiry into IRD a success? Clearly, it was costly, in 
cash, energy and emotions, but it provoked significant improvements in policy 
and practice. Managers may question whether the cost was worth paying; 
democrats would have no such doubt – it was a triumph for democracy. 
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13 
Representation 
Getting out and about 
Much that is tangible and substantive about parliament relates to functions such 
as law-making and inquiries; these functions occur in the parliamentary 
chamber or in select committee rooms. Likewise, the process of making 
government takes place in caucus rooms or in the offices and corridors of 
parliament. Representation is different; it involves individual members of 
parliament (MPs) meeting with their constituents in their electorates and 
advocating on their behalf.271
In the electorate MPs may well have a party meeting that evening and in the 
morning they will often hold an electorate clinic. There they are available to 
hear concerns of constituents. Over the weekend, they may appear at a number 
 It involves travel and communications. It occurs 
in electorate offices, in church halls, at sports grounds and in government 
offices all over the country. 
Representation is a very large part of the job for every MP. Having spent 
three days per week in the chamber of parliament, in select committee rooms, or 
in caucus meetings, reading bills, questioning officials and delivering speeches, 
MPS must then keep in touch with the electorate. Clearly, some of the 
motivation for this is re-election, but the task considered here is not canvassing 
for votes, it is representation (or advocacy). It involves being available and 
responsive, and looking out for the interests of the constituency. Technically, 
things are different for list MPs because they do not have a constituency, but 
every party requires its MPs to cover parts of the country where it has no local 
MPs, so there are similar representational demands on all MPs. 
In practical terms this process of representation launches MPs out towards 
their electorates every weekend, but they do not go for relaxation. On Thursday 
evening as parliament adjourns MPs pour onto the forecourt to get into taxis or 
VIP cars to the airport. They always cut it fine; it is not generally a good time to 
try to catch them for a chat. Officials must often resort to jumping in the car 
with a minister for 10 minutes of discussion as they drive to their plane. 
                                                 
271 Professor Joseph thinks of representation as an abstract process of political legitimation, but here 
we will focus on the more mundane idea of representative as advocate. 
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of school gala days, sports grounds or cultural events. That may not seem too 
onerous; most parents enjoy an hour or two at the annual gala day. But not many 
people subject themselves to another gala every weekend, followed by the local 
football club prize-giving and the national day celebration of an immigrant 
group. MPs regularly attend such functions; ministers and even the prime 
minister squeeze these activities into their regular cycle. 
Most people attend these events for pleasure, but MPs attend for work. 
Most people use the time at these events to relax with friends, but MPs are there 
to be available to everyone. Often they hear friendly words of encouragement 
and support; sometimes they hear angry or even abusive criticism. Frequently, 
they are asked for help with personal matters. On their rounds MPs hear many 
immigration worries, problems of social welfare eligibility, frustration about 
various approvals that may be needed and a host of other issues. In many cases 
they can do little; in some cases they can offer helpful advice drawn from their 
own knowledge and experience; occasionally, they will use their contacts to 
access good advice; and sometimes they will intervene in an issue, perhaps by 
writing to the minister or contacting a district office. Often the MP will 
undertake this role personally, but frequently an assistant employed in the MP’s 
electorate office will do the job. 
An intervention by an MP is the most common way that local departmental 
officials have contact with an MP. Such events are simple, and generally they 
occur without difficulty. There are many who act to represent a frustrated 
citizen, including welfare groups, clergy or lawyers. In theory, an MP has no 
greater standing than anyone else when acting as an advocate; the public service 
does not work for MPs, it serves the minister. The reality is a little different. 
Being an MP, the parliamentarian has privileged access to the minister, and 
an opportunity to request advice from the top. Rather than attract unnecessary 
attention from on-high, most local officials will treat an MP with considerable 
respect, answering calls promptly and tidying issues where that can be done. 
This does not imply any bending of the rules, simply responsiveness. But where 
issues cannot be easily resolved this may lead to more complications. If there is 
an opportunity for an opposition MP to attract attention to a sad or difficult case, 
then the iron rule predicts that the opportunity will be taken. If the difficult case 
involves the exercise of discretion by the official, then the everyday paradox 
suggests the official may suffer as the MP pursues the issue. 
Officials quickly learn that the MP has a unique ability to acquire 
information by asking written questions through parliament, or even elevating 
an issue to an oral question. The process of answering such questions can be 
time-consuming; dealing with an irritated minister’s office that would like the 
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issue to go away is enervating. But, as a means of venting issues that might 
otherwise go unresolved, parliamentary questions are valuable. 
Backbench MPs are not part of the government, but their availability to the 
public provides an informal means of providing constant feedback to the 
government and correction of mistakes. Their weekend work as representatives 
makes this feedback possible. The next issue is: what makes the weekend work 
possible? This turns the focus from the work of MPs to the support they receive. 
Support for MPs 
As MPs go about their work they receive support from the Parliamentary 
Service. This is an agency like a government department, but it is not part of the 
executive. The service is led by a general manager, who is responsible to the 
Speaker. The Parliamentary Service provides all security, information, 
communication, travel, catering and secretarial support for MPs, including 
electorate offices and staff. The Parliamentary Service is expected to provide 
exemplary and flexible support for the various needs of 120 MPs. Not all MPs 
are reasonable or patient with their requirements; it is a hard job. 
Support is provided by a combination of direct provision of services, 
reimbursement of costs, and provision of budgets that MPs can manage. 
Budgets apply particularly to electorate offices; they cover rent of the office, 
pay for staff and other incidental expenses. In some parts of the world, including 
Australia, electorate offices are owned by the government and are provided to 
MPs for their use, but in New Zealand the MP selects the office that suits. 
The choice of offices by MPs has caused difficulties for the Parliamentary 
Service. The issue is not that MPs find sumptuous offices; far from it. On the 
contrary, a combination of a wish to avoid wasting the electorate budget, and an 
aim of projecting personal frugality has led to many very humble offices around 
the country. Some are so humble they could raise health and safety issues for 
those who work there. The problem is that though the MP selects the office and 
the electorate staff, the employer is the Parliamentary Service; any occupational 
safety issues would be the responsibility of the Parliamentary Service, but it has 
no effective means of controlling the working conditions for its staff. 
The Parliamentary Service is well used to handling these kinds of issues out 
of the glare of publicity. But in late 2009 another issue hit the headlines. 
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Case study – electorate offices 
On 10 October 2009, The Dominion Post newspaper used a banner headline to 
report on the rent of electorate offices.272
This was not the first time MPs had used parliamentary funds to rent their 
own property for an office. In 2003, the auditor-general reported on an 
investigation into the use of an out-of-parliament Wellington office by ACT.
 The paper showed the smiling faces of 
six parliamentarians whose electorate offices were rented from themselves. That 
is, the MPs had acquired an office in their own name or in the name of a fund or 
trust and nominated that office as their electorate office. Once they had received 
an independent valuation to prevent overcharging, the Parliamentary Service 
duly paid them rent to occupy their own office. 
Apparently, several long-serving National MPs have organised their affairs 
this way. The Labour party has offices that the party owns and that it rents to the 
Parliamentary Service as electorate offices. It is striking that three first-term 
MPs have already made similar arrangements; they are Amy Adams (National, 
Selwyn), Aaron Gilmour (National, list) and Stuart Nash (Labour, list). 
Apparently, Ms Adams bought her office in November 2008 and Mr Gilmour in 
January 2009; it is not reported when Mr Nash bought his office. 
273
Though The Dominion Post expressed concern in 2009,
 
The office was located in an apartment owned by Richard Prebble, then the 
leader of ACT. At that time, the issues complained of revolved around whether 
ACT had secured extra support, and whether the office had been used; not 
whether it was appropriate for an MP to own an office that was rented to the 
Parliamentary Service. In the event, the auditor-general found no problem with 
the arrangement, noting that the rent had been struck after receipt of an 
independent valuation. 
274 the Speaker saw 
no problem in members putting their allowances towards property in which they 
had a financial interest. He criticised the journalism, ‘To me that’s just dumb. 
It’s so lacking in objectivity’.275 There is real force to the Speaker’s point; this is 
not a new practice, rentals are probably no higher than they otherwise would 
have been,276
                                                 
272 Small and Kay (2009a).  
273 Auditor-General (2003). 
274 ‘Advantages for MP landlords’ (2009, p B4).  
275 Watkins (2009b, p A2, quoting the Speaker). 
276 Apparently, the prime minister charges only a peppercorn rental for the use of the electorate 
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work. It has long been decreed that MPs may not use part of their own home as 
an electorate office, but the use of an MP’s property for an electorate office is 
within the rules. 
But the very fact this practice is within the rules raises concern. A realistic 
change in the scenario will illustrate the point. Suppose the issue is no longer an 
electorate office for a new MP to be based in Napier; instead, consider the case 
of a senior fisheries officer for the Hawke’s Bay district office, required to 
establish a new district office. If that officer were to propose locating the office 
in a building she owned, the conflict of interest would be apparent immediately. 
The department would promptly remove the fisheries officer from any further 
involvement in selecting the office, and would need to direct that the officer 
either be a landlord for the department’s office or an employee managing the 
office; doing both at the same time would be unacceptable. Why is it acceptable 
for an MP to do the same thing? 
Parliamentary expenses 
The funding of electorate offices for New Zealand parliamentarians was only 
one of a very large number of parliamentary expenses issues that arose around 
the world during 2009. In Britain, starting in May, the Daily Telegraph used 
leaked documents to run a series of revelations about use of expenses; the most 
eye-catching involved an MP using allowances to clear a moat, and another who 
used the funds for a duck house. Several others used accommodation assistance 
to purchase or renovate property, both in their constituency and in London. 
Within a couple of months, the Speaker was replaced as his defence of the old 
system became untenable. By the end of the year, an independent committee, 
chaired by a former senior civil servant, was developing rules for the future, and 
there was great tension within party caucuses as MPs faced the loss of the 
assistance they had been using. 
In Ireland, newspapers ran a similar campaign; there a big issue was travel 
costs. Eventually, this led to the resignation of the Speaker in the face of 
revelations about his own expenses. His total bills had averaged around 
NZ$175,000 per year over eight years.277
In New Zealand it is ironic that controversy erupted following an important 
reform initiated by the Speaker and the prime minister. For years it has been 
hard to acquire details on expenses; the Parliamentary Service has been exempt 
from the Official Information Act 1982. On 30 June 2009, the Speaker and the 
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prime minister jointly released full details of expenses for every minister and 
MP and undertook to continue those releases quarterly.278
There was an immediate poring over the details. An opposition MP,  
Chris Carter, was an early target as the records showed he was the highest 
spender other than ministers and the leader of the opposition. The minister of 
finance, Bill English, was the focus as it became apparent that Ministerial 
Services was paying rent to his family trust so he could occupy his own 
home.
 For the first time it is 
now easy for anyone to examine the record to see who has received what.  
All expenses of all MPs are included, irrespective of party or position. 
279
After some outcry, Bill English and Rodney Hide refunded the 
controversial expenses, even though at the time it was not apparent there had 
been a breach of the rules, and both could demonstrate they had sought advice 
before accessing the allowances. The emotional strain of this process was 
visible as both ministers looked defensive before sacrificing tens of thousands 
of dollars. Statements from Rodney Hide illustrate the pressure as his position 
shifted over two weeks. In October he was reported as deploring the rules that 
allowed him to claim the costs of his partner’s travel, but defending his use of 
the allowance to maintain his personal relationship, ‘I don’t think I would 
achieve a good result by being a martyr’.
 And the disclosures for July to October showed that the leader of ACT, 
Rodney Hide, had used his parliamentary allowances to pay for his partner to 
accompany him as he travelled overseas on ministerial business. This last was 
not against the rules, but was contrary to the prime minister’s expressed wish 
that ministers should pay personally for travel costs of partners. 
280 By November he had changed his 
mind, and he spoke of his shame at his ‘casual use’ of taxpayers’ money, ‘That 
was wrong’.281 He returned a total of $21,974.40. Bill English repaid a total of 
$32,000 in two payments as the controversy continued.282
The public commentary regularly returned to accommodation arrangements 
and partner travel; both are matters of great importance to the families of MPs. 
Though MPs may put each other under stress on policy issues, it is generally 
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accepted that they avoid dragging each other’s families into debate. In this case 
it was public comment that put families under pressure. 
The Speaker attempted to defuse things by providing more background for 
journalists. He referred to his concern at the pressure that families were feeling, 
‘anyone’s wife is really, really troubled by the current focus … and it is causing 
a lot of stress’.283
If the newspapers do want to have a view and want to lobby on it, I am 
very happy to issue them with a lobbyist card and relieve them of their 
[press gallery] offices here, and if they want to be lobbyists – fine.
 Later, as he saw ongoing pressure from reporters ‘parroting a 
view’, he started to threaten the media: 
284
Pay and conditions: The whole package 
 
How did things reach this state? The media are reporting righteous 
indignation about the income and support received by MPs while 
parliamentarians feel beleaguered, misunderstood and unappreciated. The issue 
of substance is whether the level and structure of support to MPs is appropriate. 
Parliamentarians have good grounds for being defensive about their conditions. 
The idea that they are paid more than they are worth is common; after all, they 
are paid well above the average. But debate about MPs’ pay is not just afflicted 
by jealousy; there is also the fact that the assessment of the work of any given 
MP is always affected by bias. Many are biased to think favourably of the work 
of politicians from the party they favour, and unfavourably of politicians from 
other parties. This means there is always a pre-existing majority who are biased 
against any given politician, because no politician or party scores above 50% in 
the elections. It is not surprising that many people doubt that most politicians 
earn their pay; everybody voted against most of the people in parliament. 
An assessment of the package of pay and conditions for MPs needs criteria 
that might encourage some objectivity. The parliament website suggests six 
principles for assessing expense allowances: accountability, appropriateness, 
openness, transparency, value for money and cost-effectiveness.285
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 Some of 
these principles seem repetitive and others are so bland as to be meaningless. 
For example, it is hard to disagree with the proposal that support for MPs should 
be ‘appropriate’. 
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An alternative list would include: adequacy, enough but not too much; 
separation, so reward for the job done is distinct from reimbursement for costs 
incurred; certainty, so administration is straightforward, the position of the 
recipient is clear, and an individual’s choices cannot determine the benefit they 
receive; and independence, so those receiving the benefit do not set the rules. 
Every one of these issues can fill chapters in those expensive-looking 
management books that clutter bookshop shelves. This text ventures only brief 
assessments. 
Adequacy of the package 
Despite popular opinion, MPs’ packages (that is salary, superannuation 
subsidies and expenses) are not excessive; they may not even be enough to 
provide an appropriate recognition for the job done. 
Comparing packages is always subjective; techniques such as job-sizing 
provide little precision. In this case, the range of tasks undertaken by MPs 
makes it hard to compare their job with anyone else’s. Parliamentarians all play 
a role, to varying degrees, in all of the functions of parliament. This means they 
must be highly analytical in different ways; they need precise language skills as 
they consider proposed laws; numeracy and financial analysis when considering 
funding issues; and investigative skills as they review the work of the 
government. They must work closely with colleagues and sometimes rivals as 
they form governments, and they must present clearly in all theatres as they take 
their representative role. To do these tasks they must keep up with 
developments and maintain exemplary skills in oral and written communication. 
According to the auditor-general the job may require MPs to act as counsellors, 
experts in government processes, advisers and advocates.286
It is a hard job and an important one. Senior managers’ jobs will often have 
more responsibility for expenditure and employment matters, but their range 
does not generally extend beyond their organisation. The decisions MPs make 
 Ministers must do 
all these things as well as their executive responsibilities. 
These tasks are carried out in public to a degree that is hardly matched 
elsewhere. Every mistake will be magnified by opposing politicians, of whom 
there are more than there are friends. If other politicians do not publicise an 
MP’s failings, there is always the possibility that the media will take an interest; 
often not a friendly interest. 
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affect us all. The government they put in place will control decisions for years; 
the laws they make will endure for decades, sometimes longer. 
Despite all that, and even taking account of personal biases, everyone can 
think of some MPs who they believe are not up to the job. They appear too 
inarticulate, excitable, slow or lazy. But though not all MPs are as good as each 
other there is no one who can appropriately be given a job to assess pay for 
performance. Therefore, they must all receive pay for the job and it will always 
be difficult to arrive at a fair rate. The job of setting that rate falls to the 
Remuneration Authority, which exists to set the pay for MPs, ministers and 
other senior positions in the government system. 
November 2008 was the most recent occasion that the Remuneration 
Authority made an increase for MPs and ministers. The authority set a basic pay 
for a backbench MP of $131,000, plus an expense allowance of $14,800. 
Ministers have a salary of $204,000 plus the same expense allowanceas 
backbench MPs, and the prime minister has a salary of $393,000 plus an 
allowance of $19,700. At that time, the authority acknowledged that it had long 
given up trying to link parliamentary pay to private salaries, and it was even 
having difficulty maintaining a fair link to the salaries received by public sector 
executives and by judges; instead it was linking to inflation, so parliamentary 
pay was falling behind.287
The facts substantiate that assertion. Data collected annually by the State 
Services Commission shows that of the 47,052 people employed in the public 
service on 30 June 2009, 1,165 had a base salary (not including performance 
pay or other one-off payments) over $140,000 in the year to 30 June 2009; that 
is, nearly 1,200 were paid about the same or more than backbench MPs. It is 
safe to assume that almost all the public service officials who appear before 
select committees receive more than the parliamentarians on the committee. On 
the same basis, 202 public servants are paid more than ministers (over 
$210,000) and 7 get more than the prime minister (over $410,000).
 
288
These numbers relate only to the core public service, which, according to 
the State Services Commission’s annual report, pays the most conservative 
salaries in the public sector.
 
289
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 The same State Services Commission report 
shows that in the tertiary education sector, for example, another 700 people have 
total packages (including one-off payments) above the income of backbenchers. 
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On the same basis, the annual report for the New Zealand Police for 2009 shows 
another 90 who have a total package higher than the pay of backbenchers. And 
there are more. The total state sector, including district health boards and state-
owned enterprises employed more than 290,000 people at 30 June 2009;290
Separating reward from reimbursement 
 that 
is over six times as big as the core public service. It is safe to assume that 
several thousand state employees received more than MPs, several hundred got 
more than ministers, and several dozen got more than the prime minister. 
These comparisons cannot be definitive. State sector senior managers 
would generally control significant budgets and manage many staff members; 
MPs do neither of those things. In addition, because of complexities in the way 
some expenses are reimbursed, the Remuneration Authority figures 
underestimate the full benefits MPs received. In addition, the salaries published 
by the authority omit a generous superannuation allowance of up to 20% of a 
backbencher’s pay. This amounts to some $26,000 per year, and MPs need to 
contribute only 40 cents for each dollar of superannuation subsidy they receive. 
But even when these measures are taken into account, the disparity is not large 
enough to overturn the comparisons in the previous paragraphs; MPs are not 
overpaid. 
In 2009, because the Remuneration Authority awarded a zero increase, the 
relative position of MPs has deteriorated further. Though many senior positions 
have not seen a pay increase, some have. For example, the authority awarded a 
1.2% increase for judges. There are good grounds for parliamentarians to feel 
they are targeted unfairly, as their pay is not excessive. On other criteria, 
however, the support for MPs is harder to justify. 
In theory, there is a clear separation between MPs’ salaries, as set by the 
Remuneration Authority, and their reimbursement for the costs of the job. But 
on closer examination some of the expense allowances have the potential to spill 
over into rewards rather than reimbursement. 
This has been a matter of concern for many years. In 2001, the auditor-
general considered more should be done to clarify the allowance component of 
the MPs’ package, to ensure it really was a reimbursement for actual expenses. 
This might seem fiddly and bureaucratic, but in the absence of receipts for 
expenditure (as is a normal requirement for other public sector reimbursement) it 
is not easy to tell whether the allowance is a reimbursement or an income top-up. 
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This issue is compounded by the fact some of the expense entitlements are 
explicitly intended to act as rewards. In particular, the Speaker’s directions that 
outline the rules by which MPs are to be reimbursed for expenditure include 
provision for a subsidy for private international air travel.291 There is no 
suggestion that this should be seen as reimbursement for the cost of the job; it is 
explicit that it should be used for private (non-business) purposes. The 
Speaker’s directions extend over the lifetime of some former MPs, as past low 
salaries are compensated by lifetime access to the travel subsidy (up to an 
annual cap). In terms of its value it may be that this subsidy is a reasonable 
component of the package for MPs. The Speaker has pointed out that MPs’ 
salaries reflect an adjustment that was intended to offset the cost of the 
subsidy.292
Certainty 
 Despite those points, it still fails the test of separation. When 
rewards and reimbursements are blurred, transparency is not achieved. 
The rewards and compensations available to MPs ought to be clear to members 
and the public. Such certainty would make it easier for the public to form its 
view on the fairness of the system and for MPs to plan their lives. In various 
ways the current system fails the certainty test. 
First, no pay system can be certain if the recipients can, by their own 
actions, determine the value of the rewards they will receive. Though there is an 
average offset to MPs salaries for the air travel subsidy, the value received by 
each MP varies according to the amount they travel. That is, the reward is not 
based on contribution or effort but on the amount that the member and their 
partner like to travel. Those who enjoy a regular break in the Northern 
Hemisphere derive more value than those who take their holidays in Taupo. It is 
hard to see any virtue in that. 
Provisions that allow members to be paid rental for use of their own 
properties provide another means by which MPs may adjust their own rewards. 
Accommodation allowances and electorate office support are intended to assist 
members to attend parliament, not to build a property portfolio. Even where 
there are independent valuations, there is potential for decision-making to be 
affected by conflicts of interest. Even if it works out cheaper for the taxpayer, 
the risk of conflict of interest may not prove worthwhile. 
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Second, no reimbursement system is certain if recipients cannot get clear 
guidance as to their entitlements. The recent report of the auditor-general shows 
that Bill English sought advice as to his housing entitlements and that staff at 
Ministerial Services paid his housing subsidy even though they had concerns 
about his financial interest in the house.293
She had done so, not because she thought she had not been entitled to 
the payment, but because, as she put it, she had been deeply wounded 
by the suggestions which had been made publicly to that effect and 
would rather not accept the allowance than be considered a cheat.
 The fact Mr English ended up 
repaying $32,000 demonstrates the impact uncertainty can create. 
This is not the first time that uncertainty of administration has led to 
repayment. In 2001, the auditor-general reported that Marian Hobbs had been 
advised by the Parliamentary Service that she was entitled to an accommodation 
allowance. When this became a matter of controversy, she privately repaid 
$18,540. The auditor-general reported that: 
294
Independence 
 
The good name of MPs is important to them, and to us. When 
administrative uncertainty creates an impression of opportunism nobody is well 
served. That administrative uncertainty comes from the complexity of the rules 
and the separation in the treatment of ministers and other MPs. That complexity 
can trap MPs and officials. 
Clearly, the pay package of MPs does not pass the certainty test. 
Any pay system where the recipient is among those who set the rules is 
inherently open to doubt; how can anyone be sure that the conditions were set 
objectively? This situation is surprisingly common; boards of director face it all 
the time. But a key difference between companies and parliament is that 
discontented shareholders can sell their shares, but citizens have only one 
parliament. 
The Remuneration Authority exists to cope with this problem. It sets the 
salaries and allowances, including superannuation provisions, for all MPs. But 
the rules for expenses are different; the rules applying to members are set by the 
Speaker, and the rules for ministers are set by the prime minister. In both cases 
the person setting the rules is covered by the rules, and is also put into the 
position by the votes of those MPs who benefit from the rules. 
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The pattern of determinations issued by successive Speakers and prime 
ministers demonstrate that they have been scrupulously fair, and have not bent 
the rules to favour themselves or their colleagues. But it remains difficult for 
them to achieve an appearance of independence. This is especially problematic 
when part of the system of rewards (the travel subsidy) is not controlled by the 
Remuneration Authority, but by the Speaker. Similarly, the decision by the 
prime minister in 2009 to allow ministers to use their self-drive cars in 
Wellington is an effective increase in the value of their package, but it was not 
determined by the Remuneration Authority.295
An opaque system 
 
An associated issue is the management of reimbursements. Every accounts 
section in any organisation can face pressures from other staff who interpret the 
rules to claim entitlements. Accounts officers may feel browbeaten as they 
handle the imaginative claims of senior staff. This can be even more significant 
if they are dealing with an MP. Even if the MP is not aggressive, it is hard to 
avoid the fact of a disparity in power; accounts staff know that the MP might 
appeal to the Speaker or the prime minister, and that could create unwelcome 
pressure for management. During the expense debacle in Britain, it became 
apparent that the small parliamentary accounts section had become 
overwhelmed as it coped with pressure from members. This led to the approval 
of unjustified expenses. There is no suggestion that the same has occurred in 
New Zealand, but the risk exists. 
A further problem arising from the lack of independence is the absence of 
anyone to speak up in defence of members’ conditions, other than members 
themselves. The Speaker has explained and defended, and clearly feels the 
issues keenly, but he cannot separate himself from the issue because in the eyes 
of the media and the public he is part of the issue. 
Taken together, the criticisms that the system does not separate pay and 
expenses and is not certain and not independent describe a process that is not 
transparent. It is hard to make comparisons of pay and conditions for MPs 
because the components are complex and disparate. That conflicts with the 
openness that characterises New Zealand’s government systems and cannot be 
justified. How did this come about? 
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On this occasion, the driver is not the iron rule of political conflict. In fact, 
it is the test case that demonstrates (by its absence) that the iron rule is 
beneficial and contributes to good government. 
Parliamentary pay and conditions is one of the few areas where the iron 
rule of political conflict is suspended. The occasional maverick criticises perks, 
but that has not translated into a coherent push for reform. A succession of 
opposition parties have not wanted to take up the issues. This means the searing 
scrutiny that parliamentarians apply to other areas is absent. The democratic 
safeguards the iron rule applies to the rest of the government system are not 
applied to parliament. 
The solution when the iron rule fails is to remove the issue from parliament. 
This has been proposed previously; change would not be difficult. 
Possible reform 
The issues of pay and expenses are not new; they have been canvassed many 
times in the last decade. The auditor-general has made six reports into various 
aspects of funding for members and parties during the current decade. All have 
found some confusion in the rules and have encouraged improvements. Every 
three years the Parliamentary Service Commission commissions a report into 
support services for parliament; these have called for more clarity and rigour 
around expenses for members and parties. 
The most significant report was provided in 1999, by a committee chaired 
by Stan Rodger, a former minister.296 That report proposed a series of changes 
designed to address all the issues outlined above. In particular the report 
proposed placing control of salaries and expenses with the Remuneration 
Authority. The Auditor-General endorsed that approach in his 2001 report on 
parliamentary salaries.297
Legislation giving effect to the reforms was introduced, and referred to the 
Standing Orders Select Committee for consideration. The reform came to a halt 
as the select committee reversed the main reform in the bill, and left control of 
expenses with the Speaker and the prime minister. The committee was 
concerned that any outside authority would be able to constrain the travel of 
MPs; they saw that as problematic because it would involve decision-making by 
an organisation unfamiliar with parliament and inappropriate because outsiders 
should not control the work of members. 
 
                                                 
296 Rodger et al (1999).  
297 Auditor-General (2001b, p 167).  
Representation 
 203 
A non-parliamentary body should not be responsible for determining 
what services should be funded as parliamentary business.298
The use of officials in advocacy roles is not common, but it has been done 
with considerable success. When the Reserve Bank was made independent  
Dr Brash, the first governor under the new system, set out to explain and defend 
his role. If he was to be responsible for decisions made at arm’s length from the 
government, he saw the need to defend the decisions himself. Likewise, if the 
 
The underlying point is that representation is a critical function of 
parliament. That task imposes extraordinary demands on members. Travel up 
and down the country is not fun, it is tiring work. The electorate office and the 
home phone are not perks, they are essential tools. Attending social functions is 
not an optional extra; it is part of the daily grind. 
Given the hostility that regularly attends discussion of parliamentary pay 
and conditions, the committee’s view is understandable. The members are 
correct; they should be supported in their work, not controlled. Parliament is 
different from any other organisation and it must be accorded respect rather than 
suspicion. How can members be sure that any outside authority will understand 
and sympathise with their needs? 
The committee’s view may also be a reflection of the cultural void dividing 
politicians and officials. MPs see the rule-bound behaviour of officials, and 
dread its impact on themselves. They know it is only by maintaining flexibility 
that they can get the job done. 
But keeping control in the hands of parliament has created a system that 
does not stand up to scrutiny. Far from supporting members in their work, the 
current structure is corrosive; ongoing challenge is undermining the credibility 
of parliament. Members deserve better; we all deserve better. But until members 
feel less beleaguered, little change is likely. 
One idea could be added to the proposals that parliament rejected in 2002 
that might make change more successful; this would be a small change in the 
expectations of the chair of the Remuneration Authority. If that organisation 
were to take on a wider responsibility for parliamentary expenses, it would be 
reasonable to expect it to defend its decisions and to defend parliamentarians 
from unfair attack. That has not been the norm in the past, but that is partly 
because the authority could not defend a system that it did not control. A more 
involved authority could be more active to front the issues and absorb some of 
the pressure. 
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Remuneration Authority were to take on a wider role, MPs could reasonably 
expect that the Authority would explain and defend its decisions, and allow 
members to get on with their job as parliamentarians. 
The need for reform is pressing. Parliament is a fine institution, but one of 
its key support systems, the pay and conditions of MPs, is damaging 
parliament’s image. Worse, it may be damaging the integrity of MPs. Using 
benefits that they are entitled to is not corruption, but reorganising their affairs 
to benefit from parliamentary expenses is murky water. It seems that some MPs 
have become so inured to their system of rewards that they actively encourage 
new colleagues to take advantage of the rules. When the Green Party announced 
it was reorganising its housing to stop exploiting parliamentary benefits, the 
party’s co-leader, Metiria Turei, gave an unusual glimpse at how questionable 
activities are encouraged. 
When I first got into Parliament MPs from other parties told me that is 
the first thing I should do – buy a flat in Wellington – because the 
[mortgage] interest would be paid.299
The fall from grace of Phil Heatley, the minister of housing, demonstrates 
another erosion of values. Newspapers report that he had ignored warnings from 
officials as he used his ministerial credit card for private expenses and made at 
least one false declaration in his expense claims.
 
Similar pressures were reported by MPs in Britain as their scandals 
unfolded. The fact the case study reported on three new MPs who have arranged 
things so they might benefit from the rent of an electorate office shows they too 
have learned of the opportunities available for them to exploit. It is unfortunate 
that their first decisions on taking office seem to have reflected personal interest 
rather than the public interest. 
300
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 Did he feel he was beyond 
reproach or that these purchases represented his fair entitlement? Whatever he 
had used to justify his behaviour, his resignation may help to shock his 
colleagues into a realisation that parliament is being undermined by its own 
processes. Reform and the adoption of the proposals put forward by  
Stan Rodger could solve the problem. A fully autonomous process of setting 
pay and expenses should leave MPs financially no worse off but their morality 
would be less open to question. 
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Members of parliament, officials, and the electorate 
Representation is a quintessential political process. Public servants could never 
be comfortable moving among the community, voicing public aspirations, and 
interceding for individuals; politicians do it all the time. Despite that, this is an 
area where public servants play significant roles. 
The first role is that of the staff in local offices of government agencies. 
This is the location for most of the interaction between officials and MPs. Most 
public servants involved are mid-level district office staff. Such interactions 
happen every day all over the country, usually without difficulty. 
The second role is the administration of support services for MPs, including 
the reimbursement of expenses. This is a thankless task, performed by low-level 
administrative staff dealing with issues that are extremely important to MPs. 
Tempers can get frayed. Staff can feel they are in the front line in someone 
else’s quarrel. 
The third role is setting salaries and superannuation, which is done by the 
Remuneration Authority, a group of senior part-time office-holders. The 
Remuneration Authority could be given more authority and more responsibility 
to set, explain and defend a more open system of pay and expenses. In that way, 
some officials could make a major contribution to strengthening parliament. 
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Conclusion to Part Three 
Each of the five activities of parliament has produced its own tale about the 
interactions between officials and parliament. Making government is a process 
remote from officials; legislation involves officials as one group among many 
others; funding largely involves mid-level finance officials; scrutiny brings 
senior officials into direct contact with members of parliament (MPs); and 
representation involves interaction with relatively junior and local office staff. 
But there is one thing in common; officials must know their place: Parliament 
rules; officials serve. 
In all those activities the central point is that nobody, other than 120 
members, has any say in parliament. Officials are not members, so they do not 
count. That may seem arrogant, but most MPs find that coping with the reality 
of the iron rule, combating their opponents while competing with their 
colleagues, leaves little time to consider the needs of officials. When officials 
interact with parliament, it is on parliament’s terms. Parliament’s rule is the iron 
rule, so the official is caught in the everyday paradox. 
Parliamentarians are just as interested in solving the problems of humanity 
as officials are, but they must do it through the political contest. This means a 
reasoned focus on the big issues of the time, maybe involving billions of dollars, 
can be swept aside in a dash to focus on a consultancy contract for a few 
thousand dollars. This may seem frivolous to the official, and it is certainly not 
good management; but the official does not set the agenda, parliament does. 
Despite the apparent fixation with trivia, parliament manages a lot of 
substance. The noise is not always an indication of the real work. The chapters 
reviewing the functions of parliament were not intended to assess parliament’s 
performance, but it is apparent much good work is achieved in parliament. This 
work occurs through the operation of the iron rule. Governments are formed, 
laws are made, funding is provided, scrutiny occurs and people are represented. 
A few activities suggest some divergence from a focus on the public 
interest. If the emergence of log-rolling were to move on to pork-barrel politics, 
that would be a setback. It may be that proportional representation encourages 
some MPs to focus on sectoral interests rather than the common interest, but 
that is not explored here. It is a matter to consider in the run-up to the proposed 
referendum. Similarly, funding processes that encourage members to profit from 
the support they are offered erode public confidence in parliamentarians. 
It is ironic that the public concern about parliamentary expenses is partly a 
learnt response to parliament’s behaviour. Everyone can see that MPs would be 
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highly critical if other parts of the government system handled expenses in the 
way that parliament does. The argument that parliament is different and that 
different rules should apply is not persuasive and it undermines parliament. The 
aim is not to get parliament to adopt bureaucrats’ rules; it is to persuade 
parliament to apply its own standards to itself. If parliament would fix that, it 
would help to improve its credibility in discharging its other roles. 
But it is not for officials to promote reform of parliament; it is not their 
place. Officials have large responsibilities, but they are always subordinate to 
parliament. That is proper; only MPs have a democratic mandate. Parliament is 
the source of the moral authority behind any action of the executive. 
Technocrats may believe they serve the interests of the people, but only MPs 
accept the discipline of checking whether the people agree. 
Parliament deserves respect because it carries a huge responsibility; MPs 
earn that respect by working for the public interest. 
 Part Four 
Conclusion 
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14 
Conclusion: Their parliament, and ours too 
The previous chapters have told a story of constitutional principles, political 
contest and cultural confusion. History has carved the shape of parliament and 
the state services. As a result New Zealand has a government system to be 
proud of; in at least one respect it rates best in the world. In 2009, New Zealand 
scored the best of every nation in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index.301
At the same time as the constitution has developed its separate institutions, 
it has moulded the participants into different tribes with foreign cultures. Some 
might claim they seem like different species from different planets. For those 
who find it helpful to think of men as originating from Mars and women from 
Venus, the idea that parliamentarians are from Jupiter and public servants from 
Neptune may be easy to understand.
 The institutions of government must be doing something 
right. But, oddly, they sometimes seem to do their best work despite each other. 
There is only one government, and all its component parts are broadly 
engaged on the same endeavour, to make the country a better place. Why is it so 
hard for the different branches of government to work together? In part, the 
answer is that they are not supposed to work together; the whole idea of 
separation of powers means the different branches of government work 
separately. History saw many lives lost as that principle was established. 
302
                                                 
301 Transparency International (2009). 
302 For others, do not panic, it is only a metaphor. For the avoidance of doubt, please note that no 
New Zealand MP or official was born on or descends from any living thing from, or has ever 
been abducted and taken to, Jupiter or Neptune or any other extra-terrestrial location; nor are our 
lives and polity significantly influenced by the movement of planets. It seems that the only 
legislator in world history who may be said to come from (and whose life was therefore 
influenced by) space is United States senator and astronaut John Glenn. But, as with law and 
physics, this book makes no claim to be an authoritative text on cosmology. Others, such as 
conspiracy theorists and astrologers, may dispute the claims in this note. 
 
Jupiter was the king of the gods; he looked to nobody for authority. He 
strode around confidently expecting respect and obedience. Neptune was also 
important; he was god of the sea. But if your workplace is the sea, you do not 
stride, you wade, or even swim out of sight, in the depths. Such is the difference 
between parliamentarians and officials. 
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But the parallels are not just mythical; consider the planets. Humanity has 
observed Jupiter since prehistoric time as one of the seven stars in the heavens. 
That is because Jupiter, though very distant, is the largest planet in the solar 
system. That means it exerts the strongest gravitational pull, and it has a host of 
at least 16 satellites. It is also the planet that generates the greatest heat from its 
massive core – more heat than it receives from the sun. It has huge storms; the 
Great Red Spot, for example, has raged for at least 300 years. This massive 
planet spins at a frantic speed, revolving once every 10 hours and it swings 
around the sun in a majestic elliptical orbit, once every 12 years.303
As they do their work parliamentarians are right to be precious about their 
privileges. Democracy cannot be served if parliament is subject to external 
direction. MPs do a unique and important job; they deserve our respect and our 
understanding. But the job they do is ours because they are elected as our 
 
Neptune is a lesser thing. It is smaller and orbits far further away from the 
sun; it is a much colder, less passionate place. On the other hand it is more 
stately and takes a dignified 165 years in its orbit. Generations of public 
servants can come and go before everything turns over. It revolves at a modest 
speed; faster than once a day, but slower than Jupiter. But though it is smaller, 
Neptune is not without influence on other planets, including Jupiter; that is how 
it was discovered. Neptune was found in the 19th century as astronomers 
detected anomalies in the orbit of other planets that could be explained only by a 
previously unknown influence – not unlike the establishment of the non-
political civil service at around the same time. Ever since then the public service 
has exerted its modest influence. 
Judges presumably orbit the sun on some other planet; something weighty 
but not too showy. And various other players could be located in a constitutional 
solar system. Officers of parliament including the auditor-general and the 
ombudsmen may be moons of Jupiter. Wherever various players are located, the 
point is that their different roles place them each on their own orbit. 
Of course, members of parliament (MPs) and public servants do not 
understand each other. Their different career paths have largely sealed them off 
from each other; like space travellers locked in different spaceships. Both may 
work on the same endeavour, but they have different jobs and different 
experiences. But though there are differences, both represent important values. 
The public service works to managerial values; aiming for efficiency, propriety 
and good employment. Parliament represents the values of democracy. 
                                                 
303 MPs are not so lucky, they must ‘return to go’ every three years. 
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representatives. It is their parliament, and it is our parliament too. 
New Zealanders expect parliament to evolve and respond to the expectations of 
a changing society. We expect parliament to observe ever-higher ethical 
standards. So far parliament has generally met that expectation. 
Sometimes the operations of parliament can compromise the public 
service’s managerial values; democracy can be inefficient, and even brutal to its 
participants or naïve bystanders. But the weaknesses of parliament pale beside 
its strengths. It is a vigorous place for the contest of ideas. Democracy has its 
problems, but rule by the bureaucracy would be much worse. 
But it is not the system that matters. It is the people. This book attempts to 
explain why MPs and officials tend to behave in the ways they do. The lesson 
for both groups is that it is useful to understand the pressures faced by others. 
Both groups have an important role to play, and both can improve their own 
effectiveness by understanding and supporting the role of the other group. 
Sensible people can make the constitution work well. 
The last word falls to William Gladstone. As chancellor of the Exchequer 
in 1853 he commissioned the Northcote–Trevelyan report into the civil service, 
and in his first premiership he presided over the development of the non-
political civil service in Britain.304 By those means he did more than anyone else 
to bring integrity to the relationship between parliament and professional public 
servants. But despite that, it was not the rules that mattered to him, it was 
people. He said that the constitution depends ‘on the good sense and good faith 
of those who work it’.305
                                                 
304 Jenkins (2002, pp 164–167).  
 
305 Quoted by Lord Carswell in R (Jackson) v Attorney-General (Foxhunting Case) [2005] 3 WLR 
733, 788. 
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Afterword 
A Summary 
 
 
In court, from the bench, they’re judicious 
Departments are sometimes officious 
But in Parliament House 
Even when they carouse 
They are dreadfully disputatious 
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